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ABSTRACT
The conflict between protected area and local people is a major challenge for conserva-
tion in developing countries. The conventional top-down approach has failed mainly
due to the exclusion of local people in conservation. A new management approach
that promotes local participation and reduces conflicts is necessary to achieve both con-
servation and development objectives. Using the case of Natma Taung National Park
(NTNP) in Myanmar, this study investigates the relationship between the protected
area and local indigenous people living in and around the park. The social-ecological
coevolution model is applied to explore the inter-linkages between the protected area
and local people. The empirical analyses focus on three main thematic areas: local land
tenure system, livelihood dependency on forest resources, and traditional ecological
knowledge (TEK) of local people. The comparative study design is used to analyse
similarities and differences among the three indigenous communities living inside,
bordering, and outside the national park. Based on this information, four management
scenarios are developed and evaluated by using multi-criteria decision analysis.
Results indicate that local people mainly follow the traditional land tenure system
rather than formal government regulations. However, local compliance with the
traditional land tenure system are declining, particularly among the households
located inside and at the borders of the park. Major drivers for this decline include
top-down regulations by the national park, improved road access, and increased
market demand for permanent cash crops. Regarding local livelihoods, the majority of
households greatly rely on forest products for their sustenance. Despite restrictions
from the national park, households inside and bordering the park have more forest
income than those located outside the park. Thus, the contribution of forest income to
poverty reduction is higher among households inside the park than those bordering
and outside the park. However, the effect of forest income on reducing inequality
is higher among households outside the park than those inside and bordering the
park. Regarding traditional ecological knowledge (TEK), local people use different
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types of ecological knowledge and management practices that are important for
conservation and sustainable use of natural resources. Local TEK can be grouped
into four different categories: resource-use practices, rules and regulations, customs
and rituals, and taboos and totem. Although the awareness of these practices is still
high, local compliance has declined within the last decade. The compliance rate is
lower in TEK associated with normative belief systems than the TEK adopted based
on instrumental perspectives. This particular trend is mainly influenced by changes in
local religious beliefs, the introduction of alternative livelihood opportunities, and the
degradation of environmental resources.
Results from the three case studies support to evaluate the four management scenar-
ios with different levels of local participation. Multi-criteria decision analysis indicates
that collaboration with local stakeholders under the co-management scenario received
the highest ranking scores to achieve effective conservation, sustainable livelihoods, and
social justice. To improve the current management system of NTNP, the study recom-
mends five key management strategies: (i) formalising customary tenure institutions to
increase legitimacy of conservation regulations, (ii) developing target-specific rules to
sustain local livelihoods and reduce people-park conflicts, (iii) incorporating traditional
ecological knowledge and management practices to enhance local participation in con-
servation and reduce management costs, (iv) integrating adaptive monitoring and
feedback mechanisms to improve resilience and adaptive capacity against unforeseen
social-ecological changes, and (v) promoting integrated planning and management at
regional level to improve collaboration among government organisations.
Regarding theoretical aspects, the thesis highlights that effective conservation will
not be achieved unless management institutions are in line with the social system and
the natural environment. To develop effective management strategies, it is important to
understand not only the ecological conditions of the protected area but also the socio-
cultural context of local people. The thesis also emphasises that social characteristics
such as local institutions, knowledge, and belief systems play important roles in
maintaining the resilience of the target social-ecological system. Such characteristics are
not static, but changing over time in response to the dynamic changes in government
regulations, market conditions and local cultural belief. Understanding the pattern
of transformation within the social-ecological system is essential to achieve long-term
conservation goals and minimise social conflicts in the future.
Keywords: social-ecological system; land tenure; forest dependency; traditional knowl-
edge; adaptive co-management; protected area; Myanmar
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Der Konflikt zwischen Schutzgebieten und Einheimischen ist eine große Herausfor-
derung für den Naturschutz in Entwicklungsländern. Der konventionelle Top-Down-
Ansatz ist vor allem aufgrund des Ausschlusses der lokalen Bevölkerung in den
Naturschutz gescheitert. Ein neuer Managementansatz, der die lokale Beteiligung
fördert und Konflikte reduziert, ist erforderlich, um sowohl Erhaltungsziele als auch
Entwicklungsziele zu erreichen. Diese Studie untersucht die Beziehung zwischen dem
Schutzgebiet „Natma Taung Nationalpark“ (NTNP) und den einheimischen Urein-
wohnern, die in und um den Park leben. Das sozial-ökologische Koevolutionsmodell
wird angewendet, um die Wechselbeziehungen zwischen dem Schutzgebiet und der
lokalen Bevölkerung zu untersuchen. Die empirischen Analysen konzentrieren sich
auf drei Hauptthemenbereiche: Das lokale Landnutzungssystem, die Abhängigkeit
des Lebensunterhalts von Waldressourcen und das traditionelle ökologische Wissen
(TEK) der lokalen Bevölkerung. Ein vergleichendes Studiendesign wird verwendet, um
Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschiede zwischen den drei indigenen Gemeinschaften zu
analysieren, die innerhalb, an und außerhalb des Nationalparks leben. Basierend auf
diesen Informationen werden vier Managementszenarien entwickelt und mithilfe einer
multikriteriellen Entscheidungsanalyse bewertet.
Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die Bevölkerung vorwiegend dem traditionellen Land-
besitzsystem statt den formellen staatlichen Vorschriften folgt. Die lokale Einhaltung
des traditionellen Landbesitzsystems ist zurückgegangen, insbesondere bei den Haus-
halten innerhalb und an den Grenzen des Parks. Zu den Haupttreibern für diesen
Rückgang zählen Top-down-Vorschriften des Nationalparks, eine verbesserte Stra-
ßenanbindung und eine erhöhte Nachfrage nach dauerhaftem Erntegeld. In Bezug
auf den Lebensunterhalt vor Ort ist die Mehrheit der Haushalte in hohem Maße auf
Waldprodukte angewiesen. Trotz Einschränkungen durch den Nationalpark haben
Haushalte innerhalb und außerhalb des Parks ein höheres Einkommen aus dem Wald
als Haushalte außerhalb des Parks. Der Beitrag des Einkommens aus dem Wald zur
iv Zusammenfassung
Armutsbekämpfung ist bei Haushalten innerhalb des Parks höher als bei Haushal-
ten außerhalb und an der Grenze des Parks. Die Auswirkung des Einkommens aus
dem Wald auf die Verringerung der Ungleichheit ist jedoch bei Haushalten außerhalb
des Parks höher als bei Haushalten innerhalb und an der Grenze des Parks. Um die
nachhaltige Bereitstellung von Waldeinkommen und die damit verbundenen Ökosys-
temleistungen zu erreichen, wenden die Menschen vor Ort unterschiedliche Kenntnisse
und Managementpraktiken an, die in vier verschiedene Kategorien unterteilt werden
können: Praktiken der Ressourcennutzung, Regeln und Vorschriften, Bräuche und
Rituale sowie Tabus und Totems. Obwohl das Bewusstsein für diese Praktiken immer
noch ausgeprägt ist, ist die Einhaltung lokaler Vorschriften in den letzten zehn Jahren
zurückgegangen. Die Befolgungsrate ist bei TEK, welches mit normativen Glaubenssys-
temen assoziiert ist, niedriger als bei TEK, welches auf instrumentellen Perspektiven
basiert. Dieser besondere Trend wird hauptsächlich durch Veränderungen der lokalen
religiösen Überzeugungen, die Einführung alternativer Existenzgrundlagen und die
Verschlechterung der Umweltressourcen beeinflusst.
Die Ergebnisse der drei Fallstudien unterstützen die Bewertung der vier Manage-
mentszenarien mit unterschiedlicher lokaler Beteiligung. Multikriterielle Entschei-
dungsanalysen zeigen, dass die Zusammenarbeit mit lokalen Stakeholdern im Rahmen
des Co-Management-Szenarios die höchsten Bewertungen erhielt, um einen wirksamen
Schutz, eine nachhaltige Lebensgrundlagen sowie soziale Gerechtigkeit zu erreichen.
Um das derzeitige Managementsystem von NTNP zu verbessern, werden in der Stu-
die fünf zentrale Managementstrategien empfohlen: (i) Formalisierung der üblichen
Amtszeitinstitutionen, um die Legitimität der Erhaltungsbestimmungen zu erhöhen,
(ii) Entwicklung zielspezifischer Regeln zur Aufrechterhaltung der Lebensgrundlagen
vor Ort und zur Verringerung von Konflikten zwischen Menschen und Parks. (iii)
Einbeziehung traditioneller ökologischer Kenntnisse und Managementpraktiken, um
die lokale Beteiligung am Naturschutz zu verbessern und die Managementkosten
zu senken, (iv) Integration adaptiver Überwachungs- und Rückmeldungsmechanis-
men, um die Widerstandsfähigkeit und Anpassungsfähigkeit gegen unvorhergesehene
sozial-ökologische Veränderungen zu verbessern, und (v) Förderung einer integrierten
Planung und Management auf regionaler Ebene, um die Zusammenarbeit zwischen
Regierungsorganisationen zu verbessern.
In Bezug auf theoretische Aspekte hebt die Arbeit hervor, dass eine effektive Er-
haltung nur erreicht werden kann, wenn die Management-Institutionen mit dem
Sozialsystem und der natürlichen Umwelt in Einklang stehen. Um effektive Manage-
mentstrategien zu entwickeln ist es wichtig, nicht nur die ökologischen Bedingungen
des Schutzgebiets zu verstehen, sondern auch den sozio-kulturellen Kontext der lo-
kalen Bevölkerung. Die Dissertation betont auch, dass soziale Merkmale wie lokale
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Institutionen, Wissen und Glaubenssysteme eine wichtige Rolle bei der Aufrechterhal-
tung der Widerstandsfähigkeit des sozial-ökologischen Zielsystems spielen. Solche
Eigenschaften sind nicht statisch, sondern ändern sich im Laufe der Zeit als Reakti-
on auf sich ändernde formale Regelungen, Marktbedingungen und lokale kulturelle
Überzeugungen. Das Verständnis der Transformationsmuster innerhalb des sozial-
ökologischen Systems ist unerlässlich, um langfristige Erhaltungsziele zu erreichen
und soziale Konflikte in Zukunft zu minimieren.
Schlüsselworte: social-ecological system; land tenure; forest dependency; traditional
knowledge; adaptive co-management; protected area; Myanmar
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background of the Research
Protected area is one of the important tools to conserve biodiversity and ecosystem
services (Dudley and Stolton, 2010). Empirical evidence has shown that protected
areas contribute significant reduction in deforestation, habitat destruction, and loss of
wildlife species compared to other land management options (Bruner, 2001; Nagendra,
2008). Due to the increasing awareness of conservation, the global coverage of protected
areas has increased up to 15.4% of the total land area in 2014 (Juffe-Bignoli et al., 2014).
The global community has also committed to increasing protected areas up to 17%
of total land area and 10% of the coastal and marine area by the year 2020 (CBD,
2011). However, creating protected areas not only provides ecological benefits but
also incurs social costs (Ferraro, 2002). Major impacts of protected areas include
involuntary displacement of local people, limiting access to natural resources, and
altering traditional livelihoods and associated cultural practices (Coad et al., 2008).
Consequently, the conflicts between protected areas and local people have increased
resulting in limited political and social support for conservation practices (Watson
et al., 2014).
Being a signatory country to Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), Myanmar
has committed to establish protected areas up to 10% of the country’s area by 2020
(Forest Department, 2015). As of 2018, Myanmar has established 42 protected areas
covering about 5.81% of the country’s total area. Due to political and economic
constraints, about half of the protected areas are regarded as ‘paper parks’ without
effective management system in place (M. Aung, 2007). Moreover, most protected
areas in Myanmar are located in rural areas where local people greatly depend on
forest resources for their livelihoods (Rao et al., 2011). Since protected areas restrict
local use of forest resources, there is an increasing conflict between park authorities
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and local people (Allendorf et al., 2006). This has further reduced the legitimacy of
existing protected areas resulting in habitat degradation, resource extinction, and social
conflicts (Rao et al., 2013).
To achieve effective conservation, Myanmar has transformed its protected area
management strategies from strict protection approach towards more participative
approaches. For instance, the National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan (NBSAP)
was updated by including a set of action plans to promote local participation in con-
servation. This includes the implementation of co-management activities in protected
areas, recognising the Indigenous and Community Conserved Areas (ICCAs), and
designating buffer zones to support local livelihoods (Forest Department, 2015). The
Protection of Wildlife and Protected Areas Law (POWPA) was also revised to support
community engagement in protected area management. Although the government
has initiated to promote local participation in conservation, there is still no proper
guideline or management model in Myanmar to implement community-based conser-
vation approaches. To complement this knowledge gap, this study takes Natma Taung
National Park (NTNP) as a case study in order to propose management strategies that
promote community participation in conservation and reduce people-park conflicts.
1.2 Justification
Community-based conservation is an emerging approach not only to achieve conser-
vation objectives but also to reduce social conflicts (Berkes, 2004). Community-based
conservation is an evolutionary process so that it should not be imposed directly by the
state (Brechin et al., 2002). Instead, it should be fostered by creating favourable policies
that recognise local institutions, resource needs, and cultural practices (Armitage et al.,
2009). Previous studies have suggested that community-based approaches will be
sustainable only if the conservation objectives are in compliance with the needs and
interests of local people (Agrawal and Gibson, 1999), the management practices are
embedded within the local institutional context (Barrett et al., 2001), and the effec-
tive trade-off mechanisms among multiple interest groups are in place (Adams and
Hutton, 2007). Designing management strategies to meet these conditions requires
understanding the holistic relationship between local people and natural resources
(Berkes et al., 1998). Following this theoretical concept, this study aims to explore
the relationship between protected area and local communities in order to propose
management strategies that promote conservation and reduce social conflicts.
Natma Taung National Park (NTNP) is one of the most important protected areas
in Myanmar due to the presence of unique ecosystems and cultural values. In 2014,
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the park was included in the tentative list to nominate as a UNESCO Natural World
Heritage Site (UNESCO, 2014). However, the nomination process was delayed due to
the existing conflicts between the park and local people (Meyers, 2014). Particularly,
the involuntary acquisitions of customary lands have created social conflicts between
the national park and local people. The conflicts have become more common in recent
years resulting in ecological degradation and unsustainable use of natural resources
(Meyers, 2014). Therefore, it has become one of the government priorities to promote
conservation and resolve the existing people-park conflicts in order to initiate the
nomination processes (Forest Department, 2015).
Geographically, NTNP is situated in Chin State where the indigenous Chin people
are living with their own unique traditions. Previous studies have shown that people
living in Chin State have strong customary land tenure systems that have been handed
down over several generations (Andersen, 2015). However, there is no scientific study
that analyses how the national park has influenced the customary land tenure system
and social institutions among the Chin people. This information is essential to design
management strategies that reduce future land-use conflicts between the national park
and local indigenous people. Since most protected areas in Myanmar are located in
areas managed by indigenous people (Istituto Oikos and BANCA, 2011), results from
this research can be replicated in other protected areas with similar land-use conflicts
with local people.
Previous studies have indicated that rural people in Chin State mainly rely on shifting
cultivation and forest resources for their livelihoods (P. S. Aung et al., 2015; Chan and
Takeda, 2016). However, it is still unexplored how the national park regulations have
influenced the livelihoods of local people. To facilitate trade-off between conservation
and rural development, it is important to explore the relationship between different
livelihood systems and local dependency on forest resources. This information is
essential to promote the important role of forest conservation and to ensure the
sustainable provision of ecosystem services (McElwee, 2010). The results can be used
in revising the existing conservation regulations in other to minimise livelihood impact
of protected areas and to reduce people-park conflicts.
As the Chin people are living closely related to forests, they possess diverse arrays of
knowledge and practices regarding conservation and management of forest resources
(Sakhong, 2003). Such knowledge is essential to enhance community engagement in
conservation and reduce management costs (Ruiz-Mallén and Corbera, 2013). There-
fore, it is important to explore different types of knowledge and practices that local
people applies in managing important natural resources. It is also important to explore
whether such knowledge and practices are still accepted by local people or not. This
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information is crucial in developing management strategies that are adapted to local
situations.
Despite having complex social and environmental issues, NTNP is officially recog-
nised as an ASEAN Heritage Park (AHP). Therefore, the park is important not only
for Myanmar but also for other ASEAN countries. As most ASEAN countries have
similar ecosystems and cultural practices, selecting NTNP as a case study will provide
an opportunity to replicate the analytical approaches in other protected areas across
ASEAN region. Since NTNP is part of the AHP program, results from this study can
further be applied in other AHPs with similar ecological context and social conflicts.
1.3 Research Objectives
The overall objective of this research is to analyse the social-ecological relationship be-
tween protected area and local communities in order to develop management strategies
that promote conservation and reduce social conflicts. Based on theoretical justifications
and local research gaps, this study formulates four main specific objectives:
1. To analyse how local land tenure systems influence access to and control of
ecosystem services.
2. To examine how local livelihood systems influence household dependency on
forest products.
3. To explore how traditional knowledge systems influence local use and manage-
ment of natural resources.
4. To propose adaptive management strategies that promote effective conservation
and reduce social conflicts.
1.4 Scope of the Research
This research applies the case study approach and adopts the Natma Taung National
Park (NTNP) in Myanmar as a case study. The overall focus of this research is the
NTNP and indigenous Chin ethnic communities living around the national park. The
social-ecological coevolution model is applied as a theoretical foundation to analyse the
relationship between the protected area and local people. Based on existing theoretical
concepts (e.g. Berkes et al., 1998) and local research gaps, this research explores the
three thematic topics that are important for understanding the relationship between
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social system and natural environment: (i) land tenure system; (ii) local livelihood
systems; and (iii) traditional ecological knowledge of local people. The empirical
analyses focus on three village tracts located inside, bordering, and outside the park
in order to highlight how conservation regulations influence on each thematic topic.
Data analyses are conducted at three main levels. The first level includes an in-depth
analysis of each case-study to explore social-ecological relationships in each particular
context. The second level focuses on comparative analysis across the three cases in
order to provide similarities and differences among different social-ecological context.
The third level synthesises at the national park level to provide policy implications for
protected management in Myanmar.
1.5 Structure of the Dissertation
This dissertation consists of eight chapters. The first three chapters describe research
background including objectives, theoretical framework, and methods for data col-
lection and analyses. The other five chapters present empirical results including
interpretation, discussions, and critical reflections. A brief outline of each chapter is
presented as follows:
Chapter one introduces research problems and justification and presents the main
objectives, the scope of the research, and the structure of the dissertation.
Chapter two discusses the social-ecological system approach in protected area man-
agement with theoretical explanations regarding land tenure and property right insti-
tutions, the role of ecosystem services in local livelihoods, and traditional ecological
knowledge and management practices. This chapter also discusses the overview of pro-
tected area management in Myanmar including the history of conservation initiatives,
policy and legal framework, and current management practices.
Chapter three explains the research approach and methodology applied in the thesis.
It first introduces the conceptual framework for this study with detailed explanations
of its components. Later it explains the research design including justifications for case
study selections. Finally, it discusses the methods for data collection and analytical
processes to ensure the reliability and validity of the research outcomes.
Chapter four describes the study area based on document reviews and oral history
analyses. This chapter is organised with two main sections. The first section focuses on
the ecological settings of the Natma Taung National Park with detailed discussions on
the park establishment processes, status and trends of crucial ecosystem services, and
challenges in implementing park management activities. The second section focuses
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on the socio-cultural settings of Chin ethnic people focusing on dynamic changes in
political history, socio-economic conditions, and cultural practices.
Chapter five presents the empirical results from the three embedded case studies with
detailed analyses of land tenure institutions, livelihood strategies and forest income, as
well as the traditional ecological knowledge and management practices.
Chapter six discusses the similarities and differences between the three case studies
with particular focus on local compliance with land tenure institutions, livelihood
dependency on forest income, and the potential application of traditional ecological
knowledge in protected area management.
Chapter seven presents the synthesis of case study results and management implica-
tions for Natma Taung National Park. It discusses the four management scenarios in
accordance with the three sustainable criteria: biodiversity conservation, livelihood
improvement, and social justice.
Chapter eight concludes the dissertation with a proposed management framework
for NTNP. This chapter also discusses the theoretical contributions, the strength
and limitations of the applied methods, and the outlooks for future protected area
management in Myanmar.
CHAPTER 2
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
2.1 Social-Ecological System Approach in Protected Areas
Protected area, as defined by International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN),
is ‘a clearly defined geographical space, recognised, dedicated and managed, through
legal or other effective means, to achieve the long-term conservation of nature with
associated ecosystem services and cultural values’ (Dudley, 2008, p. 8). This definition
highlights that protected areas aim not only to protect nature and biodiversity but
also to ensure the sustainable provision of ecosystem services to improve human
well-being. It allows policymakers to look beyond the natural system and integrate
social considerations in protected area management (Palomo et al., 2014). In addition
to nature protection, several efforts have made in the past to integrate conservation
objectives into the development agenda in order to meet sustainable development goals
(Alpert, 1996; Wells and McShane, 2004). To achieve these dual objectives, conservation
practices have been shifted beyond protectionist paradigm toward more people-centred
approaches (Bajracharya and Dahal, 2008). However, practical evidence has shown
several challenges in implementing people-centred approaches (Andrade and Rhodes,
2012; Bauch et al., 2014).
According to K. Brown (2003), there are three major challenges encountered in
implementing people-centred approaches. The first challenge concerns identifying
different values, knowledge, and interests of diverse stakeholders regarding particular
resources. As values and knowledge are evolving and adapting to external changes
(Berkes et al., 1998), a pluralist approach is necessary to understand the dynamics of
knowledge and values over time. The second challenge is how to integrate diverse
stakeholders’ interests into conservation planning and implementation in a fair and
justice way (K. Brown, 2003). This challenge has called for a greater deliberation and
inclusion of local people in decision-making rather than simple passive participation.
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The third challenge is how to create new institutional settings that are flexible and
adaptable to manage complex environmental issues and accommodate diverse interests
and values assigned to each resource. K. Brown (2003) concludes that neither state nor
local institutions alone are sufficient to deal with complex environmental issues so that
integrating both institutions is necessary to achieve effective conservation outcomes.
To overcome challenges in people-centred approaches, research on national resource
management has focused more on social system analysis rather than the ecological
science (Berkes et al., 1998; Ostrom, 2009). Conventional thinking of people as threats
or stressors to the ecological system has changed and people are considered as an
integrated part of the natural environment (Folke, 2006). Based on this assumption, a
new conceptual model, namely Social-Ecological System (SES) approach, has evolved
in natural resource management. The SES approach has emerged based on the
assumption that both ecological and social systems are linked to each other so that
harmonizing the two systems is necessary to achieve the desired outcomes (Norgaard,
1994; Berkes et al., 1998). This approach has been widely used in recent literature to
analyse complex environmental issues. These include studies on sustainability science
(Graaf et al., 1996; Kates, 2001); natural resource management (Anderies et al., 2004;
Rammel et al., 2007); collective action (Ostrom, 2009); and protected area management
(Palomo et al., 2014; Cumming et al., 2015).
The SES approach is rooted in two main theoretical perspectives. The first perspec-
tive is related to the theory of coevolution1 between the social system and natural
environment (Norgaard, 1994; Berkes et al., 1998). According to Norgaard (1994), the
term "coevolution" implies that people try to adapt to the environmental changes by
altering their knowledge, forms of social organisations, and technologies. At the same
time, how people know, organise, and use technologies alter the characteristics of the
evolving environment (Figure 2.1). Norgaard (1994) explains that the success of a
society depends on its social system that sustains social organisations and rationalises
individual actions in using environmental resources. Therefore, changes in characteris-
tics of the social system—such as knowledge, value, or belief system—will influence
how people apply selective pressures on particular resources in the environment.
Consequently, resources that fit with the social system will be sustainable and the less
fit ones will eventually extinct. Also, knowledge and value systems that fit with the
natural system will continue to survive, and the rests will disappear. Norgaard (1994)
argues that the coevolutionary development will not be achieved unless the reciprocal
1The term “coevolution” was initially used in ecological science referring to the mutual relationships
between butterflies and their food plants (Ehrlich and Raven, 1964). Later, it was adopted in social
science to describe the reciprocal interactions between the social system and natural environment
(Kallis and Norgaard, 2010).
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changes between environment and society are complementary and beneficial to each
other.
Figure 2.1: The coevolutionary process between social system and environment
Source: Norgaard, 1994, p. 27
The second theoretical perspective of the SES approach is the resilience thinking to
understand and adapt with the dynamic changes of the social-ecological systems (Folke,
2006). The term ‘resilience’ in SES approach refers to the ability of a system to absorb
disturbances while still retaining its primary functions and structural components
(Walker et al., 2004). Unlike traditional problem-solving methods, SES approach focuses
on maintaining the ability of the system to adapt to the changing social-ecological
conditions (Folke, 2006). The resilience concept has evolved based on the assumption
that the social-ecological system shares the characteristics of a complex adaptive system
(Levin, 1998). A complex adaptive system is a conceptual model, which explains that
the interactions among system components are complex and non-linear so that changes
in a simple but powerful rule can transform the entire system into a new situation
(Holland, 1995). As social-ecological systems are dynamic and unpredictable, it is
difficult to establish rigid management approaches that aim to control a particular
situation (Holling and Gunderson, 2002). A new problem or situation may evolve at
any time so that the conventional resource management based on linear cause-effect
thinking will not be effective in the long run (Berkes, 2004). Therefore, implementing
SES approach requires a flexible and adaptive management system that emphasizes
the dynamic interaction between the social system and natural environment (Armitage
et al., 2009).
Adaptive co-management is a collaborative and learning-oriented process that aims
to improve the resilience and adaptive capacity of the target social-ecological system
(Armitage et al., 2009). It is an integrative governance system that combines adap-
tive management principles and co-management practices (Berkes, 2009). Adaptive
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management is the concept of learning and doing where management principles
are flexible and open to future options to modify and cope with dynamic changes
(Williams, 2011). Unlike the traditional trial-and-error approach, adaptive management
aims to overcome the challenge of complexity and unpredictability by allowing contin-
uous learning and feedbacks during management processes (Allen and Garmestani,
2015). Co-management is the sharing of power and responsibilities between govern-
ment authorities and local resource users (Berkes, 2009). The concept has evolved in
response to the failures of traditional top-down planning and management practices
(Berkes et al., 1991). It aims to improve the legitimacy of management practices through
empowering local communities and maintaining social justice (Borrini-feyerabend et
al., 2000). The key advantage of adaptive co-management is minimising resource-use
conflicts by integrating diverse views and interests of stakeholders in decision-making
processes (Plummer et al., 2012). It can also redress the ’problem of fit’ between gover-
nance institutions and the biophysical environment by integrating local knowledge and
practices that have evolved based on continuous learning and localised experiences
(Olsson et al., 2004).
However, adaptive co-management is not a panacea and should not be used for
every resource management issues. The decision to use adaptive co-management
requires to consider several factors including type of resources, project duration, scale
of conflicts, and the presence of options for negotiation (Plummer et al., 2012). For
instance, adaptive co-management is not appropriate for managing rare resources,
such as endangered species, which do not allow to learn experiences from management
failures (Allen and Gunderson, 2011). In such cases, it is more suitable to provide
absolute protection with minimum livelihood impacts. The project duration is also
an important factor to be considered before choosing the adaptive co-management
approach. Adaptive co-management is a long-term learning process so that the
management outcomes will not be visible within a short period (Westgate et al.,
2013). Therefore, it is not suitable for conservation projects which require tangible
outcome within a limited time period. The essence of adaptive co-management is the
collaboration and negotiation among the relevant stakeholders so that it may not be
applicable if there is limited or no option for negotiation. For instance, in areas with
high population pressure or with no alternative resource to meet local requirements,
using adaptive co-management may escalate more conflicts than other management
approaches (Allen and Gunderson, 2011).
The SES approach is an important tool to guide sustainable management of natural
resources in the face of uncertainty and unexpected changes (Folke, 2006). It offers
opportunities to analyse the dynamic linkages between the protected area and local
people. On the one hand, it helps to enhance current conservation efforts by revealing
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the bundle of ecosystem services that protected area is contributing to all stakeholders
(Palomo et al., 2014). On the other hand, it allows uncovering existing institutions and
social mechanisms that regulate the flow of these services (Rammel et al., 2007). Under-
standing existing resource management institutions allows to identify synergies and
conflicts between conservation and development objectives, and provides opportunities
for trade-off among stakeholders under common understanding (Berkes and Ross,
2013). Uncovering ecosystem services demand by local resource users offers options for
management intervention that enable to reduce current pressures on ecosystems with
minimum livelihood costs (Martín-López et al., 2012). Integrating local knowledge and
management practices into formal management organizations can provide a platform
for local participation in conservation and reduce management costs (Colding et al.,
2003).
2.1.1 Land Tenure System and Property Right Institutions
Land tenure refers to the institutional relationship among people in relation to land
and natural resources (FAO, 2002). It is an important social mechanism that regulates
the linkages between society and environment (Berkes et al., 1998). It is constituted by
rules that define particular rights for individuals over the land and related resources
(Schlager and Ostrom, 1992). Such rules are developed by the state based on consti-
tutional arrangements or evolved within the society based on local customs, norms,
and belief systems (Ostrom, 2005). Land tenure systems are usually differentiated into
two different types (FAO, 2002). The first type is the formal (de jure) system where the
tenure rules are explicitly acknowledged and protected by the state. The second type
is the informal (de facto) system where the tenure rules are not legally recognised and
protected by statutory laws. Both types of land tenure systems may overlap each other
particularly in areas protected and managed by local indigenous people (Fitzpatrick,
2005).
Land tenure is usually defined by using the property right concept. Property right is
an enforceable authority to undertake particular actions in a specific domain (Schlager
and Ostrom, 1992). It not only affects who may use what resource or not, but also
provides incentives to the right holders to achieve effective protection of resources
and to reduce management costs (Demsetz, 1967). Property right is usually described
as the bundle of rights that can be classified into four different types (Schlager and
Ostrom, 1992). The first type is the private property where the rights are assigned to a
private party such as an individual, a household, or a corporate body. The second type
is the communal property where the rights are assigned to all members of a community.
The third type is the state property where the state authority exclusively holds the
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rights. The fourth type is the open-access where specific rights are not assigned to
anyone so that the land is free and open to everyone (Schlager and Ostrom, 1992). In
practice, property rights may overlap with each other due to lack of implementation
(Pradhan and Rajendra, 2002). For instance, reserved forests may be regarded as state
property under formal regulations; however, without effective enforcement, they may
be considered as open-access by local people (Luttrell, 2001).
A community may hold different rights over different resources within the same
property regime (Pradhan and Rajendra, 2002). Therefore, analysing land tenure
system requires to explore the bundle of rights associated with each property regime.
Schlager and Ostrom (1992) classify five different types of rights that are relevant
for common-pool resources. These include (1) access right, which permits to enter a
defined physical boundary; (2) withdrawal right, which permits to obtain the products
of a resource; (3) management right, which allows to regulate resource use patterns; (4)
exclusion right, which allows to determine who will have access right; and (5) alienation
right, which permits to sell or transfer the land and related resources. Schlager and
Ostrom (1992) argue that different types of rights influence the interest and actions of
resource users and the sustainability of particular resources.
Property rights will not be effective unless there are effective governance systems
in place. According to Ostrom (1990), an effective governance system should define a
clear boundary among resource users that indicates who has the right to use in which
conditions and who do not have the right. It should adopt the principle of collective
choice arrangements in formulating new rules if the existing ones are not compatible
with local situations. It should also include effective monitoring systems together
with graduated sanctions and conflict resolution mechanisms that are accepted by
all members. Ostrom (2005) argues that governing common property based on these
design principles should consider the complexity of local social-ecological systems and
should be adaptive to rapid exogenous changes.
One important aspect of governing common property is to formulate rules that
are legitimate and accepted by all affected individuals (Ostrom, 2005). According to
Tyler (1990), people follow rules based on two main perspectives. The first one is the
’instrumental perspective’, where people may comply with rules based on rational
choice decisions. For instance, the decision to conduct the illegal activity is determined
based on the potential benefits of rule-breaking and the severity of penalty if it is
found out by the others (Sutinen and Kuperan, 1999). The second one is the ’normative
perspective’, where people may comply with rules based on their moral norms and
legitimacy in the rule-making processes (Tyler, 1990). For instance, an individual
may follow the rules if he/she perceives that the law is fair and appropriate and the
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enforcement institutions are legitimate (Sutinen and Kuperan, 1999). The differentiation
between these two perspectives allows resource managers to understand why people
follow or reject particular rules and to develop rules that motivate local cooperation in
resource management practices (Tyler, 2014).
Property right systems can be changed due to several reasons. First, property rights
will be changed when the resource protection costs are higher than the resource-
use benefits. For instance, degraded forest areas under collective ownership may
become open-access when the benefits of using degraded resources become lower
than the protection costs (Fitzpatrick, 2006). Second, conflicting situations among
stakeholders may also induce land tenure changes. As the conflicts often attract
government intervention, the common property may transform to state property due
to the increased enforcement of state regulations (N. Wang, 2001). Third, changes
in social norms and cultural belief systems also contribute to the transformation
of local tenure rules. This is particularly common among indigenous communities
where the traditional sacred forests have become open-access in response to the
introduction of modern religious beliefs (Hundie, 2008). Fourth, property rights
may also be changed due to changes in government policies and related legislation.
For instance, the new economic policy to promote fishery products in Vietnam has
induced privatisation of open-access lands for shrimp farming (Luttrell, 2001). The
emergence of economic opportunities may require new legislations that do not fit with
local tenure regulations. As the government often supports legal enforcement against
private investors, most common property areas gradually become private property
under concession agreements (Luttrell, 2001).
Understanding local land tenure systems is essential for protected area management.
Most protected areas in the tropics are overlapped with communal lands previously
managed by customary institutions (Rights and Resource Initiative, 2015). The existence
of dual land tenure systems often creates conflicts between protected areas and local
people, particularly when the management authorities try to restrict local rights over
land and resource-use practices (Adams and Hutton, 2007). The displacements induced
by protected areas often result in the reallocation of rights among affected communities
(Brockington and Igoe, 2006). This, in turn, affects the well-being of local people by
changing livelihood activities, income-generating opportunities, and the consumption
patterns of natural resources (Mascia and Claus, 2009). Therefore, understanding
how protected areas influence local property right systems is vital in developing
conservation strategies that minimise social conflicts.
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2.1.2 Ecosystem Services and Local Livelihoods
The term ’ecosystem services’ is commonly used to demonstrate the flow of benefits
from nature to society. The concept has evolved based on the assumption that natural
ecosystems and related services are currently undervalued so that identifying all
benefits that ecosystems contribute to society will reduce anthropogenic pressures on
natural resources (Daily, 1997). Earlier definitions of ecosystem services highlight the
important role of ecological processes and their linkages to human society. For example,
Daily (1997, p. 3) defines ecosystem services as “conditions and processes through
which natural ecosystems, and the species that make them up, sustain and fulfil human
life”. Later definitions have become more anthropocentric focusing on benefits rather
than the ecological components of the ecosystem. For instance, Costanza et al., p. 253
(1997) define ecosystem services as “the benefits human populations derive, directly or
indirectly, from ecosystem functions”. The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA)
simplifies this definition as “the benefits people obtain from ecosystems” (MA, 2003,
p. 53).
Ecosystem services are generally classified into four different types (MA, 2003). The
first type is provisioning services that include all products obtained from ecosystems
including food, fibre, fuel, and genetic resources. The second type is regulation services
that include all benefits obtained from ecological processes including climate change
mitigation, water regulation, disease prevention, and pollination. The third type is
cultural services that include non-material benefits obtained from the ecosystem such as
education, recreation, or spiritual experiences. The fourth type is supporting services
that provide the necessary conditions to produce the first three services (MA, 2003).
Depending on each service type, the potential benefits of an ecosystem may differ
across different actor groups (MA, 2003). For instance, the provisioning services may
provide more benefits to local users who depend on the ecosystem for their livelihoods.
However, the regulation services such as climate change mitigation or water regulation
services may extend beyond local users providing benefits at regional and global
scales.
One crucial aspect of the ecosystem service approach is the valuation of services that
society benefits from the environment. Value in simple term is “the relative importance
or worth of an object to an individual or groups in a given context” (T. C. Brown, 1984,
p. 236). The value system is important because it shapes the choice for a particular
product or service and thereby influences on individual behaviour to enjoy or consume
it (MA, 2003). Value can generally be distinguished into two types (Farber et al., 2002).
The first one is the intrinsic value, which measures based on the existence of an item
without referencing to its utility. For instance, a particular species may have intrinsic
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value in maintaining the health and integrity of the relevant ecosystem without any
relation to human satisfaction (Farber et al., 2002). The second one is the instrumental
value, which is measured based on its utility in meeting human preferences. This
type of value system is fundamentally anthropocentric and may cover both the use
and non-use values of a particular species or ecosystem (Goulder and Kennedy, 1997).
The distinction between intrinsic and instrumental values is important in conservation
planning (Farber et al., 2002). Most protected area managers are ecologists who
give more preferences towards intrinsic values of species and ecosystems, whereas
policymakers and local communities give more attention to instrumental values such as
provisioning or cultural services. Understanding both intrinsic and instrumental values
allows open discussions among stakeholders and provides options for negotiation
between conservation and improvement of human well-being (McShane et al., 2011).
The connection between ecosystem services and human well-being has been well
documented (Summers et al., 2012). For instance, Wunder (2003) conceptualises
the role of forests in poverty alleviation in the tropics. The author differentiates
poverty alleviation into two different types. The first type is poverty prevention where
forests provide basic materials—such as food, water, shelter, and so on—to maintain
a minimum standard of living, although it may be below the poverty line. In this
concept, the ecosystem services from forests enhance local resilience by serving as
safety nets and gap fillers to mitigate poverty without lifting people above the poverty
line (Wunder et al., 2014). The second type is poverty reduction where forests provide
additional income to lift people above the poverty line (Wunder, 2003). For instance,
a study by Fonta and Ayuk (2013) in south-east Nigeria shows that about 10.4% of
poor households have been lifted above the poverty line due to forest income. The
conceptual distinction between the two aspects of poverty alleviation is important
in developing pro-poor forest policies that aim to balance between conservation and
livelihood improvement of rural poor (J. A. Fisher et al., 2014).
The degree to which an individual gets benefits from an ecosystem may differ across
communities. For instance, Angelsen et al. (2014) found out that forest environmen-
tal income is higher in high-income households than the medium and low-income
households. A study by P. S. Aung et al. (2015) also shows that better-off households
receive more forest income than medium and poor households. According to Ribot and
Peluso (2003), the ability to derive benefits from the environment not only depends on
property right that an individual is assigned to but also is mediated by complex access
mechanisms including capitals, markets, technology, labour, and social relationships.
The choice of livelihood strategies also determines the types of benefits that households
receive from the ecosystems (Scoones, 1998). Changes in livelihood strategies may also
change the resource use patterns of individual households (Chilongo, 2014). These
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particular changes may affect the distribution of income from ecosystem services
across communities (Daw et al., 2011). Understanding the income distributive effects
of ecosystem services is central not only to minimize the negative effects associated
with natural resource dependence but also to optimize the benefit-sharing in a fair and
justice ways (Fonta and Ayuk, 2013).
Ecosystem service approach is an important tool for protected area management. It
helps resource managers to raise public awareness for conservation and sustainable
use of natural resources. It also helps to identify the distribution of benefit among
diverse stakeholders under different local circumstances. This information provides
opportunities to integrate diverse needs and interests of stakeholders in conservation
practices (Martín-López et al., 2011). The valuation of ecosystem services also supports
resource governance and decision-making processes. Identifying the values of different
service types helps to determine winners and losers among beneficiaries and provides
justifications for trade-off among relevant stakeholders (Pritchard Jr. et al., 2000).
Understanding the relative contribution of ecosystem services can provide incentives
for conservation and sustainable use of natural resources (Costanza, 2000).
2.1.3 Traditional Ecological Knowledge and Management Practices
Traditional Ecological Knowledge (TEK) is a form of knowledge that has evolved within
the society based on long-term observations of the environment (Berkes, 2008). It plays
an important role in maintaining the resilience of social-ecological systems by providing
adaptive capacity to adjust social actions against disturbances (Walker et al., 2004). It
also symbolises the co-evolutionary relationship between social and ecological systems
(Norgaard, 1994) and provides a platform for local participation in conservation (Berkes,
2009). TEK has become a popular topic in most global frameworks for conservation.
For instance MA (2005) recommends that the effective management of ecosystems
typically requires “place-based” knowledge held by local resource managers. The
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) also encourages to preserve, maintain and
promote the wider use of traditional knowledge with the approval and involvement of
the knowledge holders (CBD, 2011). The Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform
on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) framework also recognizes the role of
TEK in ecosystem service management and create opportunities for the inclusion of
such knowledge in ecosystem and biodiversity assessments (Díaz et al., 2015).
The term Traditional Ecological Knowledge (TEK) is often used interchangeably
with Local Ecological Knowledge (LEK) (Berkes et al., 2000; Olsson and Folke, 2001).
According to Berkes (2008, p. 7), TEK is defined as "a cumulative body of knowledge,
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practices, and belief, evolving by adaptive processes and handed down through
generations by cultural transmission, about the relationship of living beings (including
humans) with one another and with their environment". Olsson and Folke (2001)
argue that the term ’traditional’ requires to indicate the time scale in order to clarify
what is traditional and what is not. The authors have suggested using the term ‘Local
Ecological Knowledge (LEK)’ to include recently generated knowledge (Olsson and
Folke, 2001). However, Berkes (2008) argues that the term TEK differs from LEK mainly
because the latter often lacks perspectives regarding historical evolution and cultural
transmission.
TEK differs from modern scientific knowledge. Berkes (2008) explains that both tra-
ditional and scientific knowledge have evolved in similar patterns; both of which have
emerged through observation of environmental phenomena, and thereby developing
intellectual processes to interpret the complex natural system. In contrast to scientific
knowledge, TEK also includes spiritual or religious dimensions. Moreover, TEK is
integrated with moral and ethical context rather than rational deductive thinking
(Berkes, 2008). According to Agrawal (1995), the distinction between traditional and
modern knowledge system is arbitrary so that both systems should be treated as
complementary rather than contradictory to each other. However, Raymond et al.
(2010) argue that integrating both systems can face many challenges. On the one hand,
most scientists often ignore TEKs that are based on spirituality or religious belief. On
the other hand, traditional communities hardly accept the scientific knowledge on
the first hand and prefer to keep own knowledge system to avoid abrupt changes
(Raymond et al., 2010).
Berkes (2008) differentiates TEK into four levels. The first level relates to local
empirical knowledge about the environment such as information on species identifica-
tion, taxonomy, life histories, distributions, and behaviour. The second level includes
knowledge related to land and resource management systems. It comprises a set of
practices, tools, and techniques that are rooted in local understandings and experiences
on ecosystem functions and processes. The third level includes social institutions
related to resource management systems such as taboos, norms and codes of social
relationship. The fourth level relates to local world-views or belief systems that shape
social institutions and perceptions of the environment (Figure 2.2). The term TEK
comprises all these levels as knowledge-practice-belief complex so that the analysis of
TEK should include all these levels in order to understand the complex relationship
between human and the environment (Berkes, 2008).
TEK has emerged among society in two different ways. The first one is the ecological
understanding model, where TEK is generated by learning from ecological processes
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Figure 2.2: Levels of analysis in traditional knowledge and management systems
Source: Berkes, 2008, p. 17
among plants, animals, and other components of ecosystems (N. J. Turner and Berkes,
2006). In this model, TEK can also be generated among society by observing changes
in ecological cycles and natural disturbances that occur within the environment. The
second one is the depletion crisis model, where TEK has emerged in response to
depletion of natural resources that people depend for their livelihood or in the face
of environmental shocks and crisis (Berkes and N. J. Turner, 2006). In some cases,
resource depletion may become trigger points for the people to redesign existing
practices in order to minimise such experiences in the future. Both types of knowledge
are transmitted by learning lessons from self-observations or other people through
oral history and discourses among the society (N. J. Turner and Berkes, 2006).
In contrast to knowledge generation, TEK can be lost for several reasons. Firstly,
people may lose TEK when local access to land and resource is restricted by formal
regulations, as in the case of protected areas in many parts of the world (Brockington
and Igoe, 2006). Secondly, people may no longer use TEK in relation to a particular
resource when the resource itself is declined or lost in their surroundings (N. J. Turner
and K. L. Turner, 2008). Thirdly, TEK may be lost due to the introduction of modern
management techniques that replace traditional resource stewardship practices. For
instance, traditional practices and social institutions among swidden communities
in South-east Asia have changed due to the introduction of modern agricultural
practices (Cramb et al., 2009). Fourthly, TEK may be lost due to modernisation and
economic development, especially when younger generations have engaged more in
market-oriented activities such as non-farm employment and migration that decrease
their interactions with the environment (Gómez-Baggethun et al., 2010). Finally, TEK
may be lost when people change their religious belief which influences local taboos,
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norms, and ritual practices related to natural resource use and management practices
(Osei-Tutu, 2017).
Several authors have indicated the important role of TEK in conservation and
management of natural resources. For instance, Berkes et al. (2000) identify several
TEK that are important for conservation and sustainable use of natural resources.
These include monitoring the state of resources, total protection of certain species,
temporary restriction of harvest, multiple species management, rotational farming, and
succession management. The use of TEK also empowers local people to participate
in conservation practices (Ruiz-Mallén and Corbera, 2013). It contributes to local
livelihood by improving people’s ability to manage essential resources in sustainable
ways (Parrotta and Trosper, 2012). TEK related to places, timing, and methods of
harvesting helps local resource users to make important decisions, such as whether to
harvest or reserve the critical resources (Menzies, 2006). The use of TEK under formal
management system also provides opportunities to respect value, knowledge, and
priorities which may lead to positive local attitudes towards conservation initiatives
(Ruiz-Mallén and Corbera, 2013).
Despite its relative importance, several limitations exist regarding the application
of TEK in formal management practices. First, TEK is closely related to traditional
societies who are considered as static and isolated from other societies (Rist et al.,
2014). Due to improved infrastructure and technology, the intercultural communica-
tion among traditional societies has increased affecting the long-term applicability of
existing TEK practices (Reyes-García et al., 2014). Second, TEK is generated in the
immediate context of local livelihoods so that it is most suitable to be used for par-
ticular livelihood activities that have been practised for several generations (Agrawal,
1995). The adoption of TEK in its static form will be challenging when the livelihood
activities are constantly changing due to modern agricultural technology and market
improvement (Gómez-Baggethun et al., 2010). Third, TEK is generally location specific
and characterized by particular communities living in specific geographic region (Men-
zies, 2006). This specific nature of TEK limits the dissemination and utilization by a
broader public. The challenge for further replication has become a major obstacle for
creating TEK based management practices (Agrawal, 1995). A more dynamic approach
that integrates both historical and geographical perspectives is essential in assessing
and application of TEK in formal management practices (Rist et al., 2014).
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2.2 Overview of Protected Area Management in Myanmar
The concept of protected areas was initiated in Myanmar in relation to Buddhist
religious belief. Traditionally, forests around the Buddhist monasteries were delineated
as sanctuaries for wildlife and domestic animals. The first documented traditional
protected area was the Yadanabon Wildlife Sanctuary designated by King Mindon in
1860 (M. Aung, 2007). Modern protected areas were introduced by the British colonial
government with a special focus on the protection of wildlife for recreational hunting.
In 1912, the Wild Birds and Animals Protection Act was enacted in order to protect
endangered birds and other wildlife species. The law was later amended in 1936 to
prohibit killing animals inside the wildlife sanctuaries. By the time Myanmar got
her independence in 1948, about 11 protected areas had been officially designated as
wildlife sanctuaries (M. Aung, 2007).
During the post-independence period after 1948, the protected area management
was neglected due to complex political situations. It had regained its momentum after
the initiatives of Nature Conservation and National Park Project (NCNPP) in the 1980s
(FAO, 1985). The project was implemented from 1981 to 1985, with technical support
from Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and financial assistance from United
Nations Development Program (UNDP). It was designed as a preparatory phase to
identify suitable areas for the establishment of national parks and to develop legal
and administrative infrastructure for the subsequent management (FAO, 1985). The
NCNPP introduced modern concepts of protected areas such as national parks in
addition to the earlier concept of wildlife sanctuaries. In 1985, the Nature and Wildlife
Conservation Division (NWCD) was formed under the Forest Department as a focal
institution dedicated to protected area management and biodiversity conservation.
Myanmar Forest Policy (1995) provides a policy framework to establish and manage
protected areas in Myanmar. The initial policy target was to establish protected areas
up to 5% of the country’s total area by 2010. The target was revised in the National
Forestry Master Plan (2001-2030) to increase up to 10% of total land area by the year
2020. As of 2018, Myanmar has established 42 protected areas with a total area of
39,313 km2 covering about 5.81 % of the country’s area (Figure 2.3). Additional 19 sites
(covering about 2.02% of the country’s area) have been selected as proposed protected
areas for the future.
The Protection of Wildlife and Protected Areas Law (POWPA) (1994)2 is the main
legal framework for the establishment and management of protected areas in Myanmar.
2It was amended in 2018 and renamed as Conservation of Biodiversity and Protected Areas Law.
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Figure 2.3: Number and percentage of protected areas in Myanmar
Source: Nature and Wildlife Conservation Division, 2018
It authorises the NWCD to establish protected areas on any land including the lands
under private ownership. For instance, section 8 of the law states that:
The Minister may [...] in any land in which an individual or a private organization
had the right of cultivation, right of possession, right of use and occupancy,
beneficial enjoyment, heritable right or transferable right, with the approval of
the Government and for the purpose of the objective of this Law, [...] designate
protected areas according to the categories.
The POWPA Law restricts all human activities within the protected area, except
for the recreation activities and scientific research. For instance, section 39 of the law
prohibits all activities that destroy the ecosystem or any natural state in the protected
area, including illegal encroachment, hunting, and collection of protected plant species.
Regarding wildlife species, the law issues a list of threatened species, which are
categorised into three groups: (1) completely protected species; (2) normally protected
species; and (3) seasonally protected species. According to the law, killing, hunting, or
wounding of protected wildlife species shall be punished with imprisonment of three
to ten years depending on the nature of offences. Apart from prohibitions, the law
also provides opportunities to implement actions that reduce resource dependency
and minimise resource-use conflicts. Section 13 of the law permits to designate buffer
zones inside or close to the protected areas to allow limited use of forest products by
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surrounding communities. The law also permits to establish collaborative management
between the government and local people with particular objectives to achieve both
conservation and development outcomes.
Regarding management structure, all protected areas in Myanmar are under the
direct administration of the Union Government. At the Union level, the Forest Depart-
ment is the main government institution responsible for managing all permanent forest
estates including reserved forests, protected public forests, and protected areas. Under
the Forest Department, protected areas are managed by Nature and Wildlife Conserva-
tion Division (NWCD). At the site levels, the park wardens are assigned to operate
day-to-day management activities under direct instructions from NWCD. Among the
42 protected areas, only 22 protected areas have management organizations in place.
The remaining 20 protected areas are regulated under the authority of Township Forest
Departments without proper management system in place (Figure 2.4).
Forest Department (FD)
State/Regional FD
Township FD
Reserved Forests 
(812) & Protected 
Public Forests (326)
Un-managed 
Protected Areas (20)
Nature and Wildlife 
Conservation Division 
(NWCD)
Park Wardens
Managed Protected 
Areas (22)
Figure 2.4: Organization structure of protected area management in Myanmar
Source: Forest Department, 2015
Protected areas in Myanmar are classified into six different categories in accordance
with the IUCN classification. However, management practices are similar across all
six categories. In all protected areas, the park wardens have to implement five main
management activities: (1) regular patrolling and law enforcement; (2) conducting
scientific research to monitor important species and ecosystems; (3) raising public
awareness to increase people participation in conservation; (4) managing buffer zones
to minimize land and resource use conflicts; and (5) promoting ecotourism in protected
areas. Therefore, either a national park or wildlife sanctuary, there is no difference in
terms of regular management activities and penalties for illegal offences.
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Protected area management activities are being implemented with limited staff and
budget allocation. As of 2018, NWCD employs only about 31% of its allocated staff
to manage all protected areas in Myanmar3. The average budget allocation for each
protected area is about 25 USD/km2/year (Emerton et al., 2015). This amount is
relatively lower than the annual budget allocated in other protected areas in ASEAN
countries4 which ranges from 39 to 329 USD/km2 (Figure 2.5). According to Emerton
et al. (2015), NWCD would need additional 8.88 million USD per year to achieve
fully-staffed, improved management and expanded protected area network.
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
Vietnam Malaysia Cambodia Indonesia Lao PDR Thailand Philippines Myanmar
U
S
D
/k
m
2/
ye
ar
Country
Figure 2.5: Budget allocation for protected areas in ASEAN countries
Source: Adapted from Emerton et al., 2015
Due to limited budget and staff allocation, the government has initiated to change
the management strategy from complete protection towards more stakeholder inclusive
approaches. In 2015, the National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan (NBSAP) was
formulated to guide biodiversity conservation and protected area management in line
with the CBD’s Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011-2020 and the Aichi Biodiversity Tar-
gets (Forest Department, 2015). After the development of NBSAP, the co-management
concept has become an official government agenda for managing protected areas in
Myanmar. The NBSAP provides a strategic framework to integrate local communities
in biodiversity conservation and protected area management. For instance, target 11.3
of NBSAP aims to implement pilot co-management projects in five protected areas in
order to provide incentives for conservation and to compensate for restricted access of
3Although the official staff allocation is 1,727, only 536 staff were employed at NWCD in 2018.
4Vietnam’s state budget allocation is significantly greater than other Asian countries and is comparable
to public budget allocations for PA in Europe and North America (Emerton et al., 2015).
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natural resources (Forest Department, 2015). The NBSAP also encourages to identify
and record traditional ecological knowledge and management practices in conservation
areas inhabited by indigenous ethnic people. It includes formalisation of customary
land tenures and the documentation of traditional knowledge to promote conservation
and public awareness (Forest Department, 2015).
The new protected area law5 also includes provisions to implement co-management
and other community-based approaches in protected area management. For instance,
section 13 (e) of the law authorises Forest Department to permit the implementation of
co-management activities to achieve both conservation and sustainable development of
local people. These include monitoring and law enforcement, buffer zone management,
public awareness, research, and community-based ecotourism practices. Section 13 (g)
also authorises to establish buffer zones inside or adjacent to the protected area in order
to permit local resource use and other activities for socio-economic development of local
people. Despite the existing legal frameworks encourage to implement co-management
activities in protected areas, the actual implementation of the co-management approach
is still limited in Myanmar. Moreover, there is no clear provision regarding decision-
making and benefit-sharing between park authorities and local people. The lack of
clear guideline and management strategy has imposed challenges for park authorities
to negotiate with local stakeholders regarding the collaborative management of natural
resources (Kimengsi et al., 2019).
5Conservation of Biodiversity and Protected Areas Law (2018)
CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
3.1 Conceptual Framework
This research conceptualises protected area as a social-ecological system and focuses
on the reciprocal interactions between local people and the natural environment.
The conceptual model is rooted in social-ecological coevolutionary theory elaborated
by Norgaard (1994) and Berkes et al. (1998). The model is further modified based
on the framework proposed by Pretzsch et al. (2014) in order to integrate adaptive
management principles into protected area management. Following Pretzsch et al.
(2014), the conceptual framework is composed of three main components. The first
component is the natural system that provides products and services important for
human well-being (MA, 2005). The second component is the social system that
shapes people’s behaviour in constructing their ways of life (Scoones, 1998). The third
component is the interface that characterises the co-evolutionary relationship between
the two systems within the given policy and legal frameworks (Figure 3.1).
Among the three components, this research emphasises the interface between the
two systems in order to understand the relationship between the protected area and
local people. Regarding the analytical approach, the interface is conceptualised with
four main thematic complexes. The complex I deals with local land tenure systems
that influence access to and control of ecosystem services provided by the natural
environment. As most protected areas in tropics are overlapped with the lands owned
by indigenous people, analysing both formal and informal land tenure systems will
help to understand local resource-use conflicts and provide options for trade-off
between them (Fitzpatrick, 2005). Land tenure system will not be effective unless
effective governance systems are in place. Therefore, it is also essential to identify
not only different types of rights that are assigned to particular resources (Schlager
and Ostrom, 1992) but also different governance activities implemented by different
26 Chapter 3 Research Methodology
actor groups (Ostrom, 1990). As communities are diverse and heterogeneous, not
all members of the community will accept traditional tenure rules developed by
local people. Understanding why some people do not follow the rules is essential
to minimise social conflicts (Ramcilovic-Suominen and Hansen, 2012). As local land
tenure systems are changing over time (Hundie, 2008), analysing the patterns of
changes in tenure rules and their influences on both social and ecological systems will
help to minimise adverse impacts in the future.
Figure 3.1: Conceptual framework for analysing the relationship between protected
area and local people
Source: Adapted from Pretzsch et al., 2014; Berkes et al., 1998.
The complex II focuses on the flow of products and services from the natural
system to improve the livelihoods and well-being of the society. From an ecological
point of view, the capacity to provide ecosystem services may vary depending on
the function and scale of a particular ecosystem and its ability to adapt to external
disturbances (Groot et al., 2012). From a social point of view, households may use
different types of products and services depending on the choice of strategies that
households adopt in sustaining their livelihoods (Ellis, 1998). The choice of livelihood
strategies is also influenced by individual access mechanism including property right
system, knowledge, technology, market, and cultural institutions (Ribot and Peluso,
2003). Changes in livelihood strategies will influence the pattern and distribution
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of benefits from the natural system within the community (Dorward et al., 2003).
Understanding the relative contribution of forests to local livelihood is essential to
highlight the important role of protected area in reducing poverty and inequality
among rural households (J. A. Fisher et al., 2014).
The complex III focuses on traditional ecological knowledge (TEK) in relation to
conservation and sustainable use of natural resources. Following Berkes (2008), this
study conceptualises TEK as a knowledge-practice-belief complex that has evolved
within the society over a long period of time. Therefore, the analytical approach
emphasizes not only the local knowledge and management practices but also the
social mechanisms that influence local institutions and resource-use practices. Taboos,
norms, and rituals are important social mechanisms that ensure local participation in
conservation and reduce management costs (Colding and Folke, 2001). However, TEK
may be changed in response to changes in the social system including local world-
views and religious belief (Gómez-Baggethun and Reyes-García, 2013). Understanding
the pattern of changes in local TEKs will help to minimise TEK losses and to improve
local adaptive capacity against external disturbances (Berkes and Ross, 2013).
The complex IV focuses on the management system that influences the interac-
tion between the social system and natural environment. Following Plummer and
Fitzgibbon (2004), an effective management model can be characterised with three
main criteria: (1) conservation effectiveness, (2) livelihood improvement, and (3) social
justice. Conservation activities will not be effective unless the management institutions
are legitimate and accepted by local stakeholders (Hayes and Ostrom, 2005). Designing
management strategies based on existing tenure institutions is essential to improve
local participation in conservation and reduce management costs (Persha et al., 2011).
To reduce people-park conflicts, the management system should contribute to local
livelihoods by ensuring the sustainable provision of ecosystem services (Adams, 2004).
To achieve social justice, management interventions should be fair and equitable and
should provide opportunities to maintain cultural practices (Plummer and Fitzgibbon,
2004).
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3.2 Data Collection
3.2.1 Selection of case studies and units of analysis
This research applies the case study approach to analyse the social-ecological relation-
ship between the protected area and local people in Natma Taung National Park. The
reason to use the case study approach is that social-ecological systems are complex
and context-specific so that it requires in-depth analysis rather than the general as-
sessment (Ostrom, 2007). According to Yin (2009), case studies help to understand the
comprehensive details of a particular phenomenon and provide context-dependent
knowledge for further theory development. In this research, the Natma Taung National
Park is chosen as the primary case within which the three village tracts located inside,
bordering and outside the park are chosen as embedded cases to perform the cross-case
analysis (Figure 3.2).
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Figure 3.2: Locations of study villages in Natma Taung National Park
Source: Park Management Office, 2017
The reason to choose NTNP is mainly because it is one of the protected areas in
Myanmar that encounters a long-standing conflict with local ethnic people. As the
NTNP is recognised as an ASEAN Heritage Park (AHP), results from this research
can be applied not only in Myanmar but also in other AHPs in South-east Asia. The
unit of analysis is the village tract, which includes a cluster of three or more village
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settlements. The reason to choose the village tract is that it is the basic administrative
unit of formal government structure in Chin state. Moreover, selecting the village tract
allows analysing inter-community relationships among villages that share the same
administrative unit.
The selection of case study village tracts was conducted based on four main criteria:
(1) community having similar forest conditions, (2) community facing a different degree
of influences from the national park, (3) community depending on forest resources for
their livelihoods, and (4) community showing willingness to participate in the research.
The first case is the Makyar village tract located inside the core area of the national
park with frequent visits by park authorities. The second case is the Ung village tract
located on the boundary of the national park with less frequent visits by park rangers.
The third case is the Kitaw village tract located outside the national park without any
influence by the park management. A total of 50 households that represent at least
31% of total households in each case were selected for household survey by using the
stratified random sampling method (Table 3.1). The reason to use equal sample sizes
is to minimise sampling differences for cross-case analyses.
Table 3.1: Number of sample households selected for each case study
Case-I (Inside) Case-II (Bordering) Case-III (Outside)
Villages HH Sample Villages HH Sample Villages HH Sample
Makyar A 42 15 Ung A 58 15 Kitaw A 40 15
Makyar B 20 10 Ung B 58 15 Kitaw B 31 11
Makyar C 26 15 Ung C 26 10 Kitaw C 43 15
Makyar D 21 10 Ung D 22 10 Kitaw D 9 9
Total 109 50 162 50 123 50
Note:Village names are changed for ethical reasons. HH refers to total number of
households.
3.2.2 Process of data collection
Data collection was conducted in three phases. The first phase, preliminary exploration,
was carried out from May to June 2016. The primary purpose was to explore current
situations in the study area in order to assess the feasibility of the research project. The
second phase, empirical data collection, was conducted from January to June 2017. The
purpose was to collect the empirical data from sample households in each case study
village tract. The third phase was the scenario workshop conducted in September 2018
in order to disseminate the research findings and to develop management scenarios
with stakeholder participation.
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Following the conceptual framework, data collection processes focused on four
main thematic areas: (1) local land tenure system, (2) livelihood dependency on forest
products, (3) traditional ecological knowledge, and (4) future management scenarios.
Variables and indicators were developed for each thematic area in order to guide the
data collection processes. The contextual information for the study area was collected
mainly from government reports, publications, and grey literature. The overview of
research variables, indicators and data sources are presented in Table (3.2).
Table 3.2: Lists of key variables, indicators, and data sources
Key variables Measurement indicators Data sources
1. Land tenure system
• Property rights Status and dynamic of different rights
(access, withdrawal, management,
exclusion, alienation)
Participatory land-use
mappings
• Governance structure Formal and informal governance
activities (boundary delineation,
controlling forest, permission,
sanctioning, conflict resolutions)
Key informant
interviews and focus
group discussions
• Role of actors Duties and responsibilities of local
actors in governance activities
Key informant
interviews and focus
group discussions
2. Ecosystem services & livelihoods
• Forest income Net benefit from the sale and use of
forest products
Household surveys
• Poverty and inequality Total income (cash and subsistence)
from all income sources
Household surveys
• Livelihood trends Patterns of changes in livelihood
activities and key drivers of change
Household surveys
and focus group
discussions
3. Traditional Ecological Knowledge (TEK)
• Ecological knowledge Local knowledge regarding natural
resource management
Key informant
interviews and focus
group discussions
• Management practices Awareness and compliances with local
management practices
Household surveys
• Social mechanisms Local customs, norms, taboos, and
belief system
Key informant
interviews and focus
group discussions
Continued on next page
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Table 3.2: (continued)
Variables Measurement indicators Data sources
4. Adaptive
Management
Multi-criteria decision analysis based
on conservation effectiveness,
improved livelihood, and social justice
Diagnosis from
research outcomes;
Participatory scenario
workshop
3.2.3 Methods of data collection
Both qualitative and quantitative methods were employed for data collection. The
advantage of using the mixed-method approach is that it allows utilising the strength
of both qualitative and quantitative data collection methods. According to Creswell
(2009), the mixed-method approach is more suitable when the use of either qualitative
or quantitative approach alone is inadequate to address the complex research issues.
As the interactions between social and ecological systems are complex, using the
mixed-method approach provides more comprehensive data to realise the research
objectives. The qualitative methods applied in this research include participatory
land-use mappings, focus group discussions, key informant interviews, and field
observations. Regarding quantitative methods, the semi-structured household survey
was used to support the qualitative analyses. The details of each technique are
discussed below:
• Field observation: Field observation is an important tool to explore the real-life
situations of the study area (Yin, 2009). During field observation, the researcher
took field notes regarding the social behaviour of local communities and the actual
conditions of the natural environment. It includes the current status of forest
resources, land-use types, household conditions and livelihood activities, market
accessibility, and local cultural practices. Information from direct observations
was also used to revise the questionnaires and to validate the responses.
• Participatory land-use mapping: This exercise was applied at 12 villages located
within the three case study village tracts. The primary purpose was to explore
the bundles of rights associated with each land-use type. A group of villagers
including village headman and elders were asked to participate in drawing
village land-use maps. First, the villagers were asked to identify the traditional
village boundaries with the aid of Google-Earth images. After that, different
land-use types within each village territory were identified for each distinct
geographical feature. Finally, local land ownership system and different types of
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right associated with each land-use type were discussed. The village territories
were further confirmed with neighbouring communities to validate the historical
land ownerships. Participatory mapping exercises helped to discover how the
villagers classify and assign different tenure rights for each land-use type and
how they differ from formal cadastral maps.
• Focus Group Discussion (FGD): About 16 FGDs were conducted not only with
local villagers but also with the rangers from the national park. FGDs helped to
get insight into particular issues and produced general consensuses about local
culture. At community levels, FGD were used to discuss settlement history, tenure
rules, agricultural practices, livelihood challenges, and social conflicts. At the
park management level, FGD were conducted to identify historical events, current
park management activities, significant challenges, and possible interventions to
improve the situation. Each FGD was conducted with three to ten participants
depending on the village and the topic of discussions. During the FGD, the
researcher raised a particular topic of interest and facilitated discussions among
the participants. Each discussion took from one to three hours, and the points of
discussion were recorded in the field notes for further analysis.
• Key informant interview: A total of 36 key informants were interviewed during
field data collection. These informants included village headmen, elders, local
hunters, carpenters, representatives from local NGOs, and government staff. The
informants were selected by using snowball-sampling in order to get access to
competent experts (Neuman, 2014). Depending on the informants, the interviews
covered a wide range of topics including government plans and regulations,
village history, tenure changes, livelihood activities, market prices, resource
management practices, and social mechanisms. Each interview took from thirty
to ninety minutes. The informants were asked informally by using open-ended
questions. The major advantage of the key informant interview was getting
information not only about the topics of interest but also expert opinions based
on the respondents’ experiences (Yin, 2009).
• Household surveys: A total of 150 households (50 from each case) were inter-
viewed during the second field data collection. All interviews were conducted
at the respondents’ homesteads using face-to-face discussions by the author
with the help of local translators. The use of face-to-face interviews allowed the
researcher to observe the surroundings, to use non-verbal communications with
visual aids, and to reduce the misunderstanding of the questions (Neuman, 2014).
The interviews were done with household heads who usually make household
decisions. Each household was visited at least three times to establish good
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relationships with respondents and to avoid taking long interview periods. This
approach was useful not only to get valid information but also to clarify the
unclear or missing data in subsequent visits.
Both structured and semi-structured questionnaires were used during household
surveys. The questionnaires were separated into three main sessions for each field
visit. The first session is related to household characteristics, major livelihood
activities, and income sources. Forest income was excluded during the first
visit because the information was sensitive and it required to establish trust
between the respondents and interviewer. The second session focused on forest
income and local use of different ecosystem services. The third session included
structured questionnaires that investigated household compliances with tenure
rules and TEK-based management practices. The questionnaires for the third
session were formulated based on the key informant interviews and focus group
discussions during the first two visits.
• Participatory scenario planning workshop: A stakeholder consultation work-
shop was held in NTNP on 25-26 September 2017. The primary purpose was
to disseminate research findings and to discuss future options for achieving
effective conservation and reducing social conflicts. A total of 25 stakeholders
including 11 government officials, 11 community representatives, and 3 civil
society organisations participated the workshop (see participant list in Annex
B). The participatory scenario planning approach (Rowland et al., 2014) was
used to discuss the future scenarios of social-ecological systems for the next ten
years and to propose appropriate management strategies to achieve biodiversity
conservation, livelihood improvement, and social justice. After the discussion,
the participants were asked to give priority rankings on each strategy according
to the sustainable development criteria (see detail in section 3.3.4).
3.3 Data Analysis
3.3.1 Assessment of local land tenure systems
Both qualitative and quantitative analyses were applied to explore the status and trends
of local land tenure systems. For qualitative analysis, this research first identified
different types of rights associated with each land ownership system as classified
by Schlager and Ostrom (1992). Second, it explored local governance structures in
accordance with the governance principles proposed by Ostrom (1990). Third, it
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determined the roles and responsibilities of each actor regarding land use rights and
governance activities (Table 3.3).
Table 3.3: Framework for analysing local land tenure system
Land ownerships Type of rights Governance activities Actors
• Private • Access • Defining boundary • Administrator
• Common • Withdrawal • Creating rules • Village head
• Government • Management • Giving permission • Tribal leaders
• Open-access • Exclusion • Monitoring • Landowners
• Alienation • Sanction • Tenants
• Conflict resolution • Outsiders
Source:Adapted from Schlager and Ostrom (1992) and Ostrom (1990).
For quantitative assessment, the cultural consensus method (Romney et al., 1986) was
applied to determine the patterns of agreement with existing tenure rules. This method
was commonly applied for quantitative assessment of local compliance with cultural
institutions and traditional practices (Reyes-García et al., 2007; Gómez-Baggethun et al.,
2010; Boafo et al., 2015). A total of 15 different tenure rules identified during focus
group discussions were used to prepare the questionnaire. During household surveys,
each rule was explained to the respondent and asked if he or she was aware of it or not.
If the rule was recognised, the next question was whether he or she was still following
the rule or not. A score of one was given for each positive response. The analysis was
done separately for awareness and compliances. If all responses were positive, each
household would have a total score of 15 for awareness and 15 for compliances. The
total scores were compared across the three case studies in order to determine the
differences in local awareness and compliance across the three cases. The compliance
scores were also compared across socio-economic categories in order to determine
patterns of changes in tenure compliance by local people.
3.3.2 Assessment of livelihood strategies and forest income
In order to identify household livelihood strategies, this study first explored different
types of livelihood activities that households had engaged within the last twelve
months. Income from each activity was estimated by using income accounting methods
proposed by Vedeld et al. (2004). Both cash and subsistence income were considered for
income estimation. Family labour was omitted because the labour market in the study
area was limited so that the opportunity cost of labour was extremely low and may
not be realistic (Sjaastad et al., 2005). Due to mutual labour sharing among farmers,
it was difficult to calculate individual labour inputs for collective activities. Forest
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income in this study refers to the gross monetary values from the use and sale of all
forest products minus the sum of estimated production costs without family labour
values. Based on this concept, this study estimated the monetary values from the sale
and subsistence use of timber, firewood, Non-Timber Forest Product (NTFP), forest
food, wildlife, fodder, and medicinal plants. A similar concept was used to estimate
income from other sources including agriculture, livestock, wage employment, and
other non-farm activities. Income was calculated based on self-reported value because
it represents actual household choices and reflects local demand and supply conditions
(Cavendish, 2002).
After estimating income, households were clustered to form a group of households
with similar livelihood activities. To identify livelihood clusters, the two-step clustering
method was applied by using the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and an ag-
glomerative Hierarchical Cluster Analysis (HCA). The reason to apply the PCA before
cluster analysis was to avoid multicollinearity among the income sources (Chilongo,
2014). The PCA was performed by using the share of income from each income cate-
gory to generate the linear combinations of variables (principal components) according
to income variations across households. The resulting principal components with
Eigenvalues greater than "one" were taken as inputs for HCA. The Euclidean distance
matrices were calculated based on the selected principal components. After that, the
agglomerative HCA was performed by using Ward’s methods. The livelihood clusters
were determined based on the evaluation of cluster dendrograms produced by the
HCA. After clustering households, the amount of forest income was compared across
livelihood strategies in order to determine which strategy depend more on forest
income. The pattern of changes in livelihood strategies within the last ten years was
analysed based on household responses.
In order to determine the relative importance of forest income, the three Fos-
ter–Greer–Thorbecke (FGT) poverty measures (i.e. poverty headcount ratio, poverty
gap ratio, and poverty severity index) were calculated by using equation 3.1 as pro-
posed by Foster et al. (1984). The FGT indices were compared between with and
without forest income in order to indicate the effect of forest income on poverty
reduction.
Pα =
1
n
q
∑
i=1
[
z− yi
z
]α
(3.1)
where P refers to poverty measure1 defined by α ≥0 ; y refers to household income
in increasing order; z refers to national poverty line; and q is the number of poor
individuals.
1If α=0, P measures poverty headcount ratio; if α=1, P measures poverty gap ratio; and if α=2, P
measure poverty severity.
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The Gini decomposition method proposed by Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985) was also
used to measure the effect of forest income on total income inequality. Following
Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985), the marginal effects of each income source were calculated
by using equation 3.2 and 3.3.
GT =
k
∑
k=1
SkGkRk, (3.2)
∂GT/∂k
GT
=
SkGkRk
GT
− Sk, (3.3)
where GT represents the Gini coefficient of total household income; Sk refers to the
share of total income by each income source; Gk measures the Gini coefficient of each
income source; and Rk represents the Gini correlation between each income source and
the cumulative distribution of total income (Lerman and Yitzhaki, 1985).
3.3.3 Assessment of traditional ecological knowledge
For analysing traditional ecological knowledge (TEK), this research first identified
different types of TEK regarding the use, control and management of natural resources.
Qualitative content analysis was mainly used to identify TEK that local people apply
in their daily lives. The awareness and compliance scores for each TEK were calculated
by using cultural consensus method (Romney et al., 1986) as described in section
3.3.1. The scores were compared across the three case studies in order to determine its
variations in response to the national park regulations. The identified TEKs were further
categorised based on normative and instrumental aspects in order to understand the
patterns of changes in local compliances.
Regarding statistical analysis, the non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis tests were used to
analyse variations across three case studies. The pair-wise multiple comparisons were
conducted by using Dunn’s tests with the Bonferroni correction method. The Wilcoxon-
Mann-Whitney rank-sum tests were also applied to compare the differences between
two socio-economic categories such as education, religion, and residency status. The
associations between different income sources were tested using the Pearson correlation
method. All analyses were conducted with R statistical software version 3.4.4.
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3.3.4 Assessment of future management scenarios
Four different management scenarios were proposed based on the levels of local
participation in protected area management (Borrini-Feyerabend et al., 2013). The
Multiple Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) method was applied to select the most
appropriate model among different management alternatives (Mendoza and Martins,
2006). Criteria for selection of management scenario were justified based on the three
pillars of sustainable development: (1) effectiveness for biodiversity conservation,
(2) improving local livelihood, and (3) enhancing social justice (see Table 3.4). The
assessment of each criterion was conducted based on empirical results and outcomes
from the participatory scenario planning workshop. The general assumption is that
conservation approaches will be effective only if the local people comply with rules
and regulations (Ostrom, 1990). Local livelihoods will be improved if conservation
programs address local needs and interests of ecosystem services (Sunderlin et al., 2005).
Social justice will be achieved if the conservation benefits are distributed equitably, fair
and equitable decision-making mechanisms are in place, and local cultural practices
are maintained in the long run (Berkes, 2004).
Table 3.4: Criteria for evaluation of management scenarios
Management scenarios Criteria Assessment indicators
1. Business-as-usual
Conservation
effectiveness
• Potential impacts for conservation
2. Strict protection • Local legitimacy of regulations
3. Community control • Effectiveness for implementation
4. Co-management
Livelihood
improvement
• Meeting local livelihood needs
• Contribution to poverty reduction
• Potential livelihood improvement
Social justice
• Income equality
• Social equity in decision making
• Maintaining cultural practices
Source:Own elaboration.
3.4 Data Reliability and Validity
Data reliability refers to dependability or consistency of research methods so that the
numerical values of an indicator do not vary under different measurement processes
or instruments applied (Neuman, 2006). This research applied both qualitative and
quantitative data collection tools to ensure the reliability of the study results. For land
tenure analysis, participatory land-use mapping approach was mainly used to ensure
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that the village territories and tenure rules reflect local realities by integrating the
knowledge and perception of most community members. The oral history analysis
method was also used to support the reliability of participatory land-use mapping
results. The application of focus group discussion methods also allowed participants
to express ideas and opinions in a more interactive way. Focus group discussion
enabled participants to query and explain to each other in order to produce common
information (Neuman, 2014).
To ensure the consistency of livelihood analysis, the study used survey questionnaires
in accordance with the income accounting methods applied in the global study by
PROFOR (2009). For income estimation, the recall periods were carefully chosen and
adjusted with significant events in order to stimulate the memory of the respondents
(Lund et al., 2011). For example, shorter periods were used for small and frequently-
used products whereas more extended periods were used for lesser-used products
such as timber or wildlife. The recall for each event was made from the present back
into the past in order to increase the recall ability of the respondent (Wollenberg,
2000). Traditional ecological knowledge and management practices were explored
mainly based on direct observation by the researcher and semi-formal interviews
with village elders and other key informants. Although no scientific assessment was
made to validate the actual impact of local management practices, the preliminary
findings were triangulated with local experts, government authorities, and historical
publications such as Carey and Tuck (1896), Stevenson (1943), and Lehman (1963).
The participatory scenario planning method was also useful to validate the research
findings based on the discussions among the relevant stakeholders.
Regarding data validity, this study focused on building trust between the researcher
and respondents before commencing data collection. Key empirical data such as local
use of forest products, livelihood activities, income, and asset holdings are sensitive,
and therefore households may respond with incorrect information unless they trust
the researcher (Lund et al., 2011). As trust is being built over time, the researcher
spent significant time in the study communities and clearly explained that the study is
purely scientific and all respondents will be kept as anonymous. The role of interpreter
is also crucial in building trust within communities. Therefore, the interpreters were
explicitly selected based on their relationships with local villagers. For instance, the
researcher hired three interpreters who have close relationships with villagers in each
case study. In addition to trust, the interview location can also shape the actions
and statements of the respondents (Neuman, 2014). Therefore, the interviews were
mostly conducted at the respondents’ homesteads so that they can be more confident
in answering questions and giving their opinions. It also provided opportunities to
observe household characteristics in order to triangulate with the responses.
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Most data in this study were obtained through respondents’ recalls and estimation
rather than direct measurements. This types of data are never completely accurate and
depend on honesty, cooperation, and the ability to recall past events. However, this
research tried to maximise the response validity by using triangulation and proper
designing of the recall periods (Lund et al., 2011). For instance, forest income was
estimated separately for each product, and the calculation was done based on the
quantity of each product that households used per time and the frequency of using it.
Local names and units were mostly used in order to help the respondent to estimate
the correct amount or quantity of the products (Cavendish, 2002). Furthermore, not all
the informant statements for local land tenure and cultural practices will represent the
whole community (Romney et al., 1986). Therefore, the responses were validated by
integrating well-design questionnaires into household surveys.
3.5 Ethical Considerations
This research followed the principles of conduct in doing case studies in social sci-
ence (Thomas, 2014). The free and informed consents were taken not only from the
respondents but also from the village headmen and community leaders in each case
study. Before deciding the case studies, the researcher organised a meeting with
community leaders and village headmen and explained about the nature and purpose
of the research, expected benefits, possible harm to the community, and measures to
minimise them. The case studies were selected only if the participants of the meeting
agreed to take part in this research. During data collection, each respondent was given
a full option to agree or reject for participating in the research. Although it is important
to have written agreements, this research did not take any written agreement because
it is culturally uncommon in the study area and the respondents are usually reluctant
to sign the formal agreement. In order to reduce negative impacts to the respondents,
the anonymity of each respondent was ensured by coding with numbers instead of
using the real name. The villages in each case study were named with pseudonyms
in order to improve the confidentiality of the respondents. Only the names of the
village tracts were used in the thesis in order to facilitate data validations and further
researches.
CHAPTER 4
SOCIAL-ECOLOGICAL SETTINGS OF THE STUDY
AREA
4.1 Background of the Natma Taung National Park
4.1.1 History
The Natma Taung National Park (NTNP) (locally known as Kawn Nu M’zum1) is
located in the southern Chin State of Myanmar. The geographical extent of the national
park lies between north latitudes of N 20◦58′ and 21◦50′, and east longitudes of E
93◦27′ and 94◦2′. The total area of the park is about 713.46 km2. The park area falls
into three administrative townships: Kanpetlet Township, Mindat Township, and Matupi
Township. There are about 40 villages located in and adjacent to the national park.
Most of these villages are situated within Kanpetlet and Mindat townships. Only a
few villages located in Matupi township are associated with the national park.
The history of the park was initiated during the Nature Conservation and National
Park Project (NCNPP) implemented from 1981 to 1985 (Table 4.1). The project proposed
Natma Taung as one of the potential sites for national parks in Myanmar (FAO, 1985).
According to J. A. Sayer (1983), the Natma Taung area was justified as a national park
with four distinct features. First, the area is geographically distinct because it is the
highest mountain not only in the Chin Hills but also in the central and southern part
of Myanmar. Second, the area is composed of a wide variety of montane species that
could not be found in any other part of the country. Third, Natma Taung area is
home to an endemic bird species (Sitta victoriae) and other five bird species that are not
known elsewhere in Myanmar. Fourth, the scenic beauty of the mountain is attractive
1the Government instructed to change the name of the park from “Natma Taung” to “Kawn Nu
M’zum” by official letter no 2(2)18 (1860/2016) dated 2 June 2016.
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and highly suitable for recreational activities such as hiking, bird watching, or natural
history observations.
Table 4.1: Historical time-line for the establishment of NTNP
Date Events
1936 Declared as Bawli Climatic Forest for watershed protection and
climate control.
1983 First field survey was conducted by FAO expert team and
recommended to establish as a national park.
1993 Follow-up survey was conducted by FD team, and the draft boundary
of the park was proposed.
1994 The park management office was opened at Kanpetlet to execute land
settlement processes.
1994-1996 Detailed measurement of the proposed boundary was conducted.
1997 Officially declared as a proposed national park.
1997-1998 Land settlement committee was formed, and the land settlement
processes were conducted.
1999 Submission of the first land settlement report to the Ministry of
Forestry.
2000-2005 Review on the first land settlement report by the Ministry.
2008 Decision on land allocation scheme was made by the Chin SPDC.
2009-2010 Land settlement processes were re-established to determine the areas
for land compensation.
2010 Officially gazetted as National Park.
Source: synthesised by the author.
Following the recommendations of J. A. Sayer (1983), a field survey was conducted in
1993 to identify a suitable boundary for the national park. The survey team mentioned
that the park boundary recommended by J. A. Sayer (1983) is located within the area of
Bawli climatic forest2 designated during the British colonial period in 1936. However,
there was no proper boundary demarcated for the climatic forest so that the team
selected the park boundary mainly based on the imaginary boundary of the Bawli
climatic forest. The team also included the remaining intact forests located above the
altitude of 1,500 m in the national park (Ngai, 1993).
In 1994, the park management office was opened at Kanpetlet Township in order
to execute the land settlement processes. The proposed boundary was measured
from 1994 to 1996 in accordance with the boundary demarcation procedures. The
official notice of the proposed boundary was issued in 1997. After the notification,
2The ‘climatic forest’ refers to the area designated for both watershed protection and climatic control.
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the land settlement committee was formed to investigate the current land uses and
land ownership within the proposed area and to compensate the rights and privileges
claimed by the customary landowners. Land settlement processes were conducted
until 1998. However, there were challenges to compensate for the loss of customary
lands by local people. The amount of land claimed by the customary landowners was
extremely high3 and the government had to compensate about 250 million Kyats4 to
local landowners for their lands5. Therefore, the land settlement committee decided to
re-investigate the claims made by local farmers. The committee also decided not to
compensate if the land falls within the boundary of Bawli climatic forest. After the
re-investigation, the government still had to compensate about 10.5 million Kyats (1.5
million USD in official exchange rate) to the customary land owners6. Nevertheless,
the Ministry of Forestry rejected the revised proposal and postponed the notification
processes.
In 2007, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC)7 issued a notification
letter to proceed the land settlement processes. The letter mentioned that the village
settlement areas should be excluded from the national park boundary and the land
settlement committee should find out solutions to compensate for the agricultural lands.
Following SPDC instructions, the land settlement committee submitted a proposal to
allocate agricultural lands based on the number of household members residing in
each village. The Chin SPDC approved the proposal in 20088. As a result, the park
authorities allocated a total of 10,615 acres (4,295 ha) of land to 40 villages located
around the national park (Figure 4.1).
According to park regulations, the land recipients have to follow three conditions
regarding the allocated lands. First, only the household heads written in the land
settlement report have the right to cultivate or enjoy the benefits of allocated lands so
that the descendants are not eligible to inherit the land. Second, the land recipients
are not allowed to extend, transfer, or sell the land to another person. Third, the
recipients are permitted to use firewood, poles, and bamboo for subsistence purposes
only. Therefore, selling forest products from allocated land is forbidden for all villagers.
After the land allocation processes had completed, the NTNP was officially gazetted in
20109.
3The local price for a shifting cultivation plot was about 2,000 Kyats (3 USD) in 1998. A single farmer
(e.g. Daw Hone Kee from Wa Kaut village) claimed to compensate for 79 plots.
4The official exchange rate for one US dollar was about 7 Myanmar kyats in the year 2000.
5Letter no. Natma/trip-5/98-99 dated on 2-12-1998.
6Letter no. UYin-ThaBaWa/Natma/3170/2003 dated 28-11-2003
7The official name of Military Government during 1997 to 2010.
8The proposal was approved at the Chin SPDC meeting no. 20/2008 held on 11-9-2008.
9Government notification no. 164/2010 dated 2-12-2010.
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Figure 4.1: Area of lands allocated to each village by the national park
Source: Land settlement report (2008).
4.1.2 Key ecosystems and related services
NTNP is located in the Chin Hills that connect between the southern extension of
Himalaya and Arakan Mountain Ranges. The topography of the park ranges from
740 m to 3,050 m above sea level. Due to the dramatic increase in altitude within
a relatively narrow area, different plant-communities occur along with the different
altitudinal ranges (Fujikawa et al., 2008). The tropical dry deciduous forests dominate
most areas below 1,000 m above sea level. After the deciduous forests, the mixed
evergreen broadleaved forests occur between 1,000 m to 2,000 m. Most of the shifting
cultivation plots and human settlements are distributed within this elevation ranges.
After the broadleaved forests, the pine forests (Pinus kesiya) occur 1,500 m up to 2,500
m along the exposed ridges. These forests serve as a major source of timber as there
are limited pine forests outside the national park.
The temperate semi-evergreen forests occur between 2,200 m and 2,900 m. Temperate
species such as laurels (Cinnamomum spp.) and stone oaks (Lithocarpus spp.) dominate
the moist valleys between 2,300 m and 2,500 m. These forests serve as major sources of
marketable forest products such as orchids, yams, cinnamon barks, or the beeswax.
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After the laurels and stone oaks forests, the evergreen oaks (Quercus semecarpifolia)
and the rhododendrons dominate the mountain ridges. The colourful meadows can
be found along the slope from 2,900 m up to the peak (Fujikawa et al., 2008). Due
to the occurrence of different vegetation zones within a narrow landscape, a high
diversity of plant species can be found within the national park. According to the
park management office, a total of 1,129 plant species had been recorded within the
national park. Among these, three flower species—Rhododendron burmanicum, Potentilla
montisvictoriae and Roscoea australis—are endemic to NTNP (Fujikawa et al., 2008).
Table 4.2: Key ecosystems and related services in NTNP
Elevation(m) Ecosystem types Key ecosystem services
Below 1,000 Dry deciduous
forests
Bamboo and fuelwood for household uses
1,000-2,000 Mixed evergreen
forests
Soil formation for shifting cultivation,
Human settlements
1,500-2,200 Pine forests Timber and resins for household uses
2,200-2,900 Temperate
semi-evergreen
forests
NTFPs; Habitats for wildlife; Watershed
protection
2,900-3,000 Alpine meadows Ecotourism, Scientific research
Source: synthesised by the author.
Apart from the floral diversity, another important feature of the national park is the
occurrence of several bird species. According to Thingstad and Gjershaug (2014), about
337 bird species were recorded both inside and around the park. Among these species,
White-browed Nuthatch (Sitta victoriae), which is endemic to Natma Taung area, serves
as the flagship species of the national park (Naing, 2003). About 35 mammal species are
inhabiting in NTNP10. The most important mammal species include Sunda Pangolin
(critically endangered), Western Hoolock Gibbon (endangered), Dhole (endangered),
Asiatic black bear (vulnerable), Sambar (vulnerable), and Chinese Goral (vulnerable).
Although the national park provides a diverse array of ecosystem services, many of
them are observed to be declining within the last few decades. According to C. Wang
and Myint (2016), the annual deforestation rate for Chin state between 2001 and 2010
was about 0.28% per year. This rate is relatively higher than the deforestation rate
between 1990 and 2000, which was about 0.1% per year (Leimgruber et al., 2005). A
study by Bhagwat et al. (2017) indicates that even though about 92% of the land in
Chin State is still covered with forests, the actual intact forests (over 80% canopy cover)
constitute only about 37% of the Chin State. The rate of conversion from intact forests
10According to the camera trap surveys conducted by Smithsonian Institute in 2014
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to degraded forests is rapidly increased with an average rate of 0.65% per year between
2002 and 2014 (Bhagwat et al., 2017).
The effect of deforestation on ecosystem services is relatively unstudied in NTNP.
A study on local perception by Saumya et al. (2014) shows that about 90% of the
respondents agreed on the reduction of forest resources. More than 70% of the
respondents also agreed on the reduction in water levels of the nearby rivers within the
last few years (Saumya et al., 2014). Interviews with Township Municipality Officers
also mentioned that the amount of water available for local uses has declined within
the last five years. Particularly, the water levels of two sources in Kanpetlet and
one source in Mindat have significantly decreased in recent years. At the same time,
local demand for drinking water has increased mainly due to the increasing number
of visitors and hotels in response to ecotourism promotion inside the national park.
Therefore, conservation of watershed forests has become a priority in NTNP to meet
future demand for drinking water in both townships.
Previous studies in NTNP mainly focused on species taxonomy and there was no
systematic study regarding the status and trend of wildlife population inside the park.
However, local observations have shown that the number of wildlife in NTNP has
declined within the last few years (Saumya et al., 2014). Focus group discussions with
park rangers also confirmed that wildlife populations have declined due to excessive
hunting and infrastructure development inside the park. Most flagship species such
as White-browed Nuthatch and other large mammals have disappeared along with
the roadsides due to hunting and increasing access of visitors with motorbikes. A
key informant mentioned that the decline in wildlife population affects not only
the provisioning services for household consumption but also the cultural services
associated with traditional hunting practices.
4.1.3 Current state of management
The park management activities in NTNP are mainly implemented in accordance
with the annual operation plan11. The main activities include patrolling, boundary
demarcation, species monitoring and research, public awareness, and ecotourism
promotion. Patrolling is usually conducted by three patrol teams. Each team is
comprised of three to four members led by a senior park ranger. According to the
operational plan, each team has to patrol at least twice a month in each patrolling zone.
However, a key informant mentioned that the rangers usually conduct patrolling only
in areas that are easily accessible with motorbikes. There is no regular patrolling in the
11Although a five-year management plan was prepared in 2017, the park manager still follow the
operational plan due to budget regulations
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northern part of the park area due to difficult accessibility. Therefore, most of the park
areas can be considered as ’open-access’ due to the lack of law enforcement activity
against illegal uses.
The most common illegal activities in NTNP are shifting cultivation, logging, hunting,
illegal encroachment, and collection of non-timber forest products (NTFP). According
to the park management office, there are 78 illegal cases encountered by park rangers
between 2009 and 2017 (Figure 4.2). About 65% of all these cases are related to shifting
cultivation and illegal logging inside the park. A key informant mentioned that
shifting cultivation inside the park is commonly encountered mainly because of the
unclear land tenure system between the government and local landowners during land
settlement processes. Illegal logging has increased in recent years due to the increasing
demand for timber to construct wooden houses. There is no legal sawmill in Chin
state so that most construction activities have to rely on illegal timber extracted from
the national park and adjacent forests.
Figure 4.2: Number of illegal cases encountered by park rangers (2009-2017)
Source: NTNP Park Management Office, 2017.
Boundary demarcation is another important management activity in NTNP. As of
2017, only about 25% of the park boundary has been demarcated and the rest areas do
not have proper boundary demarcation on the ground. The absence of proper boundary
has offered potential land-use conflicts. Most villagers do not know the park boundary
and frequently encroach into the park area. Since after the establishment of the park,
ten villages have already encroached into the core area without permission. Among
these, three villages have already received official approval from the government and
the rests are still regarded as illegal settlements inside the national park.
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According to the park warden, there are two main challenges to conduct boundary
demarcation. The first challenge is due to the limited budget allocated for boundary
demarcation. Since the park is located in mountainous terrain, it costs at least 100 USD
per km to install boundary pillars as per standard operating procedures. Therefore,
it needs a budget of about 40,000 USD to demarcate the remaining 400 km of the
park boundary. Since the annual budget allocation for boundary demarcation is about
1,000 USD only, it may take several years to complete boundary demarcation around
the park. The second challenge for boundary demarcation is due to the resistance
of local villagers against the park. The villagers do not accept the park boundary
because most of their customary lands are located inside the park. They do not allow
park rangers to install boundary pillars near the villages. In some cases, the villagers
even threatened the park rangers for installing boundary pillars on their customary
lands12. Therefore, the rangers are concerned for their own safety since the villagers
usually have firearms13 but the rangers are not permitted to carry guns in order to
avoid conflicts.
Park management activities are being implemented with limited financial and human
resources. Although the initial staff allocation is 35, only 25 are currently assigned
to implement park management activities. Among the 25 staff members, only 16 are
park rangers and the rest are office administrative staff. On average, each park ranger
has to protect about 44.6 km2 of the park. The staff-to-area ratio is about 22.42 staff
per 1,000 km2, which is lower than the global average of 26.9 staff per 1,000 km2 in
developing countries (James et al., 1999). The annual park management budget is
about 94 USD per km2 for the year 2017-201814. The amount is lower than the required
budget (240 USD per km2) to implement all management activities indicated in the
park management plan (Forest Department, 2017). The operational cost (excluding
staff salary) is about 27 USD per km2 only. This amount is relatively lower than the
operational expenses of other Southeast Asia countries which range from 39-329 USD
per km2 (Emerton et al., 2015). To achieve effective implementation of management
activities, NTNP needs more budget and staff allocation as proposed in the park
management plan.
12In 2016, the villagers threatened the park rangers that they will be killed if they continued to install
boundary pillars near the village.
13Home-made guns are part of the Chin custom and legally permitted to carry in Chin State.
14The total operating budget for 2017-2018 was about 67,220 USD including the staff salaries.
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4.2 Socio-Cultural Settings of the Study Area
4.2.1 Background of the Chin society
Most people living in and around NTNP belong to the Chin ethnic group, which is
one of the eight major ethnic groups in Myanmar15. Generally, the Chins refer to one
of the Tibeto-Burman descents who migrated from southern China (Vumson, 1986).
The Chins originally lived in the upper Chindwin valleys and later migrated to the
mountains in order to avoid conflicts with other ethnic groups (Sakhong, 2003). After
migration to the mountains, the Chins were distributed along the three hilly regions,
namely Chin Hills, Arkan Hills, and Chittagong Hills. When the British occupied the
Chin Hills in 18th century, the Chins were geographically divided into three different
countries: Myanmar, India, and the Bangladesh (Sakhong, 2003). The Chins are known
as Mizo or Kuki in India, Lushai in Bangladesh, and Chin in Myanmar.
The Chins in Myanmar can be differentiated into three main groups: northern Chin,
central Chin, and southern Chin (Lehman, 1963). Due to isolation in hilly regions, the
Chins are separated into several tribal groups. There are 53 Chin ethnic tribes living in
the Chin State of Myanmar. They all speak Chin language in many different dialects
which are not mutually understandable among different tribes (Bradley, 1997). As the
NTNP is located in the southern Chin region, the term ‘Chin’ in this thesis mainly
refers to the Chin people who live in the southern Chin region.
15There are 135 ethnic tribes officially recognized in Myanmar, which are grouped into 8 major ethnic
groups such as Kachin, Kayah, Kayin, Chin, Mon, Bamar, Rakhine, and Shan.
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4.2.2 Political changes
The political history of Chin people can be differentiated into six different periods: (1)
pre-colonial period, (2) colonial period, (3) independence period, (4) socialist period,
(5) military control, and (6) democratic period. A summary of major political events
and their influences on the Chin people is presented in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3: Major political changes in Chin State
Date Events Political influences on Chin State
1885 British occupation to upper
Myanmar
The Chins were divided into three
countries. Tribal chiefs still maintain
administrative powers.
1896 The Chin Hills Regulation was
enacted.
The tribal chiefs received both
traditional and legal administrative
powers.
1947 The first constitution was
adopted by Panglon Agreement.
Chin Hills Tract integrated into
Myanmar as Chin Special Division.
1948 Myanmar got her independence.
Chin Special Division Act 1948
was enacted.
Both tribal chiefs and village heads were
recognised under formal administration.
Traditional rules still applicable at
village levels.
1962 Military coup was performed
due to civil unrest.
The Minister for Chin Affairs was
substituted by the military officers. No
significant changes at village level.
1974 The socialist constitution was
adopted. The Socialist Party
took over the government.
The Chin Special Division was renamed
as the Chin State. Tribal groups were
organised into village tracts.
1988 The second military coup was
performed. The SLORC took
power and adopted the military
administration.
Village tract administrators were
directly assigned by local authorities.
Customary rules were no longer
legitimate.
2008 The 2008 constitution was
adopted.
State/Regional governments were
established. Village tract administrators
were selected by village representatives.
2010 Democratic elections based on
2008 constitution.
Tribal customs no longer existed in
government structure.
Source: synthesised by the author.
50 Chapter 4 Social-Ecological Settings of the Study Area
Pre-colonial period (before 1852)
Before the British annexation, the Chin were merely tribal groups who inhabited in the
mountains. According to Carey and Tuck (1896), the Chins mainly lived as separate
tribal groups—each group had a different name and was administered by different
tribal Chief. Each tribe consists of several villages ranging from three to five villages
for smaller tribes up to more than 100 villages for larger tribes (Carey and Tuck, 1896).
Depending on the type of villages, the political systems differed from each other.
Stevenson (1937) distinguished the political systems of Chin tribal groups into two
different types: autocratic groups and democratic groups. For autocratic groups, the
Chief was the founder of the tribe and considered as the lord of all villages within the
tribe. For democratic groups, there was no tribal Chief among the villages. Instead, a
council of elders who represented the clans had to administer the whole village group
(Stevenson, 1937).
The pre-colonial land tenure system can be classified into three different types:
(1) village settlement areas, (2) cultivated lands, and (3) forested lands. Regarding
the village settlement areas, all clan members had the right to establish houses on any
available spaces within the village territory (Lehman, 1963). For non-clan members,
access to settlement areas was granted only if they made some payments to the chief
or village headmen as protection fees (Stevenson, 1943). The payment may range from
a chicken and a pot of local wine (namely Zu) or a full-grown Mithan (Bos frontalis).
Once the payment had been made, the farmers received similar rights as the clan
members (Stevenson, 1943).
For the cultivated lands, all households residing within the village territory had the
right to access and use any unoccupied land within the village territory for cultivation.
According to Stevenson (1943), there were two main types of land tenure systems for
cultivated lands. The first system was based on collective ownership systems under
the guidance of the chief or village headmen. Under this system, cultivable lands were
distributed to each household every year before the cultivating season. The Chief or
village headman was responsible to ensure that all households received a plot of land
for cultivation (Stevenson, 1943). However, the plots were granted to each farmer for
one cultivation season only so that the farmers could not inherit or transfer the plots
to their next generations (Stevenson, 1943).
The second system was the individual ownership system, where land ownership
over cultivated lands could be obtained based on the first clearance principle16. In this
16The same system was commonly practised in the lower part of Myanmar known as “dama-u-gya”,
which means that the ownership claimed by wielding the machete on the unoccupied land (Furnivall,
1957, p. 50).
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system, household who cleared the forests for the first time received the perpetual
right for cultivation (Stevenson, 1943). The cultivator received both use and transfer
rights to his patrilineal descents or another person within the community. However,
he had no right to sell the land to outsiders, and he still had to pay protection fees
to the village headman. If the land was not used for cultivation, another villager can
cultivate on the land with approval from village headman. The cultivation rights may
be cancelled when the land was needed for general public welfare such as roads or
other public buildings (Stevenson, 1943).
Regarding forest lands, all villagers or clan members had the right to access and
collect the forest products. According to Stevenson (1943), all villagers had the right to
cut building materials, fuelwood, forest foods, fishing, and hunting in any uncultivated
forest lands within the village territory. However, some forest products required
permission before harvesting. For example, hunting could be done without prior
permission, but the hunter had to pay a hind leg of the animal he killed to the Chief.
Harvesting right for the thatch grasses from the forests was also vested in households
who had cleared the weeds or tended the area for better growth of the thatch. Cutting
pine trees for house constructions required prior approval from village headmen
(Stevenson, 1943).
Colonial period (1852-1948)
After British occupation, the Chin Hill was divided into three administrative districts:
the Lushai Hills District in India; the Chittagong Hills Tracts in Bangladesh; and the
Chin Hills District in Myanmar. The Chin Hill Regulations was enacted in 1896. It
was the first formal law introduced to the Chin people. The regulation authorised a
superintendent or deputy commissioner to administer the Chin Hill Tract. Under the
superintendent, assistant superintendents were assigned with general administrative
powers to control each village group. At the village level, the tribal chief or head of
the clans were appointed as formal ‘headmen’ to control the respective villages. For
communities without a tribal chief, the village headmen were directly appointed by
assistant superintendents to administer the villages (Lehman, 1963).
Regarding village settlements, the Chin Hills Regulations restricted the formation
of new settlements without permission from the government. The Section 19 of the
Chin Hills Regulation stated that ‘no new village should be formed without the consent of
the Superintendent, who may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, prohibit the formation
thereof.’ Furnivall (1957) mentioned that there was no proper village system during the
pre-colonial days, and it was introduced by the British, based on their experiences in
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India, in order to make the country easier to rule. Moreover, the British administration
transformed the nomadic behaviour of the hill tribes by introducing a punishment
system, either cash or the crops, to the villagers who migrated out of his village
(Stevenson, 1943).
Another significant change in local land tenure was the delineation of the village
boundaries throughout the Chin Hills. According to Stevenson (1937), the demarcation
of village boundaries not only influenced the village land tenure system but also
created social conflicts among the tribal villages. Particularly, villages which had better
relationships with the authorities received a large area of village territories regardless
of tribal boundaries recognised before the British occupation. Villages which received
smaller areas of land had to borrow cultivated lands from other villages. Consequently,
land markets had evolved in most populated areas of the Chin Hills (Stevenson,
1937).
Although the British introduced formal regulations, they did not restrict the rights
of villagers to practise shifting cultivation, and forest resource uses within the village
boundary. Stevenson (1937) mentioned that access to and the use of agricultural lands
were still maintained under the customary rules, although individual ownership was
gradually evolved in response to the territorial restrictions. Moreover, section 32 of
the Chin Hills Regulations stated that ‘No prosecution under the Upper Burma Forest
Regulation (1887), or any rule thereunder, be instituted against any Chin except with the
sanction in writing of the Superintendent.’ Therefore, the villagers were able to continue
their rights to hunt wildlife or collect the forest products in accordance with local
customary practices.
Independence period (1948-1962)
Myanmar received her independence in 1948. After the independence, the constitution
provided special conditions for the frontier areas including the Chin Hills. The Chin
Hills Tract was renamed into the Chin Special Division. The Chin Special Division Act
(1948) was enacted to administer the Chin people. It included the modifications of
several laws in line with the tribal customs and traditions of the Chin people (Hmone,
1962). The Act was later amended in 1959 to have a uniform system in judicial
organisations (Maung, 1959). Under the Chin Special Division Act, the administrative
power was given to the Minister for Chin Affairs elected by the Chin Affairs Council.
The village Chief still maintained his administrative power in accordance with the
village traditions17.
17Article 11(1) of the Chin Special Division Act (1948).
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Under the Chin Special Division Act, the villages were regulated similarly to the
British administration. Access to cultivated lands was permitted in accordance with
local traditions. Apart from cultivated lands, the forest lands were protected in
accordance with the Forest Act (1902). However, special provisions were made for the
Chin Special Division in order to adapt with customary regulations. For example, the
clause (c) of the forest law in Chin Special Division Act stated that ‘No tree shall be
reserved tree except Teak.’. The clause (d) also stated that ‘There shall be no restrictions on
the collection or removal of other forest products including the parts and products of animals
except those prescribed by local custom.’ The Chin Special Division Act also included
provisions to give awards to the hunters who could kill large predators such as tiger,
leopard, or bear to appreciate their culture (Hmone, 1962). Therefore, although there
were a few administrative reforms after the independence, customary rules were still
legitimate in Chin State during that period.
Socialist period (1962-1988)
In 1962, the military took a coup and replaced the government with the “Revolutionary
Council” formed by the military officers. The Minister for Chin Affairs was replaced by
the military officer appointed by the Council. Later in 1974, the military government
enacted a new constitution18 based on socialist political ideology. According to the
article 11 of the constitution, there was only one ruling party in the government that
controlled all the administrative authorities. The Revolutionary Council founded the
Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) as its own political party where most of its
members were from the military (Leckie and Simperingham, 2009).
Under this constitution, the Chin Special Division was no longer a ‘Special Division’.
It was renamed as ‘Chin State’ in order to have equal status with the other States
and Divisions. The villages were grouped into village tracts regardless of their tribal
affiliations. The customary rules were no longer legitimate in Chin State (Vumson,
1986). The laws and rules were applied in the same way as in the central government.
The constitution also stipulated that the state is the ultimate owner of natural resources
and shall nationalise the means of production within the land.
The Chin Special Division Act (1948) was no longer applicable under the socialist
constitution. Other national laws, that were previously exempted in Chin State, had
become applicable towards the Chin people. The most important laws that influenced
the customary rights of the Chin people were the Land Nationalisation Act (1953) and
the Forest Act (1902). According to the Land Nationalisation Act (1953), the State had
18The Constitution of the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma (1974)
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the right to confiscate any agricultural land within the country. The purpose of the
Act was to abolish the landlordism and to ensure equal distributions of land ownership
among the farmers (Leckie and Simperingham, 2009). The Act included provisions
to exempt against the confiscation of agricultural lands owned by the agriculturalist
family. However, there was no provision for collective land ownership so that the
communal lands under collective ownership had become open-access in accordance
with the new legislation.
Military control (1988-2010)
In 1988, the military took a coup again due to public uprisings. The socialist gov-
ernment was abolished, and a new government, namely the State Law and Order
Restoration Council (SLORC)19, was formed with military officers. The administrative
power was vested to the military generals directly appointed by the chairman of
the council. The village tract administrators were no longer elected by the villagers.
Instead, they were directly appointed by township authorities.
During the military government, a series of laws were promulgated to restrict local
use of forest resources. Among these, the Forest Law (1992) and the Protection of
Wildlife and Protected Areas Law (POWPA) (1994) had a significant influence on the
local rights to forest resources. The Forest Law (1992) authorised Forest Department to
establish reserved forests and protected public forests on the “Land at the disposal of
the Government”. It means that any land that had not acquired legally under existing
laws could be converted into reserved forests. Since the Chins did not have any legal
title over the communal lands, most of the uncultivated forest lands in Chin State were
transformed into reserved forests. Furthermore, the Forest Law restricts the collection
of any forest product for commercial purpose without permission from the Forest
Department.
Democratic period (2010-Present)
In 2008, a new constitution was enacted to substitute the Socialist Constitution (1974).
According to this constitution, the administrative power is shared between the States
and the Union Government. At the local level, the village tract councils were formed
by elected representatives from each village. The councils were also responsible to
select the village tract administrators in accordance with the Ward or Village Tract
Administration Law (2012). Since all existing laws become applicable under this
19it was later renamed as State Peace and Development Council (SPDC).
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constitution, there is no difference in legal regulations between Chin State and other
regions of the country.
In 2012, the Government also enacted two new laws related to land administration,
namely the Farmland Law (2012) and the Vacant, Fallow and Virgin Land Management
(VFVLM) Law (2012). According to the Farmland Law (2012), all farmers need to apply
the “Land Use Certificate (LUC)” for their agricultural lands in order to get the rights
to use, inherit, and sell the lands. However, the farmers need to submit evidence to
the Township Farmland Administration Body to prove the ownership of the land. For
instance, the section 6 of the Farmland Law states that "[...] a person who has right for
farming shall be [...] head of the household [...] who is legally holding and working the land in
accordance with the land laws existed at the time when he acquired the land". This provision
is not applicable in Chin State since most of the shifting cultivation areas are under
the collective ownership of all villagers or members of a particular lineage group.
Moreover, the application process needs to be passed through many institutional levels
which made the farmers less incentive to apply for the formal documents. As a result,
most swidden farmers in Chin State do not apply or are not eligible to apply the LUC
under formal regulations (Andersen, 2015).
The VFVLM Law (2012) also threatened the rights of swidden farmers in Chin State.
The law increases the risks of land grabbing for business concessions. For instance,
the article 3 of the VFVLM Law states that the land that is not cultivated over five
years can be defined as vacant or fallow lands and can be granted as concessions to
business investors for the commercial uses. Since most swidden farmers in Chin State
could not apply LUC, they do not have any formal right over shifting cultivation areas
collectively owned by all village members. Consequently, the conflicts between the
government and traditional landowners have increased due to the formal regulations
imposed by the Farmland Law and the VFVLM Law.
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4.2.3 Socio-economic changes
In response to political changes, Chin State had undergone several changes in socio-
economic conditions. The changes became more dramatic within the last two decades.
Major socio-economic changes in Chin State can be differentiated into three different
types—demographic changes, economic changes, and cultural changes.
Demographic changes
Chin State has the lowest population density in Myanmar compared to other adminis-
trative divisions20. Although the population has increased within the last decades, the
rate of increase is not dramatic compared to other States and Regions. According to
the national census in 2014, about 478,801 people live in Chin State representing about
0.9% of the country’s population (Department of Population, 2015). The population
density is about 13 persons per km2, where about 79% of them are living in rural
areas. The amount of population is slightly increased compared to the census results
conducted in 1983, where the total population was about 368,949 and the population
density was 10 persons per km2 (Department of Population, 2015).
The average household size in 2014 was about 5.1 persons per household. This
amount did not show significant changes compared to the colonial times, which was
reported to be about five persons per household in 1896 (Carey and Tuck, 1896). Due
to limited economic opportunities, Chin State has the highest internal migration rate
compared to the other States and Regions (Department of Population, 2015). Most of
the people migrated to Yangon and neighbouring regions such as Sagaing or Magway.
International migration is relatively lower in Chin State than the other States and
Regions. Within the Chin State, the Mindat district, where the NTNP is situated, has
the least emigration during the last decade. As of 2014, about 15,536 people have
migrated to foreign countries and most of the migrants are between 20 and 30 years
old (Department of Population, 2015).
International migration is also common among the case study village tracts. About
11 people in Case-I, 44 in Case-II and 5 in Case-III were reported to have migrated
abroad within the last ten years. The most common destination is Malaysia mainly
because of higher job opportunities for the young people. Despite the increasing rate of
migration, the total population of case study village tracts has increased by 34 per cent
between 2008 and 2017 (Figure 4.3). The amount is lower than the average national
population growth rate which has increased by 46 per cent between 1983 and 2014
20Myanmar has a total of 14 administrative divisions (seven States and seven Regions).
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(Department of Population, 2015). The total population is expected to increase in the
future due to the improving infrastructure and increasing market opportunities for
certain cash crops.
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Figure 4.3: Changes in total population of case study village tracts (2008-2017)
Source: Land settlement report (2008) and field survey (2017).
Economic changes
The people in Chin State mainly rely on agriculture, livestock, forest products, and
a few off-farm activities. Before British occupation, there was no cash currency or
trade within Chin State (Carey and Tuck, 1896). Although British administration
introduced Indian currency to pay for salaries and labour charges, the opportunity
to spend the money was limited due to the absence of markets within Chin State
(Stevenson, 1943). Cash economy and modern trading practices were improved after
the independence. Notably, cash earning opportunities had increased only among
the civil servants, such as teachers, soldiers, and wage labour (Lehman, 1963). Due
to the political conflicts, the economic opportunities were limited in Chin State for
several decades (MIID, 2014). Therefore, despite the increasing development initiatives,
the majority of the population in Chin State still rely on shifting cultivation, livestock
farming, and collection of forest products (P. S. Aung et al., 2015; Kmoch et al., 2018).
After the democratic reforms, the government introduced several development
schemes in Chin State (MIID, 2014). Village roads, schools, and hospitals were con-
structed throughout the Chin State (World Bank, 2014). Several development projects
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were also implemented with the supports of local and international organisations.
These development projects have influenced local economic conditions. Due to im-
proved accessibility, markets for certain cash crops have increased in recent years. One
of the most promising cash crops is the elephant-foot-yam (Amorphophallus spp.) (Vicol
et al., 2018). Although yam market had been introduced since 1997, the systematic
cultivation of yam started just around 2006 (Fujikawa et al., 2013). Some farmers
have even cultivated yam at commercial scale (Chan and Takeda, 2016). Consequently,
market prices for yam have significantly increased in Chin State which has motivated
farmers to engage more in yam cultivation.
Cultural changes
Religion was one the most important cultural changes in Chin State. In pre-colonial
times, the Chins were mostly animists who believed in spirits and superstitions. Carey
and Tuck (1896) mentioned that rituals and feasts were the main characteristics of the
Chins’ religion. During the colonial period, the British officers invited American Baptist
Missions to the Chin Hills in order to introduce Christian religion (Sakhong, 2003).
At first, only about 3% of the population in Chin State were converted to Christian
religion (Stevenson, 1943). The conversion rate was increased after the missionaries
had introduced the written language and taught at missionary schools (Sakhong, 2003).
Lehman (1963) indicated that the introduction of modern medicines also motivated
the Chins to convert to Christianity. As of 2014, about 85.4% of the total population in
Chin State are Christians; only 13% are Buddhists, and the rests are Islam and a few
Animists (Department of Population, 2016).
Apart from religion, the education level of local people has also increased within
the last decade. In the past, only a few people attended the school mainly because of
inaccessibility and language barrier (Lehman, 1963). After the democratic reform, the
number of schools has increased in Chin State. Consequently, the number of students
has increased with an average of 3,020 students per annum between 2011 and 2017
(Figure 4.4). As of 2014, more than 90% of the people within 10-24 years old have
formal education, whereas only less than 70% of the people between 50-70 years old
have formal education (Department of Population, 2015). This indicates the younger
generations in Chin State have more formal education than the older generation.
The village settlement structure has changed compared to the last ten years. Tradi-
tionally, the Chin villages were mostly established along the steep mountain slopes.
Lehman (1963) indicated three main criteria that the Chins traditionally used for select-
ing new areas for village establishment. The first criterion was that the village should
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Figure 4.4: Changes in the number of schools and students in Chin State (2011-2017)
Source: Myanmar Statistical Yearbook, 2017.
be in a defensible position against the enemies. The second one was that the site should
be as close as possible to natural water sources and agricultural fields, and the last
one was to have a proper shelter against the wind and other natural hazards (Lehman,
1963). Although most villages are still following some of these criteria, some villages
have started to choose the area with better access to roads and other public services. It
is mainly because access to market and public services has become important along
with the increasing market economy and infrastructure development. The introduction
of Chinese motorbikes also motivates them to move village settlements closer to the
roads. As a result, most villages have started to encroach into the national park due to
better road conditions and accessibility to the township markets.
CHAPTER 5
DIAGNOSES OF CASE STUDY VILLAGE TRACTS
5.1 Case Study-I: Makyar Village Tract
5.1.1 Land tenure system
About 75% of the land owned by Makyar village tract is inside the national park.
Among the four villages, only Makyar B village has the legal permission to stay inside
the park. The other three villages are regarded as ‘illegal settlements’ inside the
park. According to park regulations, the villagers have no formal right to access, use,
or transfer the land and other forest resources. In reality, the villagers have been
managing their lands in accordance with local customary practices. Participatory land-
use mapping exercises indicate four different land-use types in Makyar village tract:
(1) village settlement area, (2) agricultural land, (3) forest land, and (4) government
allocated land (see detailed land-use map in Appendix A).
Village settlement area
The village settlement areas are located along the eastern side of mountain ridges
approximately between 1,800 m and 2,200 m above sea level. The houses are built
in the positions to protect against the south-west wind during the monsoon season.
There is no housing plan in all villages. Any villager who wishes to build a house can
choose any available site. There is no boundary or fence between houses so that the
free spaces are regarded as village communal lands. Generally, the settlement area is
the collective ownership of all villagers residing in the village. Even if the village is
established on the land formerly owned by someone, the land has to be donated to the
community as collective ownership.
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Under the customary system, all village members can access and use the land inside
the settlement area. The land can also be transferred or inherited to other village
members. However, it cannot be sold to outsiders since the absolute ownership is
collectively held by all villagers. For the land borrowers1, they have access, use, and
management rights over the land, but they do not have the right to exclude, transfer, or
sell the land to outsiders. The land borrower has to pay a land-use fee to the landowner
which usually includes several pots of local wine (Zu) and a few livestock depending
on crop productivity. Table (5.1) summarises the local rules for village settlement areas
in Makyar village tract.
Table 5.1: Local rules for village settlement areas in Makyar village tract
Types of rights Formal rules
Local rules (villagers)
Borrowers Outsiders
Village area Housing site
Access Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Use No Yes Yes Yes No
Manage No Collective Individual Yes No
Exclude No Collective Individual No No
Transfer No Collective Individual No No
Sale No No No No No
Source: Focus group discussions, 2017.
Agricultural land
Shifting cultivation is the main type of agriculture in Makyar village tract. Shifting
cultivation areas are located at lower altitudes below the village settlement areas. The
cultivation plots are organised into different rotational fields—each field consists of
several plots depending on the number of households cultivated on the field2. The
farmers cultivate on each field for two to three years depending on soil condition.
After the soil has exhausted, the farmers move to another field, which has better tree
cover to provide sufficient soil for the next cultivation cycle. The fallow period of each
field ranges from five to ten years or more depending on the number of cultivators
and land availability within the village territory.
There are two levels of tenure that are related to agricultural lands in Makyar village
tract. The first level is related to the ownership of the shifting cultivation fields.
Generally, all shifting cultivation fields are collectively owned by villagers, and no one
1Traditionally, landless farmers can borrow the land from others either from the same village or from
different village.
2In southern Chin dialect, the field is known as Khawbung and the individual plot is known as
Khawming.
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owns the fields individually. Therefore, the tenure rights related to cultivation fields
are controlled by all village members. The second level is related to ownership of
individual plots within each field. The plots may be owned by a single household or by
a group of households within the same lineage. They have both access and use rights
to their plots. They also have the right to transfer their lands to future generations
or any other household within the same community. However, they do not have the
right to sell their lands to outsiders. For instance, in 2014, the former headman of
Makyar A village tried to sell his lands to outsiders. The villagers protested against
him and reported to the park authority to take action in accordance with the park
regulations3.
Selling or transfer of agricultural land is permitted within the community only.
According to the local custom, only the patrilineal sons have the right to inherit the
land. For outsiders, they can only borrow the land from landowners for a short period
of time. They also have to follow the village customs and regulations in relation to
shifting cultivation. Land borrowers are not allowed to transfer the borrowed lands to
other farmers. They are also not permitted to cultivate perennial crops such as yam
or other horticultural trees to avoid conflicts in the future. Table (5.2) presents the
summary of local rules for agricultural land in Makyar village tract.
Table 5.2: Local rules for agricultural lands in Makyar village tract
Types of rights Formal rules
Local rules (Villagers)
Borrowers Outsiders
Fields Plots
Access Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Use No Yes Yes Yes No
Manage No Collective Individual Yes No
Exclude No Collective Individual No No
Transfer No Collective Individual No No
Sale (within village) No No Yes No No
Sale (outside village) No No No No No
Source: Focus group discussions, 2017.
Forest land
Forest lands in Makyar village tract refer to the forest areas located outside the
cultivated lands. Since all forest lands in Makyar village tract are located inside the
national park, the villagers have no formal right to cut trees, collect NTFP, or hunt
wildlife within the forest lands. In reality, the villagers use different types of rights
3Report no. LaNga-3/ 421/2015 by park warden, February 1, 2015
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regarding the forest lands in accordance with traditional regulations. The participatory
land-use mappings indicate two different types of forest lands in Makyar village tract,
namely watershed forests and the open-access forests.
Watershed forests: All villagers rely on natural water springs for their daily uses. To
collect water, the villagers constructed small reservoirs (approximately about three to
five square meters) around the water sources. From each water source, the water is
delivered to each household by using gravity flow system. Therefore, forests located
around the water sources are preserved as watershed forests. Destructive activities
such as cutting trees or clearing the land for cultivation are strictly prohibited inside
the watershed forests. Only non-destructive activities such as hunting or collection of
NTFP are permitted without any restriction (Table 5.3).
Table 5.3: Local rules for forest lands in Makyar village tract
Activities Formal rules
Watershed forests Open access forest
Villagers Outsiders Villagers Outsiders
Access Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cutting timber No No No Yes No
NTFP No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hunting No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Manage No Collective No Collective No
Exclude No Collective No Collective No
Transfer No Collective No Collective No
Sale No No No No No
Source: Focus group discussions, 2017.
For outsiders, hunting and NTFP collection are permitted in watershed forests.
However, cutting trees is prohibited both for village members and outsiders. For
instance, in 2016, some villagers from Makyar C village cut a few trees inside the
watershed forest of a neighbouring village. The neighbouring villagers reported to
the park authorities to punish the Makyar C villagers. The park authorities did not
take any action since the forest is located outside the national park. Consequently, the
villagers continued to argue each other creating social conflicts between two villages.
Therefore, although there is no specific penalty against cutting trees, breaking local
rules can lead to social conflicts among the neighbouring villages.
Open-access forests: Forests outside the watershed areas are regarded as open-access
forests. All villagers have the rights to cut timber, collect NTFP, or hunt wildlife within
the open-access forests. Moreover, the open-access forests are regarded as the common
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property of all villagers so that everyone has the right to manage, exclude, or give to
future generations. However, the villagers do not have the right to sell the land to
outsiders without consents from other village members. Regarding outsiders, they are
allowed to collect NTFP or hunt within the open-access forests. Only cutting trees is
prohibited against outsiders inside the open-access forests.
Allocated land
During the park establishment processes, a total of 270 ha of lands were allocated for
villagers who live in Makyar village tract. Among the four villages, Makyar B, Makyar
D, and Makyar C had received allocated lands as their village settlement areas are
located inside the national park. However, Makyar A villagers, who are traditional
landowners, did not receive any allocated land despite they have lost their agricultural
lands inside the park4. According to park regulations, villagers have the rights to
access, withdraw, manage, and exclude others from allocated lands. However, the use
right is given exclusively for household consumption and selling forest products for
commercial purpose is prohibited. The villagers also do not have the right to transfer
the allocated land to another including their own generations5 (Table 5.4).
Table 5.4: Changes in local rules after land allocation program
Type of rights Formal rules
Local rules (owners) Local rules (recipients)
Before After Before After
Access Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Use Own-use Own-use No Own-use Own-use
Manage Individual Collective No Collective Collective
Exclude Yes Yes No No Yes
Transfer No Yes No No Yes
Sale No No No No No
Source: Focus group discussions, 2017.
The land allocation program was designed to distribute agricultural plots to indi-
vidual households depending on the number of family members. However, the land
allocation team only demarcated one to two large shifting cultivation fields without
demarcating individual plots for each household. The villagers do not even realise
that they have individual ownership for the allocated lands. As a result, all allocated
lands are regarded as collective ownership of all villagers living in the village.
4Makyar A was excluded from land allocation as its former settlement area was outside the park.
5Section 5 of the park notification letter indicates that the allocated lands shall only be used by the
person mentioned in the land settlement reports, and shall not be transferred to future generations.
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Land allocation programs have created several social conflicts between traditional
owners and land recipients. For example, both Makyar B and Makyar D villagers live
and cultivate on borrowed lands owned by Makyar A villagers. Therefore, although
they hold both the use and management rights over the borrowed land, the exclusion
and transfer rights were still controlled by traditional landowners. However, after the
land allocation processes, they have received not only access, use, and management
rights—that they already have under traditional rules—but also the exclusion right
under formal regulations. The recipients also enjoy inheritance right, despite it is
prohibited under formal regulations, due to lack of monitoring after land allocation
processes. Consequently, traditional landowners no longer have the rights to use,
manage, exclude, or transfer the lands that have been allocated to the land borrowers.
Governance structure
There are two levels of land governance structure in Makyar village tract. The first
one is the village tract land administration committee formally organised at the village
tract level. The second one is the village council organised at each village level to make
land-use decisions.
Village tract land administration committee: The village tract land administration com-
mittee is a formal governance structure authorised by the township administrative
department. The committee is formed with village representatives and is chaired by
the village tract administrator. Each village can nominate one representative per ten
households so that the larger villages have more representatives in the committee than
the smaller ones. According to government regulations, the formal committee has the
right to define agricultural boundaries, to permit cultivation, to monitor whether the
villagers follow formal obligations or not, to give sanctions against violations, and to
resolve conflicts (Table 5.5). In reality, the committee could not practice any of these
rights mainly because most government regulations are not compatible with local
conditions. For instance, formal rules require farmers to apply for the individual land
ownership system. However, the traditional shifting cultivation practices do not allow
for absolute land ownership by individual households. The local custom of collective
land inheritance system also makes difficult formal authority to validate individual
ownership among farmers.
The village tract committee is not authorised to develop new rules because they have
to follow formal government regulations. Since the majority of lands are located inside
the park, the committee has no jurisdiction to manage the lands within the village tract.
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Table 5.5: Land governance structures in Makyar village tract
Activities
Village tract committee Village council
Formal rules Local rules Formal rules Local rules
Defining boundary Yes No No Yes
Developing rules No No No Yes
Giving permission Yes No No Yes
Monitoring Yes No No Yes
Sanctioning Yes No No Yes
Resolving conflicts Yes No No Yes
Source: Focus group discussions, 2017.
The committee also fails to resolve land-related conflicts between neighbouring villages.
For example, there were several land-related conflicts regarding land ownership
between traditional owners and land borrowers. However, the committee was not
able to solve these issues mainly because neither traditional owners nor borrowers
formally own the land under park regulations. Moreover, the committee is authorised
to solve social conflicts in accordance with formal regulations. In reality, the committee
could not resolve land conflicts since the formal regulations are not accepted by the
villagers.
Traditional village council: In contrast to the formal committee, the village councils
serve as an important governance body in Makyar village tract. Each village has
its own village council informally organised by village elders. The main purpose of
the council is to make communal decisions. Instead of formal village headmen, the
traditional village leaders usually lead the village council meetings. The traditional
village leaders are usually the heads of the clan so that they could influence most
villagers in decision-making processes. A key informant mentioned that most land-use
decisions in Makyar village tract are made at the village council meetings (KI-20, 2017).
It includes the decision to move the village into a new settlement area, to select a new
cultivated field, or to permit large-scale tree cuttings from village-use forests. Although
the council does not have any legal authority, most villagers tend to follow more on
the decisions made by the village council rather than formal village tract committee
(see Table 5.5).
The village council also has the authority to develop new informal rules regarding
land and resource uses. For example, local rules for watershed protection have been
established based on the discussions at village council meetings (KI-20, 2017). The
village council also plays an important role in resolving conflicts among the villagers.
A key informant mentioned that the villager usually held village council meetings
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to resolve land-related conflicts within the village such as disputes related to plot
boundary or land ownership among neighbouring farmers (KI-20, 2017). If the conflict
occurs between different villages, it has to be resolved either through negotiation by
the village council or by consulting with township authorities.
5.1.2 Livelihood strategies and forest income
Livelihood activities in Makyar village tract can generally be categorised into five
main types: (1) forest, (2) agriculture, (3) livestock, (4) wage labour, and (5) non-farm
employment. Among these, forest is the most common livelihood activity reported by
all sample households. Agriculture and livestock breeding are the second common
activities reported by 92% of total households respectively. About 48% of households
reported engaging in wage labour in other farms or government development projects.
Non-farm employment is the least common activity reported by 38% of total house-
holds. The detailed descriptions of income from each livelihood activity are presented
in Appendix A.
Income distribution by livelihood strategies
The hierarchical cluster analysis (HCA) in combination with the principal component
analysis (PCA) produces three distinct combinations of livelihood clusters in Makyar
village tract (see details in Appendix A). Among the three clusters, the Forest–Wage
strategy provides the highest income with an average of 2,026 USD per year6. The
second most income-generating strategy is Agriculture–Wage strategy which provides
an average income of 1,392 USD per year. The Agriculture–Non-farm strategy provide
the lowest amount of income with an average of 1,162 USD per year. However, the
non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test shows that total income is not significantly different
across the three livelihood clusters (p>0.05). It implies that the majority of households
have a similar amount of income regardless of their livelihood choices.
Regarding cash income, Forest–Wage strategy receives the highest amount of income
compared to the other two strategies (Figure 5.1a). The distribution is significantly
different across three livelihood clusters (χ2=11.60, p<0.05). Correlation analysis
shows that there is a significant positive association (r=0.44, p<0.01) between cash
forest income and total cash income, although the correlation coefficient is weak. It
indicates that those who engage more in cash forest activities receive more total cash
income than the other households. Regarding subsistence income, Agriculture–Wage
6The exchange rate for one US Dollar is 1,234 Myanmar Kyats in 2016.
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strategy receives higher amount of income than Agriculture–Non-farm strategy (p<0.01).
However, there is no significant difference for Forest-Wage strategy compared to other
two livelihood strategies (p>0.05) (Figure 5.1b).
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Figure 5.1: Total income by livelihood clusters in Makyar village tract
The distribution of forest income is significantly different across three livelihood
clusters (χ2=11.53, p<0.01). Multiple comparisons indicate that the Agriculture–Non-
farm strategy receives a lower amount of total forest income than the other two
strategies. It means that households that engage mainly in agriculture and non-
farm activities use fewer forest products than other households that engage mainly
in agriculture and wage employment activities. Regarding cash forest income, the
distribution is significantly different across the three livelihood strategies (χ2=11.25,
p<0.01). Multiple comparisons indicate that the Forest–Wage strategy receives a higher
amount of cash forest income than the other two strategies (Figure 5.2a). Although this
strategy receives more cash forest income, only 10% of households have adopted this
strategy. It is mainly because cash forest activities, particularly the extraction of wood,
require specific skills such as the use of chainsaws or house construction techniques.
Therefore, not all households can engage in this strategy. Moreover, extraction of
timber for commercial purpose is considered illegal so that there is a high risk for the
households to engage in cash forest activities than other livelihood activities.
The amount of subsistence forest income is also significantly different among the
three livelihood clusters (χ2=10.85, p<0.01). However, multiple comparisons indicate
that only Agriculture–Non-farm and Agriculture–Wage strategies are significantly dif-
ferent to each other (Figure 5.2b), whereas there is no significant difference between
Forest-Wage strategy and the other two strategies. It indicates that engagement in cash
forest activity does not influence the subsistence use of forest products.
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Figure 5.2: Forest income by livelihood clusters in Makyar village tract
Contribution of forest income into poverty and inequality
Forest income contributes about 49% of total household income in Makyar village tract.
The contribution is mainly from subsistence use of forest resources rather than cash
income from selling forest products. The proportion of cash forest income is relatively
lower than other income sources representing about 8% of total household income. It
indicates that local households rely on forest mainly to sustain the livelihood needs
rather than to generate cash income. The poverty headcount ratio for Makyar village
tract is 0.42. It means that about 42% of households in Makyar village tract are living
below the national poverty line7. The FGT poverty decomposition analysis shows that
poverty headcount ratio is reduced from 0.88 to 0.42 due to forest income (Table 5.6).
It means that limiting local use of forest products may increase about 52% of income
poverty in Makyar village tract. The poverty gap ratio has also reduced from 0.42
to 0.10 due to forest income. It indicates that forest income has a significant impact
on poor households by reducing about 76% of their poverty gaps. In addition, forest
income also reduces poverty severity from 0.25 to 0.03 indicating that forest income
equalises about 88% of income differences among the poor households.
Table 5.6: FGT poverty measures and Gini index in Makyar village tract
Income sources Headcount Poverty gap Poverty severity Gini
With forest income 0.42 0.10 0.03 0.32
Without forest income 0.88 0.42 0.25 0.38
Differences -0.46 -0.32 -0.22 -0.06
Relative change -52% -76% -88% -17%
10% increase in forest income 0.38 0.09 0.03 0.32
7The national poverty line for Myanmar is about 376,151 Kyats (304.8 USD) per adult equivalent unit
per year (UNDP, 2011).
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Forest income also reduces income inequality among households. The Gini coeffi-
cient index is reduced from 0.38 to 0.32 due to forest income. It means that about 17%
of income inequality in Makyar village tract is reduced due to forest income. The Gini
decomposition by income sources also shows that forest income has the lowest Gini
coefficient (Gk = 0.416) compared to other income sources (Table 5.7). It means that
forest income shows more equal distribution among households than other income
sources. However, it does not mean that local inequality will be reduced more if access
to forest income is increased.
Table 5.7: Gini decomposition by income sources in Makyar village
tract
Income source Sk Gk Rk GT SG MEFG
Forest 0.489 0.416 0.807 0.164 0.508 0.020
Agriculture 0.194 0.444 0.305 0.026 0.081 –0.112
Livestock 0.094 0.473 0.266 0.012 0.037 –0.057
Wage 0.143 0.847 0.610 0.074 0.229 0.086
Non-farm 0.081 0.892 0.647 0.046 0.144 0.064
Total 1.000 0.322 1.000 0.322
Note: Sk= Income share; Gk= Gini coefficient of each income source;
Rk=Gini correlation with total income; GT=Gini coefficient of total in-
come; SG=Share of total Gini; MEFG=Marginal effect on total Gini.
Results from marginal effect analysis show that only agriculture and livestock income
have equalizing effects (i.e. decreasing inequality effect) on total income inequality8. It
means that if the current level of forest income is increased by 10% and other income
sources remain the same, the total income inequality will be increased by 0.2% in
Makyar village tract. Conversely, if agriculture and livestock income are increased by
10% and other income remains equal, the total income inequality will be decreased by
1.12% and 0.57% respectively. It implies that although current levels of forest income
reduce income inequality, promotion of forest income will likely to increase total
inequality in Makyar village tract.
8The Gini decomposition method indicates that if Gini correlation with total income (Rk) is lower
than Gini coefficient of each income component (GK), the increase (or decrease) in the share of each
income source (Sk) will increase (or decrease) the Gini coefficient of total income (GT) (Fonta and
Ayuk, 2013).
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5.1.3 Traditional ecological knowledge and practices
Traditional ecological knowledge in Makyar village tract can be differentiated into
two different groups: (1) traditional agricultural practices and (2) traditional forest
management practices.
Traditional agricultural practices
Shifting cultivation is the most common agricultural practice in Makyar village tract.
The main characteristic of this practice is that cultivated fields are left for an extended
period in order to regenerate forest cover for the next cultivation cycle. The farmers
usually adopt four main activities in order to achieve sustainable shifting cultivation
practices: (1) rotational field selection, (2) land clearing, (3) controlled burning and
(4) ritual performances. The summary of TEK-based agricultural practices and their
relevance to conservation in Makyar village tract is presented in Table (5.8).
Table 5.8: Summary of agricultural practices in Makyar village tract
Sr. Description Relevance to conservation
1 No cultivation outside the
selected field.
Enhance forest protection and systematic
land-use.
2 Field selection by village council
meeting.
Enhance conservation and reduce
conflicts by collective decisions.
3 Plot sharing among farmers. Reduce encroachment into forests.
4 Labour sharing for land clearing. Support selective tree cutting.
5 Tree stumps are left standing
without cutting.
Enhance soil recovery of fallow lands by
promoting coppicing.
6 No clearing of fields without
communal rituals.
Systematic timing of land clearing.
7 Preparing fire-breaks before
burning.
Reduce destruction of ecosystem.
8 Ritual selection of a person to
start fire.
Enable systematic controlled burning.
9 Burning is done during waxing
moon only.
Adjust timing of controlled burning.
10 Adoption of systematic burning
technique.
Enable efficient control of fire.
11 Compensation payments if fire
spread outside the field.
Motivate controlled burning.
12 Taboo not to eat crop before the
harvest rituals.
Enhance connection with land and crops.
Source: Focus group discussions, 2017.
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Rotational field selection: There are two main activities that ensure sustainable fallow
management. The first activity is the selection of suitable agricultural fields for the next
cultivation season. The field selection meetings (locally known as taungya meetings)
are usually held in October after the crops have been harvested. During the meeting,
the farmers decide whether they will continue to cultivate again on the same field or
to select a new cultivation field. The decision is made based on the soil condition of
current fields as well as the availability of suitable fields for the next crop season.
The second activity is the distribution of agricultural plots to each farmer. The plots
are allocated to individual farmers either by using a lottery system or by negotiation
among farmers. Plots with better soil condition have to be allocated alternately. The
plot size for each farmer is determined based on labour availability and previous
performance. It is important because all farmers need to finish clearing the respective
plots before the rain begins in order to achieve proper burning (KI-21, 2017).
Land clearing: The plots are cleared during November and December in order to allow
enough time to dry the wood biomass before burning. One important practice is that
the farmers usually do not cut the trees located either at ridge-tops or near the streams
(see photo 7 in Appendix D). The primary purpose is to protect the crop against the
wind and to reduce soil erosion due to heavy rains. A key informant mentioned that
this traditional practice had been adopted by their ancestors so that it is considered
taboo in some villages (KI-20, 2017). It means that some farmers follow this practice
even though they do not understand its ecological benefits.
Controlled burning: The fields are usually burnt in late March or early April before
the monsoon rain begins. The controlled burning practices aim to clear the land with
minimum labour input, to release nutrients stored in plant biomass for crop cultivation,
and to suppress weed species. Traditionally, there are three main activities that the
farmers practise to ensure controlled burning. The first activity is the preparation of
fire brakes around the field. This activity is collectively done by all farmers, where
at least one person from each plot has to participate. The fire-brakes are usually
constructed by clearing the land, with a width of at least one to three meters along the
field boundary (see photo 9 in Appendix D). It is usually done within one or two days
before burning. A key informant mentioned that if they prepare fire-brakes too early,
the dry leaves or branches will cover it after a few days and may increase the risk of
fire during burning (KI-9, 2017).
The second activity for controlled burning is the selection of burning date. Tradition-
ally, the fields are usually burnt during the waxing-moon period instead of the waning
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moon. The farmers believe that it will be difficult to control the fire if the burning
is done during the waning moon. A key informant explained that the wind is more
unstable during the waning moon than the waxing moon so that it will be difficult to
control the fire (KI-21, 2017). The time for controlled burning is also determined based
on the arrival of the first monsoon rain. If the burning is done too early, the crops may
not grow very well because the ashes may be lost due to the monsoon wind. If the
monsoon rain comes before burning, the field will not be adequately burnt, and they
have to re-burn the field again. Therefore, selection of an appropriate burning date is
essential not only to minimise the risk of fire and but also to ensure optimal growth of
the crops.
The third activity is the implementation of a specific controlled burning method.
The farmers mentioned that it is essential to start a fire from higher areas toward the
valleys so that the natural barriers will minimise the spread of fire to neighbouring
fields (see photo 10 in Appendix D). Once the fire has become stable, all farmers can
increase the fire intensity around the field. Moreover, the farmers usually select a
person to start the fire in order to ensure the timing of burning. A key informant
mentioned that in former time, a village shaman was usually appointed to start the
fire during the controlled burning processes. If the village did not have any shaman,
they had to select an appropriate person who did not cause any fire accident in the
past (KI-21, 2017).
Traditional rituals: Traditional rituals play important roles in controlling the timing
of particular agricultural practices as well as in enhancing social interactions among
the villagers. Traditionally, farmers perform a series of rituals throughout a single
agricultural season (see Table 5.9). Among these, the most important one is the
‘field opening ritual’, which is usually performed before opening a new field. The
purpose of this ritual is to have better crop yields and to avoid accidents during land
clearing processes. Generally, the farmers are not allowed to clear their plots without
performing this ritual. If someone starts to clear his plot before the rite, he has to pay
fine or compensate for any accident encountered during the land clearing processes.
The farmers usually perform this ritual by offering chicken, pig, eggs, and Zu to the
field spirits. The cost for the livestock and Zu have to be shared among all participating
farmers. In most cases, wealthy farmers usually pay for livestock, and the rests have to
contribute Zu and other materials.
Other important events are ‘harvest ritual’ and ‘feast of merits’. When the crops are
ready for harvesting, each farmer should harvest a small portion of crops from his plot
in order to offer to the field spirits. He also has to donate a small share of crops to
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Table 5.9: Summary of agricultural rituals in Makyar village tract
Sr. Name Timing Means of performance Main purposes
1 Khaw Chae Before land
clearing
Collective offering
with livestock and Zu
To have better crop
yields and to avoid
accidents.
2 Khaw Ma
She
Before
burning
Collective offering
with chicken blood
and Zu
To avoid fire accidents
outside the field.
3 Mashe Bon Before
planting
Individual offering by
spraying chicken
blood over the seeds
To achieve good
germination of seeds
4 Khaw Dok Flowering
period
Individual offering by
collecting some leaves,
spray with blood, and
keep in the kitchen
To have better yields.
5 Lo Kwe First harvest Individual offering
with firstly harvested
crops to the shaman or
village elders
To appreciate the
guidance of elders and
local spirits.
6 Lo Hlu After harvest Individual or
collective offerings
with Mithan as a feast
of merit
To avoid sickness,
accidents, or being
possessed by evil
spirits.
Source: Focus group discussions, 2017.
traditional village headman in order to show his gratitude. A key informant mentioned
that family members are not allowed to consume their crops without performing the
harvest ritual (KI-21, 2017). Some farmers also perform feasts of merit after all crops
have been harvested. The main purposes are to appreciate the village spirits for giving
prosperity, and to avoid sickness, accidents, or being possessed by evil spirits.
Traditional forest management practices
Traditionally, the villagers protect forests near to the water sources in order to achieve
the sustainable provision of drinking water. This practice has evolved based on the
local understanding of the relationship between forest protection and water availability.
It was mentioned that the amount of water had declined mainly due to shifting
cultivation and tree cuttings near the water sources. The local awareness on watershed
protection has increased after the introduction of water transportation system9.
9This includes preparation of small reservoirs near the water sources and distribution of water to the
village through plastic pipes by using gravity flow system.
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In addition to watershed protection, there are several local taboos that are relevant
for forest protection (Table 5.10). The villagers also protect the forests due to their
spiritual beliefs. It was mentioned that the forests, where villagers use to perform
ritual offerings, are considered as the home of local spirits. It is believed that whoever
cut the trees within those areas will be punished by evil spirits. The punishment may
include having accidents during tree cuttings or getting severe sickness among family
members (KI-21, 2017). In addition to ritual places, banyan trees (ficus spp.) are also
considered as the home of evil spirits so that the farmers do not cut this species even if
the tree is located on the agricultural fields.
Table 5.10: Summary of resource-use taboos in Makyar village tract
Sr. Description Relevance to conservation
1 No cutting of trees or land
clearing near water sources.
Enhance water regulation service.
2 No cutting of trees near ritual
places.
Support conservation of tree species.
3 No cutting of ficus trees. Support conservation of tree species.
4 No killing of primate species such
as gibbons.
Support conservation of primate species.
Source: Focus group discussions, 2017.
Killing primate species are considered as taboo in Makyar village tract. The villagers
believe that killing primate species, particularly the hoolock gibbons, would bring
bad luck not only to the one who kills the animal but also to all members of his close
relatives. It includes having sickness among clan members, destruction of crops by
animals, or encountering fire accidents during the burning processes. A key informant
mentioned that in former time, the villagers were not allowed to bring dead gibbons
into the village. If someone did, he had to pay for compensation if unusual accidents
occurred in the village (KI-21, 2017). This explanation implies that breaking local
taboos may have social consequences even though one may not believe in evil spirits.
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5.2 Case Study-II: Ung Village Tract
5.2.1 Land tenure system
About 50 per cent of the total land area in Ung village tract is located inside the national
park. Therefore, the villagers do not have any right, except for the access right, to these
areas in accordance with formal regulations. The other 50 per cent of land located
outside the park is legally recognised as vacant lands so that the villagers have both
access and use right over these lands. However, most villagers do not recognise formal
regulations so that they usually manage the lands in accordance with local customary
regulations. Participatory land-use mapping exercises indicate four different land-use
types in Ung village tract, namely (1) village settlement area, (2) agricultural land, (3)
forest land, and (4) allocated land (See detailed land-use map in Appendix A).
Village settlement area
Village settlement areas are located at higher places along the mountain ridges. Houses
are built along the roads that connect the villages to a nearby town. There is no fence
between the houses so that the remaining spaces are available for every villager. The
settlement areas are regarded as collective ownership of all villagers residing in the
village. Therefore, both use and management rights are collectively held by all villagers.
Each household has the rights to access, use, or transfer the housing site among the
villagers. However, it does not have the right to sell the land to outsiders. It is because
the settlement area by itself is regarded as a collective property of all villagers so that
every decision has to be made collectively by all community members. Table (5.11)
summarises the local rules for village settlement areas in Ung village tract.
Table 5.11: Local rules for village settlement areas in Ung village tract
Types of rights Formal rules
Local rules (villager)
Outsider
Village area Housing site
Access Yes Yes Yes Yes
Use Yes Yes Yes No
Manage Yes Collective Individual No
Exclude No Collective Individual No
Transfer No Collective Individual No
Sale No No Yes No
Source: Focus group discussions, 2007.
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Agricultural land
There are two different types of agricultural land in Ung village tract: (1) shifting
cultivation areas, and (2) permanent farms. Traditionally, local rules for shifting
cultivation differ between the cultivation fields and individual plots. The fields are
usually owned by a group of farmers or lineage families, and all farmers collectively
make the decision to open a new field. Regarding individual plots, the owners have
the right to access, use, manage or transfer the land to another farmer within the same
village. However, they are not allowed to use their plots unless the field is collectively
chosen for cultivation. The farmers are not allowed to sell individual plots to outsiders.
Nevertheless, selling the whole field is permitted if it is agreed by all farmers.
Apart from shifting cultivation, farmers apply different tenure rules for permanent
farms. Traditionally, permanent farms refer to the areas where the farmers planted
perennial crops continuously for several years. The most common perennial crop
in Ung village tract is elephant-foot-yam, which is one of the most common cash
crops in Chin State. Yam is usually planted in areas closed to the village in order to
reduce the risk of being stolen by outsiders. In principle, yam plots are considered
as private property so that landowners have the right to sell yam plots to everyone
including outsiders from other villages. Consequently, permanent plots have become
more important for farmers than the shifting cultivation plots. Land borrowers are not
allowed to plant yam on the borrowed lands because it will become a permanent farm
in the future. Therefore, farmers who want to plant yam require either to buy the land
from other farmers or to encroach into the forests collectively owned by all villagers.
Table (5.12) summarises tenure rules for agricultural lands in Ung village tract.
Table 5.12: Local rules for agricultural lands in Ung village tract
Type of rights
Formal rules Local rules (Villager)
Non-villager
Inside park Outside park Swidden Permanent
Access Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Use No Yes Yes Yes No
Manage No Yes Collective Individual No
Exclude No No Collective Yes No
Transfer No No Collective Yes No
Sale No No No Yes No
Source: Focus group discussions, 2017.
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Forest land
More than 75% of forests in Ung village tract are situated inside the national park.
Therefore, the villagers have no right to use or manage these forests under formal
regulations. In reality, the villagers are managing the forests within each village
territory in accordance with the customary regulations. Depending on purposes and
level of protection, forest lands in Ung village tract can be categorised into three
different types: (1) watershed forest, (2) village-use forest, and (3) open-access forest.
Watershed forest: Forests around the village water sources are considered as watershed
forests in Ung village tract. Destructive activities, such as cutting trees, clearing the
land for cultivation, and livestock grazing, are not allowed inside the watershed forests.
Hunting and NTFP collection are permitted to all village members. Collecting forest
product by outsiders is strictly prohibited inside the watershed forests (Table 5.13).
Table 5.13: Local rules for forest lands in Ung village tract
Activities
Watershed forests Village use forests Open access forests
Villager Outsider Villager Outsider Villager Outsider
Access Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cutting timber No No Own use No Yes No
NTFP Yes No Yes No Yes No
Hunting Yes No Yes No Yes No
Manage Collective No Collective No Collective No
Exclude Collective No Collective No Collective No
Transfer Collective No Collective No Collective No
Sale No No No No No No
Source: Focus group discussions, 2017.
Among the four villages, Ung A and Ung C villages have established a fine system
against cutting trees inside the watershed forests. In Ung A village, whoever commit
tree cutting within the watershed forest have to pay a fine of 5,000 kyats (about 4 USD)
and the timber will be confiscated as village property. In Ung C village, the amount of
fine for cutting a tree is 15,000 kyats (about 11 USD), and the trees will be confiscated
as village property. A key informant mentioned that a villager was recently punished
to pay a fine of 20,000 kyats (about 16 USD) for cutting trees inside the watershed
forest (KI-14, 2017).
Village-use forest: Village-use forests are clearly defined in Ung A and Ung C villages.
Within these forests, the villagers can cut the trees both for personal and public uses. In
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Ung B and Ung D, village-use forests are not clearly delineated. Instead, forests located
near the villages are regarded as village-use forests. Within these forests, all villagers
have the right to cut timber for consumption only. Selling timber for commercial
purpose is prohibited inside the village-use forests. A key informant mentioned that,
The demand for timber has increased recently because many people have started
to build wooden houses. Therefore, we decided to regulate cutting trees within
two furlongs (about 0.4 km) from the village. Within this area, villagers are not
allowed to cut timber without permission from village headman (KI-14, 2017).
Apart from timber, the villagers are allowed to collect NTFP not only for home
consumption but also for commercial purposes. Outsiders are not permitted to cut
timber or collect NTFP without prior consents from village members. If an outsider
cut the trees without permission, he has to pay a fine as decided by the villagers.
For example, in 2015, the Ung C villagers cut the trees inside the Ung B territory to
renovate the village church. The Ung B villagers complained about it and asked to
pay 50,000 kyats (about 37 USD) as a compensation. A key informant mentioned that
according to the local custom, the villagers could claim the compensation even if they
found out after a long period (KI-14, 2017).
Open-access forest: Within the open-access forests, all villagers have the right to cut
timber or collect NTFP without any restriction. Cutting timber for commercial purpose
is also permitted to all village members. However, shifting cultivation is prohibited in
order to avoid fire accidents to the remaining forests. Outsiders are not allowed to cut
timber or clear the land without permission. For example, in 2016, Ung C villagers
collected construction materials, such as gravel and stones, inside the open-access
forest owned by Ung D villagers. The Ung D villagers found out and asked Ung C
villagers to pay money as a fine (KI-14, 2017). A similar case had occurred in 2014,
where some outsiders had to pay a hunting muzzle10 as they did shifting cultivation
inside the open-access forests (KI-17, 2017). Therefore, although the open-access forests
are not restricted for the villagers, they are not freely available to outsiders under
customary regulations.
Allocated land
About 270 hectares of lands were allocated to Ung village tract. According to the land
settlement report, agricultural lands were allocated to each household depending on
10Traditionally, the Chin people use any valuable thing such as a knife, gun, livestock, or earrings as a
local currency.
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the number of household members. However, the villagers do not know the area of
land allocated for each household. They do not have any official certificate so that
they do not know about their rights and regulations regarding the allocated lands. For
example, a villager mentioned that,
My father participated in the preliminary surveys conducted by the land settlement
team. They demarcated some areas and told us that those areas will be allocated to
us as compensation for our land inside the national park. Later, no one contacted
us again and we did not receive any official document regarding land allocation
(KI-11, 2017).
As the villagers do not recognise the allocated lands, there is no particular change
in customary tenure due to the allocated lands. The customary landowners are still
regarded as the owners of allocated lands. They still hold all land-use rights in
accordance with the traditional tenure regulations. Table (5.14) presents both formal
and local rules for allocated lands in Ung village tract.
Table 5.14: Local rules for allocated lands in Ung village tract
Types of rights Formal rules
Local Rules
Recipient Owner (individual) Owner (collective)
Access Yes Yes Yes Yes
Withdraw Own use No Yes Yes
Manage Individual No Individual Collective
Exclude Yes No Yes Collective
Transfer No No Yes Collective
Sale No No Yes No
Source: Focus group discussions, 2017.
Governance structure
Both formal and informal governance structures were observed in Ung village tract.
The formal governance structure is the Village Tract Land Administration Committee
organised at the village tract level in accordance with the Farmland Law (2012). The
village tract committee has the formal rights to regulate the lands within the village
tract. Therefore, it has the de jure rights to define who is eligible to cultivate on
village farmlands or not, to monitor land-use activities within village tract, and to
exercise sanctions against farmers who do not follow existing regulations. In reality,
the committee does not have any right either to define plot boundary or to decide
who is eligible to cultivate within the village tract. The monitoring activities are not
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regularly implemented by the committee, and it does not have any formal right to give
sanction against local offences (Table 5.15).
Table 5.15: Local governance structures in Ung village tract
Activities
Village tract committee Village council
Formal rules Local rules Formal rules Local rules
Defining boundary Yes No No Yes
Developing rules No No No Yes
Giving permission Yes No No Yes
Monitoring Yes No No Yes
Sanctioning Yes No No Yes
Resolving conflicts Yes Yes No Yes
Source: Focus group discussions, 2017.
In addition to village tract committee, each village has an informal land management
council traditionally organised by village elders. The council has permanent members
nominated by the villagers. The main responsibility of the council is to choose the
shifting cultivation fields and to distribute plots among individual households. The
council is also responsible for negotiating with landowners to share their plots with
landless farmers. In addition, the council has the right to develop sanctions against
illegal use of forest products11.
5.2.2 Livelihood strategies and forest income
The most common livelihood activities in Ung village tract are agriculture and forest
reported by all sample households. Another common livelihood activity is livestock
reported by 94% of total households. About 38% of households engage in non-farm
employment activities. The least common activity is wage labour reported by 30% of
total households. The detailed description of income from each livelihood activity is
presented in Appendix A.
Income distribution by livelihood strategies
The hierarchical cluster analysis indicates three distinct combinations of livelihood clus-
ters in Ung village tract, namely Agriculture–Wage, Non-Farm–Livestock, and Livestock–
Agriculture (see details in Appendix A). Among the three livelihood clusters, the
11For example, Ung A village has formulated a new rule that whoever clear the forests outside
collectively selected field must pay a fine of 5,000 kyats (about 4 USD) and shall not continue to
cultivate on that cleared land (KI-12, 2017).
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Livestock-Agriculture strategy receives the highest amount of income compared to other
strategies. The distribution of total income is significantly different across livelihood
clusters (χ2=12.88, p<0.01). Multiple comparisons indicate that total income is signifi-
cantly higher in Livestock–Agriculture strategy than Agriculture–Wage strategy (Figure
5.3a). There is no significant difference between Non-Farm–Livestock strategy compared
to the other two strategies. The results imply that households that engage in livestock
receive more income than those that do not engage in livestock breeding. This is
mainly because livestock, particularly mithan, is an important source of cash income
in Ung village tract.
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Figure 5.3: Total income by livelihood clusters in Ung village tract
Similar income distribution is observed for total cash income where Livestock–
Agriculture strategy receives higher cash income than Agriculture–Wage strategy (χ2=6.36,
p<0.05). It is mainly because cash income from livestock dominates a high share of
total cash income. Regarding subsistence income, Livestock–Agriculture strategy receive
higher income than Agriculture–Wage strategy (p<0.001) and Non-farm–Livestock strat-
egy (p<0.05) (Figure 5.3b). The results imply that households with Livestock–Agriculture
strategy engage more subsistence livelihood activities than the other two strategies.
Forest income is significantly different across the three livelihood clusters (χ2=14.89,
p<0.001). Multiple comparisons show that the distribution is particularly significant
for Livestock–Agriculture strategy compared to Agriculture–Wage strategy (p<0.001)
and Non-farm–Livestock strategy (p<0.05). This means that households that engage
mainly in livestock and agricultural activities receive more forest income than the
other livelihood activities. Regarding cash forest income, Livestock–Agriculture strategy
receives higher amount of income than the other two strategies (Figure 5.4a).
The subsistence forest income is significantly higher in Livestock-Agriculture strategy
than Agriculture–Wage strategy (p<0.001) (Figure 5.4b). However, there is no significant
difference between Non-Farm–Livelihood strategy compared to the other two strategies
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Figure 5.4: Forest income by livelihood clusters in Ung village tract
(p>0.05). It is mainly because subsistence forest income in Ung village tract is mostly
contributed by the use of wood for house construction. However, house constructions
require cash investments for hiring labour and professional carpenters. In this case,
households with more livestock have more cash income opportunities so that they
can use more construction wood than the other households. Nevertheless, correlation
analyses indicate that there is no significant association between forest income and
other income sources (p>0.05).
Contribution of forest income into poverty and inequality
Forest income contributes about 35% of total income in Ung village tract. The contri-
bution is lower when subsistence forest income is excluded from income accounting.
For cash income, forest contributes the lowest share of income (5%) compared to other
income sources. It implies that although households in Ung village tract highly rely
on forests, the role of forest income is to sustain local livelihood rather than to help
households in stepping out of poverty. The FGT poverty analysis shows that forest
income reduces all three poverty indices among households. Specifically, poverty
headcount ratio is reduced from 0.30 to 0.06 due to forest income (Table 5.16). It
indicates that about 80% of poor households in Ung village tract are lifted above
the poverty line due to forest income. The poverty gap is reduced from 0.09 to 0.01
indicating that forest income has filled about 92% of poverty gap in Ung village tract.
The poverty severity is reduced from 0.04 to 0.001 indicating that income inequality
among the poor households is reduced by 98% due to forest income.
Although forest income is relatively important for poverty reduction, its impact on
mitigating income inequality is minimal in Ung village tract. The Gini coefficient is
slightly reduced from 0.24 to 0.23 if the forest income is taken into account (see Table
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Table 5.16: FGT poverty measures and Gini index in Ung village tract
Income sources Headcount Poverty gap Poverty severity Gini index
With forest income 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.23
Without forest income 0.30 0.09 0.04 0.24
Differences -0.24 -0.08 -0.04 -0.01
Relative change -80% -92% -98% -4%
10% increase in forest in-
come
0.04 0.01 0.00 0.23
5.16). Regarding inequality within each income source, forest income has the second-
lowest Gini coefficient (Gk=0.376) after agricultural income (Gk=0.308). However,
forest income has the highest Gini correlation (Rk=0.75) and share of total income
inequality (SG=0.444) among all income sources (Table 5.17). It means that changes in
forest income will have a higher impact on total income inequality than other income
sources.
Table 5.17: Gini decomposition by income sources in Ung village tract
Income source Sk Gk Rk GT SG MEFG
Forest 0.362 0.376 0.750 0.102 0.440 0.078
Agriculture 0.226 0.308 0.233 0.016 0.070 -0.156
Livestock 0.252 0.479 0.563 0.068 0.292 0.040
Wage 0.061 0.875 0.466 0.025 0.107 0.046
Non-farm 0.099 0.762 0.278 0.021 0.090 -0.009
Total income 1.000 0.232 1.000 0.232 1.000
Note: Sk= Income share; Gk= Gini coefficient of each income source;
Rk=Gini correlation with total income; GT=Gini coefficient of total in-
come; SG=Share of total Gini; MEFG=Marginal effect on total Gini.
The marginal effect analysis shows that forest income has a positive marginal effect
(MEFG=0.078) on total income inequality. It indicates that if forest income is increased
by 10% and other income remains the same, total income inequality will be increased
by 0.78% due to forest income. Therefore, although forest income reduces income
inequality at the current level, promoting forest income will have a negative impact on
income equality in Ung village tract. This is mainly because extractions of high value
forest products such as construction wood require cash investment for chain saws and
transportation so that rich households will have more benefits than poor households.
This explanation is supported by correlation analysis which shows a significant positive
association (r=64, p<0.001) between total income and forest income.
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5.2.3 Traditional ecological knowledge and practices
Traditional practices in Ung village tract can be differentiated into three different
groups: (1) traditional agricultural practices, (2) pasture management, and (3) hunting
practices.
Traditional agricultural practices
Shifting cultivation is the main type of agriculture in Ung village tract. Traditionally,
farmers adopt several practices based on their ecological knowledge, namely rotational
field selection, land clearing, controlled burning, and ritual performances.
Rotational fallow management: The plots are usually organised into rotational fields
depending on geography situations. Each village has at least ten rotational fields
within its territory. Each field is given with a unique name depending on its location.
The fallow period ranges from five to ten years depending on soil condition. For
example, a key informant in Ung A reported that the field which is opened in 2017
was previously cultivated in 2009 and 1995 respectively (KI-19, 2017). It indicates
that there is no fixed rotation period even for the same field. Traditionally, the fields
are selected depending on soil conditions and the types of crop that the farmers aim
to cultivate. The decision is usually made at the taungya meetings. After selecting
the next cultivation field, the village council distributes individual plots to interested
farmers and decides the dates to perform the field opening rituals. The key informant
mentioned that the rotational fallow management ensured the sustainability of shifting
cultivation fields within the village territory and helped to avoid the destruction of the
remaining fallow forests for future cultivations (KI-19, 2017).
Land clearing: Majority of farmers in Ung village tract adopt a specific land clearing
method in order to improve soil condition. Traditionally, the farmers do not cut all
trees during the land-clearing processes. Instead, they usually left higher stumps in
order to enhance soil recovery and to reduce erosion (see photo 8 in Appendix D). A
key informant mentioned that,
[...] only smaller plants and shrubs are completely felled during land clearing. For
large trees, only the branches are pruned at a certain height to avoid shadows over
the crops. For medium-size trees, only the tops are cut instead of cutting from the
base. (KI-19, 2017)
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Traditional land clearing method has several advantages regarding soil condition and
secondary successions. Leaving larger trees in standing forms reduce soil erosion
because they create a reservoir of soil nutrients by collecting debris at the base during
the heavy rains. It can also increase the regeneration processes during the fallow
periods as they start to produce coppice after burning. The standing stumps also
provide natural supports for some crops such as climbing peas and beans.
The sharing of labour among farmers was also observed in Ung village tract. Since
pruning and pollarding require intensive labour activities, the farmers usually request
additional labour from neighbouring farmers. In Ung A and D, the farmers use collec-
tive labour during land clearing by organising working groups among neighbouring
farmers. A key informant mentioned that labour sharing reduces the risk of accidents
during the land clearing process and save the cost of hired labour (KI-19, 2017). There-
fore, labour sharing is one of the main reasons to cultivate in the collectively chosen
fields.
Controlled burning: Traditional controlled-burning practices are still common in Ung
village tract. All farmers have to contribute collective labour in preparing fire-breaks
and during the burning processes. For those who are not able to join in preparing
fire-breaks, they have to pay a fine of about 5,000 kyats (about 4 USD). However, Ung
village tract is located on steep mountains so that most agricultural fields have natural
barriers, such as streams or valleys, against the spread of fire. The construction of
fire-breaks for each plot is not necessary since the whole field is cleared and cultivated
at the same time. Therefore, this practice motivates farmers to cultivate collectively
in a chosen field so that they can share the responsibility for the construction of
fire-breaks.
All farmers have to pay fine if the fire accidentally spreads out into neighbouring
village territory. Therefore, the farmers usually set the date of burning in collaboration
with neighbouring villages. There is no spiritual criterion in selecting dates to start
the fire. A key informant mentioned that they usually start burning in the last week
of March or early April to avoid the monsoon rains (KI-9, 2017). It indicates that
the farmers select the optimum date for controlled burning based on their ecological
knowledge and past experiences.
Traditional rituals: Two main collective rituals are usually performed during a single
agricultural season. The first one is field opening ritual usually performed before
opening a new field. The second one is taungya burning ritual usually performed
before the controlled burning processes. Since most households are Christians, the
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ritual offerings are usually led by village priests. The process of ritual is similar to
traditional practices, where one or two chicken are killed in the field in order to get
better yields and reduce accidents. A village priest mentioned that since it is a local
tradition to perform rituals before agricultural activities, the village church has to help
the farmers to continue with their traditions. However, the rituals are guided by the
church, and the farmers have to pray to God instead of the field spirits (KI-31, 2017).
The cost of ritual has to be shared among the farmers. The rituals are also transformed
by praying to God instead of the field spirits. Instead of offering the first harvest to
the village shaman, the farmers usually offer about 10% of their first harvests to the
village church (KI-11, 2017).
Traditional pasture management
Mithans are usually reared by free-roaming in the forest without any additional feeding.
Traditionally, the farmers adopt a rotational grazing system in combination with the
management of agricultural fallows. In this system, an old agricultural field is used as
a common grazing site by all livestock holders. After one to two years, the animals are
moved to another fallow field leaving the old one to recover before the next cultivation.
A key informant mentioned that the newly-harvested fallows are usually rich in smaller
shrubs and grasses so that they can provide plenty of fodder for livestock grazing.
The presence of livestock also increases soil fertility by adding organic matters from
their dungs. Therefore, it is believed that combing fallow management with grazing
increases crop productivity in the next cultivation cycle. However, this practice also
increases weed species so that additional labour is required for weeding in the next
cultivation cycle (KI-14, 2017).
The decision to select a new grazing field is usually made collectively at the village
level. Fences are constructed around the field to protect the crops. Those who do not
participate in fence construction are not allowed to release their livestock in the grazing
field. If the animals destroy the crops in neighbouring villagers, all livestock owners
have to share the compensations. The payment is calculated either based on the extent
of crops destroyed or the duration that the animals have spent in the cultivated field.
For example, in 2013 mithan owners in Ung C had to pay about 60,000 kyats (about
50 USD) as their mithan had damaged the crops of Ung B villagers. A key informant
mentioned that the payment had to share among all mithan owners even though only
a few mithan had released from their grazing field (KI-14, 2017). This particular case
indicates the motivation of farmers to practise collective grazing in order to share the
risk of compensation among livestock owners.
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Traditional hunting practices
Although there is no specific taboo regarding wildlife species, several customary
practices were reported in relation to hunting expeditions. The first custom is the
celebration of hunting festivals after all the crops have been harvested. At least five to
ten men participate in each hunting expedition. Before the expedition, they have to
perform hunting ritual outside the village by offering chicken or pigs to local spirits.
The ritual also aims to increase the number of animals and to avoid accidents during
the expedition. It usually lasts two or three days depending on the numbers of wildlife.
After the expedition, all animals have to be shared among the households, whereas the
heads belong to the one who killed the animal12.
Table 5.18: Summary of traditional hunting practices in Ung village tract
Sr. Description Relevance to conservation
1 Hunting expedition only after
performing communal rituals.
Reduce illegal hunting within village
territory.
2 No hunting by outsiders within
village territory without
permission.
Promote wildlife conservation.
3 No taking of wildlife killed by
other people.
Support species conservation.
4 Giving wildlife hind leg to village
headman, and a small portion of
meat to other villagers.
Promote resource monitoring and social
cohesion.
5 Giving bird meat to the
newlywed family by the parents.
Improve social cohesion, but contribute
to species decline.
6 No taking of honey from beehive
without permission from owners.
Promote sustainable resource use.
Source: Focus group discussions, 2017.
Although hunting festivals are less common in recent days, hunters are still consid-
ered necessary for monitoring resources within village territory. For example, a key
informant mentioned that the hunters usually report to village headman if there are
new encroachments from neighbouring villages. Hunting expeditions were tradition-
ally used for conflict resolutions whereas the team which captured more wildlife was
decided as the winner (KI-14, 2017).
Hunting is generally allowed within the village territory only. Hunting in another
village territory requires prior permission from the residents. If illegal hunting is
found out, the hunters will get punishments from the villagers. For example, Ung D
12Killing wildlife is an honour in Chin customs, and the hunters usually hang the animal heads in front
of the houses to show their achievements
5.2 Case Study-II: Ung Village Tract 89
villagers mentioned that they usually confiscate both weapons and animals if someone
does illegal hunting in his or her village territory. If someone has captured a big game
species, he has to give a hind leg of the animal to the village headman. It means that
the village headman usually knows the numbers and type of wildlife captured within
his village territory. In addition, the hunters have to distribute a small portion of meat
to each household. It also indicates that the benefit of hunting is shared among the
community so that villagers support village hunters and protect against hunting by
outsiders.
Another important tradition in Ung village tract is that the villagers usually give
bird meat among relatives in order to enhance social bonds between the two families.
Traditionally, when a father visits his daughter’s house, he should bring some meat
for his in-laws in order to express his goodwill. The most common custom is that the
father brings bird meat that he had captured by himself. In return, the other parents
have to give back chicken or pig according to the number of wild birds that he brought.
A key informant mentioned that the number of birds per gift might range from 50
to 100 individuals depending on the size of birds (KI-14, 2017). In some cases, they
even do not count the number of birds. Instead, they put them in bamboo baskets
showing his efforts for good relations between the two families. This particular custom
indicates that maintaining traditional practices often contribute to the loss of wildlife
other than killing wildlife for regular consumption.
Collection of honey from natural beehives is also regulated by local customs. All
beehives within the village territory have individual owners who have the exclusive
right to collect honey from respective beehives. Traditionally, if someone found a
beehive at the rock cavity, he has to declare his ownership to other villagers. Each
beehive is given a name according to locally distinct features so that other villagers
also know the owner of the hive. After declaring his ownership, only the owner has
the right to collect honey from his own beehive. It is also taboo for other villagers to
collect honey without permission from the owner. If the owner does not want to collect
by himself, he may permit someone who wishes to collect honey from his beehives.
In such cases, the owner receives about half of the collected honey, and the collector
will take the other half. If an illegal collection is found out by the owner, the collector
has to pay back the same amount of honey or other products to the owner. A key
informant mentioned that the ownership system motivates the farmers to collect honey
sustainability with minimum disturbances (KI-14, 2017).
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5.3 Case Study-III: Kitaw Village Tract
5.3.1 Land tenure system
The village territories in Kitaw village tract belong to the category of vacant land or
land at the disposal of Government. Therefore, the villagers have both access and use
rights, but they do not have formal rights to manage, exclude, or transfer the land. In
practice, the villagers still recognise customary tenures, which can be differentiated
into three different types: (1) settlement areas, (2) agricultural lands, and (3) forest
lands (see detailed land-use map in Appendix A).
Village settlement area
Village settlement areas are regarded as the common property of all villagers. Every
villager has the right to build a house in any open space within the settlement area.
After the house has been built, the owner has the right to manage or transfer his
land among villagers or to his future generations. Selling or transfer of the lands to
outsiders is not allowed under customary regulations. Table 5.19 presents a comparison
between formal and local rules for village settlement areas in Kitaw village tract.
Table 5.19: Local rules for village settlement areas in Kitaw village tract
Types of rights Formal rules
Local rules (villagers)
Outsiders
Village area Housing site
Access Yes Yes Yes Yes
Use Yes Yes Yes No
Manage Yes Collective Individual No
Exclude No Collective Individual No
Transfer No Collective Individual No
Sale (within village) No No Yes No
Sale (outsiders) No No No No
Source: Focus group discussions, 2017.
Agricultural land
Both shifting cultivation and permanent farms are observed in Kitaw village tract.
Therefore, the farmers adopt two different sets of rules for each land-use type. Re-
garding shifting cultivation, the right to open a new field is regulated under the
collective decisions of all farmers. The cultivation plots within each field are owned
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either by individual households or lineage families. Individual ownership is usually
established when a farmer clears the open-access land for the first time. After the land
has been cleared, the farmer becomes the plot owner and consequently holds the right
to cultivate, exclude, or transfer the land to other villagers. Selling agricultural lands
to an outsider is not prohibited in Kitaw village tract. Regarding the land owned by
lineage families, the rights to manage, exclude, or transfer to another villager are held
by all lineage members. However, the individual members do not have the right to sell
the land without approval from other lineage members.
Permanent farming has become common in Kitaw village tract, particularly for yam
cultivation. The main difference for permanent tenure is that farmers have the right to
clear and cultivate yam based on his own decision. Unlike the shifting cultivation, the
farmers have to pay money as rent if he or she borrows the land for yam cultivation.
The amount of rent for one hectare plot is about 200,000 kyats (ca. 150 USD) per
rotation. Permanent farm owners have the right to sell the land to outsiders without
any permission. Table (5.20) summarises tenure rules related to cultivated lands in
Kitaw village tract.
Table 5.20: Local rules for agricultural lands in Kitaw village tract
Types of rights
Formal
rules
Local rules (swidden) Local rules
(permanent)
Outsider
Lineage land Private
Access Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Use Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Manage (field) Yes Collective Collective n.a No
Manage (plot) Yes Collective Yes Yes No
Exclude No Collective Yes Yes No
Transfer No Collective Yes Yes No
Sale No No Yes Yes No
Source: Focus group discussions, 2007.
Forest land
About 17% of the total land area in Kitaw village tract is covered with forests. Partici-
patory land-use mapping exercises indicate three categories of forest lands in Kitaw
village tract: (1) watershed forests; (2) village-use forests; and (3) open-access forests.
Watershed forest: All villages in Kitaw village tract have demarcated watershed forests
around the water sources. Destructive activities such as land clearing, tree felling, or
mithan grazing are strictly prohibited inside the watershed forests. Non-disturbance
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activities such as hunting or collection of NTFP are permitted both for villagers and
outsiders. Although tree cutting is prohibited inside the watershed forests, there is
no explicit sanction against village members. For example, a villager from Kitaw C
cut a few trees from the watershed forest to construct a community centre. The other
villagers complained about it so that the village headman had to stop him and asked
to look for timber in other places.
Village-use forest: All villages in Kitaw village tract have demarcated village-use forests.
Within these forests, villagers are allowed to cut timber, collect NTFP, or hunt wildlife
without permission. Burning or clearing the land for cultivation is prohibited within
these forests. Selling of timber for commercial purpose is prohibited for all villagers.
Outsiders are permitted only for hunting and NTFP collection.
Among the four villages, Kitaw A is the most active village to legalise the village-use
forests. Since 2012, the villagers have initiated to get legal land titles for their village-
use forests. The main motive of the villagers is to protect the forests against occupation
by government or private investors. The village headman mentioned that,
We were afraid that the Government would occupy our forests and give conces-
sion to a private company for development projects. Therefore, we developed a
management plan and submitted to Forest Department in order to get legal recog-
nition as Community Forest (CF). All villagers contributed about 5,000 kyats per
household (about 4 USD) for preparing and making photocopies of the document.
Nevertheless, we have not received any response from the Government (KI-25,
2017).
This particular case indicates that the demand for formal recognition has increased
in Kitaw village tract mainly due to the increasing contacts with local NGOs and
government organisations. Moreover, they had witnessed when the government
occupied unregistered lands from their neighbouring villages.
Open-access forest: Among the four villages, only Kitaw B and Kitaw C have open-
access forests within each village territory. The forests are located far away from the
villages so that the villagers do not regularly visit these forests during cultivation
seasons. The villagers mentioned that it is impossible to control illegal activities
within these forests because they are located far away from their villages. Therefore,
these forests are considered as open-access by outsiders. There is no regulation
against villagers to cut trees in open-access forests including for commercial purposes.
However, shifting cultivation by an outsider is prohibited as the forests are still inside
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the village territory and it can be easily detected if someone clears the land for shifting
cultivation.
Outsiders, who would like to cultivate within these forests, are required to request
permission from the village headman and pay a land-use fee as determined by the
villagers. For example, Kitaw D villagers have borrowed some areas of open-access
forests from Kitaw B village. In return, they have to pay a land-use fee of 30,000 kyats
(about 25 USD) per cultivation season to Kitaw B villagers (KI-28, 2017). This particular
case highlights that the principle of land ownership by clearing open-access forest is
applicable to village members only, and the outsiders will not get any ownership status
unless they live in the village. Table (5.21) presents a summary of rules regarding
forest lands in Kitaw village tract.
Table 5.21: Local rules for forest lands in Kitaw village tract
Activities
Watershed forest Village-use forest Open-access forest
Villager Outsider Villager Outsider Villager Outsider
Access Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cutting timber No No Own-use No Yes Yes
NTFP Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hunting Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Manage Collective No Collective No Yes No
Exclude Collective No Collective No Collective No
Transfer Collective No Collective No Collective No
Sale No No No No No No
Source: Focus group discussions, 2017.
Governance structure
Both formal and informal governance structures were observed in Kitaw village tract.
The formal governance structure is the Village Tract Land Administration Committee
organised at the village tract level. Although the village tract committee has the
legal authority to administer land-related issues, the villagers tend to use the formal
committee to resolve land-use conflicts between neighbouring villages. For example, in
2015, a few trees from Kitaw A forest were cut by neighbouring villagers. The villagers
reported to the township authorities via the formal village tract committee. The case
was investigated by township farmland management body and gave warnings to
neighbouring villagers to stop cutting trees outside their village territory (KI-26, 2017).
A similar case was observed in Kitaw C, where neighbouring villagers cut the trees in
their watershed forest. Kitaw C villagers reported to the village tract committee, which
gave warnings against offenders not to commit it again (KI-27, 2017). In both cases,
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formal governance authorities were able to resolve conflicts between villages although
they could not solve the conflicts among villagers residing in the same village (Table
5.22).
Table 5.22: Local governance structures in Kitaw village tract
Activities
Village tract committee Village committee
Formal rules Local rules Formal rules Local rules
Defining boundary Yes No No Yes
Developing rules No No No Yes
Giving permission Yes No No Yes
Monitoring Yes No No Yes
Sanctioning Yes No No Yes
Resolving conflicts Yes Yes No Yes
Source: Focus group discussions, 2017.
In addition to the formal committee, the traditional village council serves as an
informal institution in making land-use decisions. The village headman usually leads
the council whereas every villager has the right to participate and discuss their opinions
at the village council meetings. Selection of land for shifting cultivation is usually
made at the village council meeting. During the meeting, the villagers also negotiate
with landowners to share their plots with landless farmers. Other land-use decisions,
such as the designation of watershed protection or village use forests, are also made at
the village council meetings. Village council meetings are also important to resolve
land-use conflicts among the villagers. The council also has the right to formulate
new regulations and sanctions to protect land and forest resources within the village
territory. For instance, local rules related to Kitaw CF were discussed and approved at
the village council meetings.
5.3.2 Livelihood strategies and forest income
Five major livelihood activities are observed in Kitaw village tract. Among these, forest
is the most common activity reported by all sample households. The second most
common activity is agriculture reported by 98% of total households. Livestock is the
third most common activity reported by 94% of total households. Wage labour and
non-farm employment are the least common activities reported by 46% and 38% of
total households respectively. The detailed description of income from each activity is
presented in Appendix A.
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Income distribution across livelihood strategies
The hierarchical cluster analysis (HCA) indicates three distinct combinations of liveli-
hood clusters, namely Non-farm–Agriculture–Livestock, Non-farm–Agriculture–Wage, and
Wage–Agriculture–Forest (see details in Appendix A). Although households use different
livelihood strategies, the average total income is not significantly different across the
three livelihood clusters (χ2=10.70, p>0.05). It is mainly because households in all
three clusters receive a similar amount of subsistence income, mainly from agriculture
and livestock. The distribution of total cash income is significantly different across
the three clusters (χ2=5.53,p<0.05). Multiple comparisons also show that the average
cash income is significantly lower in Wage–Agriculture–Forest cluster than the other two
clusters (Figure 5.5a). It is mainly because non-farm income contributes a high share
of total income (24%) in Kitaw village tract. Correlation analysis shows a significant
positive association between non-farm income and total cash income (r=0.61, p<0.001).
This implies that households that engage in non-farm activities receive more cash
income than those who do not engage in non-farm activities.
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Figure 5.5: Total income by livelihood clusters in Kitaw village tract
The distribution of total forest income is significantly different across the three liveli-
hood clusters (χ2=15.70, p<0.001). Multiple comparisons indicate that forest income is
significantly higher in Wage–Agriculture–Forest strategy than the other two strategies.
However, correlation analysis shows that there is no significant association between
forest income and other income sources (p>0.05). Regarding cash forest income, the
distribution is significantly different across three livelihood clusters (χ2=8.51, p<0.05).
Multiple comparisons indicate that households that engage in Wage–Agriculture–Forest
strategy receive higher cash forest income than the other two strategies (Figure 5.6a).
Correlation analysis shows a significant positive association between cash forest income
and subsistence agricultural income, although the correlation coefficient is very weak
(r=0.29, p<0.05). It implies that households that engage more in subsistence agriculture
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are more likely to participate in cash forest activities than those who engage less in
such activity.
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Figure 5.6: Forest income by livelihood clusters in Kitaw village tract
Regarding subsistence forest income, the distribution is significantly different across
the three clusters (χ2=11.02, p<0.01). Multiple comparisons show that Non-farm–Agri–
Wage strategy receive lower subsistence forest income than the other two strategies
(Figure 5.6b). Correlation analysis shows that there is no significant association between
subsistence forest income and other income sources (p>0.05). The results imply that
the use of forest resources for subsistence purpose is not determined by the amount of
income that households receive from other sources. In other words, subsistence forest
income is equally important for all households in Kitaw village tract regardless of their
livelihood choices.
Contribution of forest income into poverty and inequality
Forest income contributes about 29% of total household income in Kitaw village tract.
The contribution is mainly in the form of subsistence income accounting for 92% of
total forest income. It indicates that the majority of households in Kitaw village tract
rely on forest mainly to sustain their livelihood rather than generating cash income.
The FGT poverty results also show that poverty headcount ratio is reduced from 0.70
to 0.30 due to forest income (Table 5.23). Forest income also reduces poverty gap from
0.31 to 0.10 and poverty severity from 0.17 to 0.04 respectively. This indicates that forest
income is relatively important in mitigating poverty in Kitaw village tract. Moreover,
comparison of the three poverty indices shows that the relative impact of forest income
is higher in poverty severity (82%) than poverty gap (67%) and poverty headcount
indices (46%). The results indicate that forest income plays a more important role in
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mitigating the depth and distribution of poverty than reducing the number of poor
households in Kitaw village tract.
Table 5.23: FGT poverty measures and Gini index in Kitaw village tract
Income source Headcount Poverty gap Severity Gini index
With forest income 0.38 0.10 0.04 0.31
Without forest income 0.70 0.31 0.17 0.42
Differences –0.32 –0.21 –0.14 –0.11
Relative change –46% –67% –82% –26%
10% increase in forest income 0.38 0.80 0.03 0.30
In addition to poverty, forest income has a significant impact on reducing income
inequality among households. The Gini coefficient has reduced from 0.42 to 0.31 if
the forest income is integrated into household income (see Table 5.23). The effect of
forest income on reducing income inequality is higher than other income sources. The
Gini decomposition analysis shows that forest income has the lowest Gini coefficient
(Gk=0.285) compared to other income sources (Table 5.24). It implies that the distribu-
tion of forest income is more equal than other income sources. Moreover, forest income
has a negative marginal effect (MEFG=–0.198) on total income inequality. It implies
that the 10% increase in forest income will reduce total income inequality by 1.98%.
Therefore, promoting access to forest income will likely to reduce income inequality in
Kitaw village tract.
Table 5.24: Gini decomposition by income sources in Kitaw village tract
Income sources Sk Gk Rk GT SG MEFG
Forest 0.292 0.285 0.359 0.030 0.094 -0.198
Agriculture 0.302 0.405 0.587 0.072 0.226 -0.075
Livestock 0.138 0.577 0.592 0.047 0.149 0.011
Wage 0.066 0.826 0.272 0.015 0.047 -0.019
Non-farm 0.202 0.877 0.865 0.153 0.484 0.282
Total income 1.000 0.317 1.000 0.317
Note: Sk= Income share; Gk= Gini coefficient of each income source; Rk=Gini
correlation with total income; GT=Gini coefficient of total income; SG=Share of
total Gini; MEFG=Marginal effect on total Gini.
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5.3.3 Traditional ecological knowledge and practices
Traditional practices in Kitaw village tract can be differentiated into three different
groups: (1) traditional agricultural practices, (2) traditional forest management prac-
tices, and (3) traditional bamboo management practices.
Traditional agricultural practices
There are four main traditional practices regarding shifting cultivation in Kitaw village
tract, namely (1) rotational field selection, (2) land clearing, (3) controlled burning, and
(4) ritual practices.
Rotational field selection: Selection of rotational field by Taungyameeting is still common
in Kitaw village tract. The average fallow period for each field is about seven to ten
years. Each village has at least seven fields to allow for sustainable rotation, except for
Kitaw D which has only two rotational fields within its village territory13. Although
there are no specific indicator species, the farmers usually decide the suitability of each
field based on the regeneration status. A key informant mentioned that they usually
decide a suitable field by evaluating whether the vegetation cover will allow proper
burning or not (KI-25, 2017). The allocation of plots is usually done by negotiation
among the farmers.
Land clearing: During land clearing, the large trees are left standing by pollarding the
branches. The primary purpose is to increase the rate of soil recovery after cultivation.
The remaining stumps are also used as natural supports for bean species which are
planted together with maize. This selection of maize-bean intercropping system also
motivates farmers to leave a certain number of standing trees during land clearing.
A key informant mentioned that it is also necessary to pollard the branches as they
provide nesting sites for birds that destroy the crops (KI-28, 2017). Labour sharing
is still common to implement selective land clearing practices. Also, the farmers
avoid clearing the trees located at top ridges or near to the streams in order to reduce
landslides and excessive erosions.
13Since Kitaw D has only two fields, they have to borrow some area of land from Kitaw B to complete
the required rotations.
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Controlled burning: Except for Kitaw B, all villages in this village tract usually prepare
fire-breaks along the field borders. In Kitaw B, most agricultural fields are located far
away from the houses so that the farmers usually do not prepare fire-breaks before
burning. Moreover, they usually face forest fire coming from other areas so that
preparing a fire-break is not effective to protect the spread of fire in their fallow lands.
In the other three villages, fire-breaks are still important since most of their fields are
located close to their houses. All farmers have to pay for compensation if the fire
spread into another village territory. For example, Kitaw A farmers had once paid four
Mithans to Kitaw C as the fire from their field had spread out into Kitaw C territory.
Since the accident had happened during collective activity, the cost of Mithan had to
share among all participating farmers. The date of burning is collectively decided in
order to ensure that every farmer can participate in controlled burning. If a farmer
could not participate, he should hire someone or pay fine for his absence.
Traditional rituals: Although the majority of farmers have converted to Christianity,
traditional rituals are still performed in Kitaw village tract. There are four types of
rituals performed in Kitaw village tract, which are the field-opening ritual, taungya
burning ritual, harvest ritual, and the feast of merit. The first two types are usually
performed collectively while the latter two are performed individually. Although the
rituals are performed collectively, the Christians usually offer and pray to God instead
of local spirits. For harvest rituals, the Christians offer some of their harvests to village
churches while the others offer to Buddhist monasteries and local spirits.
Feasts of merit are still common in Kitaw village tract. The feast is usually performed
by offering mithan meat and Zu to all villagers. The villagers usually establish wooden
posts in front of their houses after performing the feasts (see photo 18 in Appendix D).
The number of posts corresponds to the number of mithan that have killed during the
feasts. Although feasts of merit have become less frequent, some villagers still perform
the feasts to improve their health conditions. For example, a villager from Kitaw B
recently performed a feast of merit with two Mithans to improve the health condition
of his wife, who have been suffering severe sickness for a long time. This particular
explanation indicates that feasts of merit are still crucial for some farmers to improve
their spiritual well-being.
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Traditional forest protection practices
Apart from the designation of watershed forests and village-use forests (see detail
in section 5.3.1), the villagers also protect forests based on their spiritual beliefs.
Traditionally, the areas where villagers usually perform ritual offerings to local spirits
are considered as sacred forests. Except for Kitaw D, all other three villages have
sacred forests within each village territory. Traditionally, the villagers do not cut the
trees within sacred forests in order to avoid negative consequences from evil spirits.
Banyan trees (ficus spp.) are also considered as sacred trees since it is believed that this
species provides home for local spirits. A key informant mentioned that the role of
sacred forests has declined since most villagers have converted to the Christian religion.
It was also mentioned that sacred forests should be cut so that the evil spirit could
no longer live within the village territory (KI-32, 2017). Since the villagers started to
cut trees within sacred forests, the village council had to inform them to respect the
remaining believers. These particular cases indicate that although the sacred forests are
common in Kitaw village tract, the role of these forests for conservation has declined
due to the changes in local religious beliefs.
Traditional bamboo management practices
Bamboo plays an important role in local daily life. Bamboo is used for many purposes
including house construction, fencing, woven baskets, and other household items.
Traditionally, most farmers planted bamboo in their farms, particularly along the
plot borders so that they can easily recognise plot boundary in the future. The most
commonly species are Melocanna baccifera, Bambusa polymorpha, and Dendrocalamus
hamiltonii. The farmers mentioned that most of the bamboo culms located within
village territory have individual owners so that no one is permitted to cut without
permission.
Bamboo is usually harvested based on selective felling system. A key informant
mentioned that the mature culms which are at least two years old are usually harvested.
Moreover, harvesting of bamboo is usually done in November or December after the
rainy season. The farmers also apply particular methods in cutting bamboo culms. For
example, a key informant explained that,
We regularly clear around bamboo culms in order to protect against formations of
termites colonies that can slow down the growth. Bamboo should not be harvested
during rainy seasons (July to September) since they produce new shoots and roots
during that period. The best season for harvesting bamboo is between November
and January when the roots become mature enough to support culms in the long
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run. Moreover, we should leave at least three to five stems in order to support the
development of new bamboo culms (KI-24, 2017).
This explanation indicates that local farmers have proper knowledge on sustainable
harvesting and maintenance of bamboo species. Another informant also mentioned
that bamboo culms must be cut closer to the base in order to give enough spaces for
remaining culms; however, a small amount of stumps must be left on the ground so
that a new shoot can grow quickly in the next shooting season (KI-25, 2017). The
villagers also apply the bamboo-sharing system in order to maintain selective cutting
practices. Traditionally, if a farmer does not have enough mature culms, he can request
them from other farmers. In return, he has to share a similar amount of bamboo
culms if the other farmers request him to share some of his bamboos. This mutual
sharing practice also enhances social cohesion among farmers and supports long-term
collective activities.
The villagers also recognise impacts of bamboo flowering in the region14. For
example, a key informant mentioned that they had observed bamboo flowering in
2008. Consequently, there were several outbreaks of rats, which had destroyed all their
crops. The outbreak was associated with bamboo flowering which provides food for
the rats. It indicates that the villagers are aware of the ecological consequences of
bamboo flowering.
14In Chin language, the bamboo flowering is called as Mautam meaning the death of bamboo.
CHAPTER 6
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THREE CASE STUDIES
6.1 Land Tenure and Property Right Systems
6.1.1 Summary of tenure rules in three case studies
The three case studies indicate that local households tend to follow informal (de facto)
tenure system rather than formal (de jure) government regulations. All case study
villages have their own traditional territories that are clearly defined and accepted
by neighbouring villagers. Within each village territory, different tenure rules are
formulated for different land-use types, such as village settlement area, agriculture land,
and forest land. Regarding village settlement areas, all three cases have similar tenure
rules, where every household has the right to build a house at any available space
within the village territory. Frequent movements of settlement areas are observed in
all three cases. However, the movement occurred only within the village territory since
moving outside the territory will lead to social conflict with neighbouring villagers.
Regarding agricultural land, tenure rules for shifting cultivation areas are similar
across three cases. In all three cases, tenure rules for shifting cultivation can be
differentiated into two main levels. The first level is related to rotational fields, where
the farmers require collective decisions to open a new field for cultivation. The second
level is related to individual plots where farmers can cultivate crops after the field is
chosen collectively. Within each field, the individual plots are owned either by private,
clan, or all community members (see Figure 6.1). Private ownership systems are
usually established by clearing the open-access forests for the first time. After the land
is cleared and cultivated, it becomes the property of the cultivator and can be inherited
for his generations. Women are traditionally not allowed to inherit the land since they
can cultivate on the lands owned by their husbands after they have married. Land
ownership by first clearance is applicable only for village members so that outsiders
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will not be landowners even if they clear it for the first time. For clan ownership, all
clan members have equal rights to use or manage the land. Individual farmers are not
allowed to cultivate without collective agreements. The land is inherited collectively
without individual allocation so that the right to sell the clan lands by an individual
member is prohibited. For communal ownership, all villagers have the right to access
and use the cultivation plots regardless of their tribal affiliations. The allocation of
plots to each farmer is collectively done at village council meetings.
Figure 6.1: Relationship between local land ownership and land-use practices
Source: Own elaboration.
Apart from shifting cultivation, only Case-II and Case-III have permanent farms for
yam cultivation. In both cases, permanent farms are considered as private lands so
that the farmers have the right to transfer or sell the land to outsiders without any
restriction. Land borrowers are not permitted to establish permanent farms on the
borrowed land. Therefore, the farmers who would like to establish permanent farms
have to buy land from other villagers. In Case-I, the villagers only practice shifting
cultivation so that there is no clearly defined tenure rule for permanent farming.
Regarding forest lands, all three case studies have demarcated watershed forests
in order to preserve the village water sources. Tenure rules for watershed forests are
similar between Case-I and Case-III, where the outsiders are allowed for hunting and
collection of non-timber forest products (NTFPs). In Case-II, both hunting and NTFP
collection are prohibited inside the watershed forest (Table 6.1). Apart from watershed
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forests, both Case-II and Case-III have designated village-use forests. In Case-I, the
villagers have not designated village-use forest mainly because existing forest areas are
already occupied by the national park. In Case-II and Case-III, village-use forests are
located outside the national park so that the villagers are still motivated to protect their
forests. Local rules for village-use forests are similar for village members in all three
cases. Although the villagers are not allowed to cut timber for commercial purposes,
other forest use activities are permitted without any regulation. Local rules against
outsiders are different between Case-II and Case-III. For instance, hunting and NTFP
collection are prohibited in Case-II although they are permitted in Case-III.
Table 6.1: Comparison of local forest rules against outsiders in three case studies
Activities
Watershed forest Village-use forest Open-access forest
C-I C-II C-III C-I C-II C-III C-I C-II C-III
Access Yes Yes Yes n.a Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cutting timber No No No n.a No No No No Yes
NTFP collection Yes No Yes n.a No Yes Yes No Yes
Hunting Yes No Yes n.a No Yes Yes No Yes
Manage No No No n.a No No No No No
Exclude No No No n.a No No No No No
Inheritance No No No n.a No No No No No
Sale No No No n.a No No No No No
Note: C-I refers to Case-I; C-II refers to Case-II; C-III refers to Case-III.
Local rules for open-access forests are different across the three cases. For instance,
cutting timber by an outsider is permitted in Case-III although it is prohibited in Case-I
and Case-II. The main reason is that most open-access forests in Case-III are far from
the village so that the villagers have less control over these forests. Moreover, Case-III
is located outside the national park so that it is more accessible by outsiders to cut
timber without permission. In Case-I and Case-II, the villagers are able to control tree
cutting inside the open-access forests since only a few outsiders have engaged in tree
cutting due to national park regulations. Hunting and NTFP collection are permitted
in both Case-I and Case-III. In Case-II, outsiders are not permitted for hunting and
NTFP collection inside the open-access forests. It is mainly because forests in Case-II
have more marketable forest products compared to Case-I and Case-III so that the
villagers are more motivated to protect their forests against outsiders.
All three cases have both formal and informal governance structures to administer
local land-use practices. Although the role and responsibility of formal governance
structure are similar across the three cases, local acceptance of formal rules is higher in
Case-II than Case-I and Case-III. Particularly, the villagers in Case-II tend to rely more
on formal village tract administrator to resolve land-use conflicts. In Case-I, the village
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tract administrator does not have the authority to resolve land-use conflicts because all
agricultural lands are located inside the park. In Case-III, the villagers rely more on
traditional leaders to resolve land-use conflicts since they have more knowledge and
experiences about customary lands than the village tract administrator (Table 6.2).
Table 6.2: The role of actors in governance activities in three case studies
Activities
Case-I Case-II Case-III
TL VS VH VT TL VS VH VT TL VS VH VT
Defining boundary Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Creating rules Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes No No No Yes No
Giving permission No No Yes No No No Yes No No No Yes No
Monitoring Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Sanctioning No Yes Yes No No No Yes No No No Yes No
Conflict resolution Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Note: TL= Tribal leaders; VS = Village shaman; VH= Village headman; VT= Village tract
administrator
The roles of tribal leaders are more important in Case-I than Case-II and Case-III.
Although the village headman often takes responsibilities for communicating with
township authorities and official paperwork, the village council meetings are usually
organised by tribal leaders in all three cases. The tribal leaders are also important
in resolving boundary disputes among the farmers. As the shifting cultivation areas
can only be cultivated again after 7 to 15 years, the experience and knowledge of
village elders are important to identify plot boundaries for each farmer. In Case-II
and Case-III, the role and responsibilities of tribal leaders are less important because
the majority of farmers have engaged in yam cultivation so that they do not need to
follow the collective decisions made by village council meetings. In addition, most
tribal leaders usually believe in local spirits, which the young generations consider
as an outdated religion. This particular trend has further excluded tribal leaders and
village shamans in making land-use decisions.
106 Chapter 6 Comparative Analysis of Three Case Studies
6.1.2 Awareness and compliance of tenure rules
Focus group discussions revealed a total of 15 customary tenure rules that are still
being applied across the three cases. Depending on the type of ownership, tenure
rules can be categorised into three different groups, namely communal land, clan land,
or private land. Table 6.3 describes average awareness and compliance scores of each
tenure rule across the three case studies.
Table 6.3: Awareness and compliance of tenure rules in three case studies
Description of tenure rules
Case-I Case-II Case-III
A C A C A C
Communal land
Village territories have clearly defined boundaries 98 96 100 98 96 92
All villagers have the right to use communal land 100 80 100 98 100 100
Cutting trees for commercial purpose is prohibited 64 60 78 74 86 82
Clearing the land near water spring is prohibited 92 92 100 100 100 92
Shifting cultivation is not allowed without collective
decision
86 84 78 56 82 68
Clan land
Management right hold by all clan members 98 98 100 100 92 88
No cutting trees on fallow forests without
permission from clan members
82 78 42 34 64 56
Selling clan land by individual member is
prohibited
98 98 98 98 96 92
Clan lands are inherited without individual
allocation
98 86 88 38 92 74
Women do not have the right of land inheritance 90 54 100 56 100 88
Private land
Land ownership for individual plots is established
by first clearance principle
86 54 100 78 94 76
Management right for individual plot is controlled
by owner
96 94 100 100 98 98
Customary owners still control land inside the park 72 52 90 82 86 82
Right to cut trees on private fallows is held by
owner
96 90 98 96 98 98
Selling of private land to outsiders is prohibited 90 76 42 24 98 90
Note:A=Awareness (% of total households); C=Compliance (% of total households);
Sample size for each case is 50.
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More than 85% of total households in all cases are aware of the local tenure rules
indicated in Table (6.3). Only about 75% mentioned that they are still in compliance
with local tenure rules. The non-parametric Mann-Whitney-U tests show that local
compliance scores are significantly lower than the awareness scores in all three cases
(p<0.001). It means that although the majority of households still recognise the local
tenure rules, some households no longer accept them in their day-to-day practices. It
also indicates that the legitimacy of customary rules has declined among households
in all case study village tracts.
The comparative analysis shows that awareness scores are significantly different
across the three cases (χ2=5.73, p<0.05). Multiple comparisons indicate that the
awareness scores are significantly higher in Case-III (92%) than Case-II (88%). There is
no statistically significant difference in Case-I (90%) compared to the other two cases
(Figure 6.2a). It means that both inside and outside the national park have similar
knowledge on traditional tenure regulations. The distributions of compliance scores
are significantly different across the three cases (χ2=14.40, p<0.001). Specifically, the
compliance scores are significantly higher in Case-III (85%) than Case-II (75%). There
is no significant difference in Case-I (79%) compared to the other two cases (Figure
6.2b). It indicates that although households located inside the park have different
formal regulations compared to the other two cases, they all have similar compliances
with locally crafted rules.
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Figure 6.2: Awareness and compliance scores of tenure rules across three case studies
The distribution of tenure rules differs depending on the land ownership types.
Regarding communal ownership, the awareness scores are not significantly different
across three cases (p>0.05). It means that households in three case studies have a
similar rate of awareness on communal tenure rules. Regarding clan and private
ownership, the awareness scores are significantly different across three cases (Table
6.4). Specifically, the awareness scores for clan lands are significantly higher in Case-
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I (93%) than Case-II (88%), although there is no significant difference in Case-III
(86%) compared to the other two cases. The results show that households living
outside the park are similarly aware of the clan tenure rules compared to households
inside and bordering the park. In terms of private ownership, the awareness scores
are significantly higher in Case-III (96%) than Case-I (88%) and Case-II (82%). This
indicates that households living outside the park are more aware of the private tenure
rules than those living inside and bordering the park.
Table 6.4: Distribution of awareness and compliance scores for tenure
rules across three case studies
Land Ownership
% of respondents (n=50)
χ2Case-I Case-II Case-III
Communal Tenure
awareness 88 91 93 2.91
compliance 82 85 87 0.07
Clan Tenure
awareness 93a 86b 89ab 14.28*
compliance 83a 65b 80a 26.99***
Private Tenure
awareness 88a 86a 95b 14.60***
compliance 73a 76a 89b 20.96***
Note: Values marked with the same superscript letters are not significantly
different (Dunn’s test, p>0.05); χ2 = Kruskal-Wallis Chi-squared; *=p<0.05;
**=p<0.01; ***=p<0.001
Similar to awareness scores, local compliance scores for communal lands are not
significantly different across the three cases (p>0.05). It means that households in all
three cases are still maintaining communal tenure rules regardless of the national park
regulations. For clan lands, local compliance scores are significantly lower in Case-II
(65%) than Case-I (83%) and Case-III (80%) (χ2= 26.99, p<0.001). It indicates that clan
tenure rules are less legitimate among bordering households than those living inside
and outside the park. For private lands, local compliance scores are significantly higher
in Case-III (89%) than Case-I (73%) and Case-II (76%) (χ2= 20.96, p<0.001). The results
show that households outside the park are more likely to follow informal rules for
private lands than those inside and bordering the park.
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6.1.3 Pattern of changes in local land tenure system
The three case studies indicate that local land tenure systems have changed compared
to traditional practices. Despite the communal lands are still common in all three cases,
local land ownership system tends to change from collective to individual ownership.
Along with the introduction of cash crops, both communal and clan lands are being
transformed into private lands owned by individual farmers. Household surveys show
that about 16% of households in Case-I, 80% in Case-II, and 82% in Case-III have
private land that they inherited individually from their ancestors (Table 6.5). About 8%
in Case-I, 14% in Case-II, and 38% in Case-III have private agricultural lands that they
own via first clearance. The private ownership is lower in Case-I because the majority
of farmers are land borrowers so that they have no right to become landowners even
if they clear an unoccupied area for the first time. The increasing numbers of private
lands have also created local land markets in all cases. Household surveys show that
the percentage of farmers who have bought land from other villagers is higher in
Case-II (30%) than Case-I (6%) and Case-III (2%). The number is higher in Case-II
because yam cultivation is more intensive in this village tract and the land borrowers
need to buy land from others to establish permanent farms.
Table 6.5: Households’ access to agricultural lands across three case studies
Types of agricultural lands
% of households (n=50)
Case I Case II Case III
Private ownership from inheritance 16 80 82
Private ownership by first clearance 8 14 38
Clan or lineage ownership 74 98 84
Land bought from others 6 30 2
Land borrowed from others 90 46 46
Source: Field survey, 2017.
The transformation of communal lands to private ownership is mainly motivated
by three main factors. Firstly, there is an increasing demand for permanent farms in
response to changes in livelihood strategies of local households. The increasing market
price for yam has motivated farmers to engage in permanent farming rather than
traditional shifting cultivation practices. As of 2017, about 40% of households in Case-I,
94% in Case-II, and 84% in Case-III have cultivated yam to generate cash income. Since
yam cultivation does not require slash-and-burn practices, it is no longer necessary to
cultivate crops collectively in a commonly chosen field. Since yam cultivation requires
to wait for three to five years before harvesting, the cultivated plots are gradually
considered as the private property of the farmers who have invested in yam cultivation.
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Yam cultivation plots are permitted to be sold not only to local villagers but also to
outsiders. As a result, land markets have evolved within the communities, particularly
among the villages which have limited land for yam cultivation.
Secondly, private land tenure has increased due to changes in village settlement
structure. Traditionally, the villages were established on steep valleys in order to
have better defence position against their enemies. The houses were also built with
bamboo so that they can be easily relocated once there were conflicts among tribal
groups. In recent years, tribal conflicts have reduced due to improving infrastructures
and communication. Consequently, the villagers have started to establish permanent
settlements by constructing wooden houses. The introduction of modern transportation
technologies such as motorbike has also encouraged to stabilize the village settlements
near to the roads. As a result, the villagers are motivated to settle in one place and to
invest in permanent farms for commercial purposes.
Thirdly, land allocation programs by the national park also support private tenure
rather than collective ownership. According to this program, formal land titles for
agricultural lands were given to individual households in order to promote agroforestry
practices. Although there is no individual farmer who has formally accepted the
allocated lands, there is a tendency to increase private tenure if the farmers start to
claim individual plots allocated to each household. Land allocation programs have
also disrupted social cohesion between customary landowners and land recipients
mainly because they provide opportunities for landless farmers to become landowners
under formal regulations. Consequently, traditional landowners are being excluded
from their lands resulting in several social conflicts among the villagers.
Local compliances with tenure rules differ depending on the age and religion of the
respondents (Table 6.6). Specifically, younger respondents are less likely to comply
with tenure rules compared to medium-age and older respondents (χ2=10.13, p<0.01).
This is because younger respondents have more opportunities to engage in off-farm
livelihood activities so that they become less involved in traditional agricultural prac-
tices. In terms of religious groups, those who have converted to Christian have lower
compliance scores than those who still believe in Buddhism and traditional ritual prac-
tices (U=1440, p<0.05). This is because some of the traditional regulations are highly
associated with traditional religious beliefs so that those who have converted to modern
religious belief such as Christianity are no longer comply with such regulations.
The role of village elders has also changed compared to traditional practices. In
former times, tribal leaders played an important role in local governance activities
within each community. They had unwritten authority and legitimacy to govern the
land and natural resources in accordance with local customary practices. Traditionally,
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Table 6.6: Distribution of compliance scores for tenure rules across socio-
demographic categories
Variables
Mean compliance scores
Case-I Case-II Case-III Total
Age Young (<35 years) 12.00 10.88a 12.30a 11.26a
Medium(35-50 years) 11.90 12.63b 14.00b 12.24ab
Old (>50 years) 12.58 12.86ab 14.94b 12.56b
χ2 1.92 6.23* 6.25* 10.13**
Education Primary 12.15 12.56 13.92 12.26
Secondary 12.00 10.93 13.07 11.57
U 279 345* 315 2743
Religion Christian 12.19 n.a 13.06 11.78
Traditional 11.95 n.a 14.78 12.68
U 321 n.a 118* 1440*
Residency Resident 12.23 14.00 13.91 12.29
Migrant 11.67 12.06 13.62 12.02
U 195 41 236 1673
Note: Values marked with the same superscript letters are not significantly different
(Dunn’s test, p>0.05); χ2 = Kruskal-Wallis Chi-squared value; U=Mann-Whitney U
test value; * = p<0.05; ** =p<0.01. Sample size for each case is 50.
tribal leaders had the authority to accept newcomers, to select a new cultivation field,
and to allocate plots among the farmers. The role of tribal leaders had declined when
the socialist constitution introduced formal village headman directly appointed by
township administrator. The constitution also required educated young leaders as
village headmen in order to collaborate with township administrative activities. Since
most tribal leaders did not have modern education, they became less interested in
working as village headmen. Changes in local religious beliefs have also diminished
the role of village shaman in land governance activities. Since the villagers who have
converted to Christian religion no longer accept the spiritual beliefs, the village shaman
could not any more influence local land-use practices.
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6.2 Livelihood Strategies and Forest Income
6.2.1 Sectoral income by livelihood activities
Being located in the same geographic region, households in all three case studies
engage in similar livelihood activities. In all three cases, the livelihood activities can be
categorised into five different groups namely, forest, agriculture, livestock, wage labour,
and non-farm employment activities. Despite having similar livelihood activity, the
income contribution from each livelihood source differs across the three cases. In Case-
I, total household income is mainly dominated by forest income which contributes
about 49% of total income. In Case-II, household income is equally dominated by forest
(35%) and livestock (27%). In Case-III, income is fairly distributed among forest (29%),
agriculture (28%), and non-farm employment (24%) (Figure 6.3a). The contribution of
cash income from each income source also differs across three cases. In Case-I, cash
income is mainly contributed by agriculture (33%) and wage labour (23%). In Case-II,
livestock (34%) and agricultural income (32%) dominate cash income. In Case-III, cash
income is mainly contributed by non-farm (39%) and agriculture (37%) (Figure 6.3b).
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Figure 6.3: Income portfolio by each source across three case studies
In terms of livelihood strategies, the majority of households in Case-I (52%) and
Case-II (40%) adopt Agriculture–Wage strategy to generate cash income. This result
implies that agriculture is still an important livelihood activity in these two cases. In
Case-III majority of households (44%) adopt Non-farm–Agriculture strategy because
there are more non-farm employment opportunities such as government services and
petty trades in this village tract. Only households in Case-I (12%) have adopted forest
dominated livelihood strategy for generating cash income. It means that forest is an
important cash-earning activity in this village tract despite being located inside the
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national park. In the other two cases, forest income is regarded as secondary livelihood
activity to generate cash income.
The average annual household income is about 1,385 USD in Case-I, 2,671 USD in
Case-II, and 1,702 USD in Case-III (see details in Appendix A). The distribution of total
household income is significantly different across the three cases (χ2=40.70, p<0.001).
Multiple comparisons indicate that total income is significantly higher in Case-II than
Case-I and Case-III (Figure 6.4a). However, there is no significant difference in total
income between Case-I and Case-III (p>0.05). A similar distribution is observed for
cash income where only Case-II is significantly different from other two cases (χ2=45.20,
p<0.001) and there is no significant difference between Case-I and Case-III (Figure
6.4b). Both results indicate that despite the restrictions from the national park, total
income is similar between households located inside and outside the park.
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Figure 6.4: Income distribution across three case studies
The average per capita income is about 406 USD in Case-I, 650 USD in Case-II,
and 433 USD in Case-III. The level of per capita income is significantly higher in
Case-II than Case-I and Case-III. The Cumulative Density Function (CDF) for Case-II
is lower than Case-I and Case-III at all income levels (Figure 6.5). It means that income
distribution in Case-II stochastically dominates that of Case-I and Case-III. The results
indicate that households bordering the park have higher per capita income at all
income levels than households inside and outside the park. The CDF curves also
show that the proportion of households below the national poverty line is lower in
Case-II than Case-I and Case-III. It indicates that there are less poor households among
communities bordering the park than inside and outside the park. Comparison of
CDF curves between Case-I and Case-III shows that there is no first-order stochastic
dominance at lower income levels. It means that the distributions of per capita income
for poor households are similar between inside and outside the park. At higher income
levels, the CDF curve for Case-III stochastically dominates the Case-I, indicating that
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per capita income for better-off households living inside the park is lower than those
living outside the park.
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Figure 6.5: Cumulative distribution of per capita income across three case studies
The poverty headcount ratio is significantly lower in Case-II (0.06) than Case-I
(0.42) and Case-III (0.38). This indicates that the proportion of people living below
the poverty line is lower in households bordering the park than households inside
and outside the park. Similarly, both poverty gap and severity indices are lower in
Case-II than Case-I and Case-III. This is mainly because households bordering the
park have higher income opportunities both from livestock and forest products. When
comparing poverty measures between Case-I and Case-III, poverty headcount ratio
is higher among households inside the park (0.42) than households outside the park
(0.38). The poverty gap and severity indices are similar between Case-I (0.1 and 0.03
respectively) and Case-III (0.1 and 0.04 respectively). The results indicate that although
the proportion of poor households is slightly higher inside the park than outside the
park, the magnitude and intensity of poverty is similar between the two cases despite
having different regulations from the park. In other words, the national park does not
have a significant impact on the poverty gap and severity among local households.
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6.2.2 Distribution of forest income across three case studies
Every household in all case studies uses forest products as one of the important income
sources. On average, households receive about 680 USD in Case-I, 944 USD in Case-II,
and 486 USD in Case-III. Comparative analysis shows that forest income is significantly
different across the three cases (χ2=16.27, p<0.001). Multiple comparisons indicate
that absolute forest income is significantly lower in Case-III than Case-I and Case-II.
However, there is no significant difference in absolute forest income between Case-I
and Case-II (Figure 6.6a). The results imply that despite restrictions from the national
park, households located closer to the park receive more forest income than those
located outside the park.
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Figure 6.6: Distribution of absolute and relative forest income across three case studies
The distribution of relative forest income is significantly different across the three
cases (χ2= 14.56, p<0.01). Multiple comparisons indicate that relative forest income is
significantly higher in Case-I than Case-II and Case-III. However, there is no significant
difference between Case-II and Case-III (Figure 6.6b). This implies that households
living inside the park depend more on forest income than households bordering and
outside the park.
In terms of cash forest income, households receive about 115 USD in Case-I, 145 USD
in Case-II, and 36 USD in Case-III. Comparative analysis shows that cash forest income
is significantly higher in Case-II than Case-I and Case-III (χ2= 19.67, p<0.01). However,
there is no significant difference between Case-I and Case-III (Figure 6.7a). The results
indicate that households bordering the park receive more cash forest income than
households living inside and outside the park. This is because households in Case-II
have better opportunities to get forest income than in the other two cases. On the one
hand, households in Case-II have better access to forest resources than Case-III because
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they are located closer to the park. On the other hand, they have less restriction from
park authorities than Case-I so that they have better chances to sell forest products.
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Figure 6.7: Distribution of cash and subsistence forest income across three case studies
The subsistence forest income is about 565 USD in Case-I, 799 USD in Case-II, and 449
USD in Case-III. The distribution of subsistence forest income is significantly different
across the three cases (χ2 = 8.10, p<0.05). Multiple comparisons show that households
in Case-II receive more subsistence forest income than Case-III (p<0.05). This is mainly
because households in Case-II uses more construction wood than Case-III for village
resettlements. However, there is no significant difference in Case-I compared to Case-II
and Case-III (Figure 6.7b). This indicates that households living inside the park use a
similar amount of forest products for subsistence purposes compared to households
bordering and outside the park. The main reason for this similarity is because there is
no restriction against subsistence use of forest products even inside the national park
so that every household has equal opportunity to use forest products for subsistence
purposes.
The effect of forest income on poverty is higher in Case-I than Case-II and Case-III.
Specifically, forest income reduces the poverty headcount ratio of about 46% in Case-I,
24% in Case-II, and 32% in Case-III. A similar distribution is observed in terms of
poverty gap and severity, where the effect of forest income is higher in Case-I than Case-
II and Case-III. Particularly, the effects of forest income on poverty gap and severity are
significantly higher in Case-I than Case-III, although both cases have similar poverty
indices. This indicates that forest income is more important for households inside the
park than outside the park. Therefore limiting access to forest resources may increase
poor households inside the park than bordering and outside the park. Decomposing
forest income into cash and subsistence income also shows that all three FGT poverty
measures become higher when subsistence forest income is excluded from poverty
analysis (Figure 6.8). This indicates that limiting access to subsistence forest resources
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will increase local poverty more than limiting access to cash forest activities.
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Figure 6.8: Comparison of poverty indices without cash and subsistence forest income
In addition to poverty, forest income also reduces local inequality among households.
The Gini coefficient is reduced by 17% in Case-I, 4% in Case-II, and 26% in Case-III
due to forest income. This means that the role of forest income in reducing inequality
is lower in Case-II compared to Case-I and Case-III. However, forest income highly
influences local income inequality in Case-III than in the other two cases. This is
mainly because poor households in Case-III depend more on forest income than the
better-off households.
The Gini decompositions by income sources also show that only Case-III has a
negative marginal effect (MEF=-0.2) on total income inequality by forest income. It
means that increasing forest income will reduce income inequality among households
in Case-III. In Case-I and Case-II, forest income shows positive marginal effects on total
income inequality (MEF=0.02 and MEF=0.08, respectively). It means that increasing
about 10% of forest income will also increase total income inequality in Case-I and Case-
II by 0.2% and 0.8% respectively. The results indicate that promoting forest income
will increase total income inequality among households living inside and bordering
the park. This is mainly because the collection of forest products is restricted inside
the national park so that only a few households have engaged in forest activities for
commercial purposes. Therefore, increasing forest income opportunities for households
inside the park will not improve income inequality since it will only affect households
that engage in commercial forest activities.
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6.2.3 Pattern of changes in local livelihood system
Despite local households are still highly dependent on forest resources, the resource
use patterns have changed in the last ten years. Household surveys show that there
is an increasing trend in using construction wood, firewood, and forest food among
case study households (Figure 6.9). Specifically, about 44% of households in Case-I,
50% in Case-II, and 10% in Case-III reported that they have increased the use of wood
for house constructions. The increasing use of construction wood is reported more
in Case-I and Case-II than Case-III. This is mainly because the former two cases have
more forest resources than the latter one. Regarding the firewood, about 26% in
Case-I, 32% in Case-II, and 16% in Case-III reported that they have increased the use
of firewood within the last ten years. In addition to firewood, the use of forest food
has also increased reported by 22% in Case-I, 12% in Case-II, and 12% Case-III. The
respondents mentioned that forest food is still important for them because it is free
and easily available in the surrounding forests.
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Figure 6.9: Changes in household use of forest products across three case studies
The main reason for the increased use of forest products is due to socio-cultural
changes in the region. For instance, more than 50% of responses in Case-I and Case-II
indicated that the use of construction wood has increased due to the construction
of wooden houses (Table 6.7). Traditionally, the Chin people prefer bamboo house
because it is easier to build and less expensive to be abandoned if there is a tribal
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conflict. Since tribal conflicts have declined, they have started to construct wooden
houses in order to settle permanently in one village. Improving market access for cash
crops helps them to buy construction materials. The introduction of chainsaws enables
to get construction wood easily from the surrounding forests. Another important
factor that influences the increased use of forest products is the population increase.
At least 30% of responses in all cases indicate that local use of forest products such as
firewood and forest food has increased due to higher number of household members.
The increasing numbers of livestock and the limited availability of alternative sources
also motivate then to use more forest products.
Table 6.7: Reasons for changing the use of forest products
Responses
Frequency*
Case-I Case-II Case-III
Reasons for increasing use
More house construction 20 (61%) 24 (59%) 3 (10%)
More household members 13 (39%) 13 (32%) 21 (70%)
More livestock 0 (0%) 4 (10%) 4 (13%)
Limited alternative sources 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 2 (7%)
Reasons for decreasing use
Resource decline 66 (40%) 67 (50%) 67 (40%)
Alternative sources available 44 (27%) 38 (28%) 44 (27%)
Limited resource use knowledge 22 (13%) 16 (12%) 26 (16%)
Park regulations 18 (11%) 1 (1%) 0 (0%)
Less visit to forest 10 (1%) 6 (4%) 8 (5%)
Less labour to collect forest products 2 (1%) 7 (5%) 16 (10%)
Migration of household members 2 (1%) 0 (0%) 5 (3%)
Note: * Multiple responses possible. Sample size for each case is 50.
On the contrary, there is a decreasing trend in local uses for some forest products.
In all cases, more than 80% of households reported that the use of NTFP, traditional
medicine, and wildlife products have declined within the last ten years. The decreasing
use of forest products is mainly influenced by ecological changes in the surrounding
forests. For example, more than 40% of total responses mentioned that the use of
forest products, particularly NTFP and wildlife have reduced due to the decline in the
availability of forest resources. At least 27% of total responses indicated the declining
use of forest products due to the increased availability of alternative resources. The use
of medicinal plants has reduced mainly due to the introduction of modern medicines1
in village clinics. The introduction of home-gardens has also substituted local needs
for forest food.
1Modern medicines also include commercial products of traditional medicine which are cheap and
easily available at the local shops and village clinics.
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The decline in resource use knowledge contributes to the decreasing use of forest
products. This factor represents about 13% of responses in Case-I, 12% in Case-II, and
16% in Case-III respectively. The respondents mentioned that the use of certain forest
products such as wildlife or medicinal plants has declined because they no longer
have any knowledge about hunting or using medicinal plants. The influence of park
regulations was mentioned only in Case-I (11%) and Case-II (1%). The response rates
are very low despite being located inside and bordering the park. Other influencing
factors that represent less than 10% of responses include reducing the frequency in
visiting forest, less labour to engage in forest activities as well as the migration of
household members to the city.
In addition to forest resources, other livelihood activities are observed to be changed
compared to traditional practices. Particularly, households have engaged more in
cash-oriented activities than traditional subsistence livelihood practices. According to
household surveys, more than 50% of households indicated that they have increased
cash crops within the last ten years (Table 6.8). Cash crops have become more common
in Case-II (88%) and Case-III (70%) than Case-I (58%). This indicates that households
living inside the park are less likely to engage in market-oriented activities than those
bordering and outside the park.
Table 6.8: Changes in livelihood activities in the last ten years
Livelihood activities
% of households*
Case-I Case-II Case-III
Agriculture Increase cash crop 58 88 70
Increase food crop 0 0 0
Unchange 42 12 30
Livestock Increase sale 30 60 30
Increase consumption 10 0 2
Unchange 60 40 68
Off-farm Increase 38 18 48
Decrease 0 0 0
Unchange 62 82 32
Note: *Sample size for each case is 50.
Regarding the livestock, about 30% in Case-I, 60% in Case-II, and 30% in Case-
III reported that they have increased livestock for commercial purposes rather than
subsistence uses. The response rates are higher in Case-II than Case-I and Case-III
mainly because households in Case-II have traditionally more livestock than the other
two cases. Nevertheless, the majority of households in Case-I and Case-III reported that
livestock breeding has not changed within the last ten years. Off-farm engagements
have become more common in Case-III (48%) than Case-I (38%) and Case-II (18%).
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This is mainly because households outside the park have better accessibility to the
township market and they have more government projects than those living inside and
bordering the park.
6.3 Traditional Ecological Knowledge and Practices
6.3.1 Summary of TEK practices in three case studies
A total of 32 different types of TEK based management practices are identified across
the three case studies. Depending on their functions and characteristics, the identified
TEK practices can be classified into four main categories. The first category includes
TEK practices that are associated with local resource use practices. These practices have
evolved based on the local understanding of resource status and related ecological
processes. For example, the selection of a new shifting cultivation field requires an
understanding of different ecological stages regarding forest successions and their
impacts on soil formation processes. Based on this knowledge, the farmers select a
new cultivation field in order to achieve optimum soil conditions and to ensure the
long-term availability of fallow forests for future cultivations. Similarly, controlled
burning practices also require to understand the nature of forest fire and its potential
impact on neighbouring fields. Other practices such as rotational grazing, selective
cuttings of bamboo, or preparation against rat outbreaks also require to understand
the nature and ecological processes of each resource.
The second category belongs to rules and regulations that are locally formulated to
protect critical resources. Rules and regulations are the common agreements within
communities that define whether to use or not to use the particular resources. Violators
are usually imposed either with fines or sanctions within the community. In all three
cases, communities develop rules and regulations either to avoid negative ecological
consequences of a particular activity or to complement the application of other TEK
practices. For example, rules that prohibit cutting trees near the water sources are
developed in order to avoid ecological consequences of reducing water availability.
Rules that prohibit shifting cultivation outside the chosen field ensures the application
of rotational fallow management practices. Rules that define local compensation for
fire accidents also encourage the application of controlled burning practices.
The third category is related to customs and rituals that define specific social be-
haviours regarding the conservation and sustainable use of ecosystem services. Similar
to rules and regulations, this type of TEK also support either directly or indirectly to
the application of TEK based practices. For example, local customs for sharing of plots,
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labour, bamboo, and wildlife provide flexible conditions for the villagers to practice
sustainable resource management practices. Local conflict resolution mechanism also
supports the application of sustainable land management practices within the commu-
nity. Ritual ceremonies such as hunting festivals or feast-of-merit also increase social
cohesion and thereby facilitate to get common agreements in local rule formulations.
The fourth category relates to taboos and totems that refrain community members
from collecting and use of particular resources. Unlike rules and regulations, taboos
and totems have evolved based on spiritual beliefs rather than local understandings
of pure ecological processes. For example, local people do not usually cut the trees
from sacred forests or village ritual places since they believe that those activities will
have negative consequences to their daily life. Deeply rooted in local spiritual world-
view, taboos protect environmental resources with a minimum cost of monitoring and
sanctioning. Another aspect of taboo is the connection with local ancestors rather than
their spiritual beliefs. For example, some key informants mentioned that they are still
complying with some types of taboos not because they believe in spiritual beings but
because their ancestors forbid them. This strong connection with local ancestors also
creates foundations to organize new communal agreements for sustainable land-use
and resource management practices. Table (6.9) presents the awareness and compliance
scores of TEK practices in the three case studies.
Table 6.9: Summary of TEK practices in three case studies
Sr. Type of TEK practices
Case-I Case-II Case-III
A C A C A C
A Resource use practices
1 Rotational selection of swidden fields. 100 90 100 96 92 72
2 Stumps are left standing to promote coppicing. 80 50 82 74 58 20
3 Preparing fire brakes before burning. 100 98 100 100 100 90
4 Burning is done during waxing moon only. 46 30 46 28 34 20
5 Starting fire from the top or near fire brake. 100 100 86 86 90 74
6 Rotational grazing and pasture management. 50 44 40 30 28 28
7 Selective cutting of bamboo culms. 100 100 100 96 80 78
8 Preparation against pest outbreak during
bamboo flowering.
88 72 60 40 100 96
B Rules and regulations
1 No shifting cultivation outside chosen field. 100 90 98 98 94 76
2 Compensation if fire spread outside the fields. 86 86 98 96 90 78
3 No cutting of trees near village water sources. 92 92 100 100 100 92
4 No selling of trees from village-use forests. 64 60 78 74 86 82
Continued on next page
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Table 6.9: (continued)
Sr. Type of TEK practices
Case-I Case-II Case-III
A C A C A C
5 No cutting of trees at mountain tops. 88 52 82 42 94 36
6 No hunting by outsiders within village
territory.
80 36 82 50 22 4
7 No taking of animals from others’ traps. 96 74 96 80 94 70
8 No taking of honey without permission. 96 52 98 86 58 24
C Customs and rituals
1 Sharing of plots within selected field. 100 80 100 98 100 100
2 Labour sharing during land clearing. 100 50 98 54 100 66
3 Custom of earth-eating to resolve conflicts. 96 60 96 20 96 38
4 Ritual selection of person to start fire. 84 36 56 10 84 24
5 Bamboo sharing system among owners. 98 92 94 86 76 72
6 Hunting festivals after crop harvesting. 94 14 96 4 96 8
7 Giving hind leg of wildlife to village headman. 100 34 100 38 100 26
8 Giving bird meat to the newly-wed family. 98 90 100 86 98 86
9 Feast of merit by killing mithan. 100 44 98 2 100 38
D Taboos and totems
1 No cutting of trees within the sacred forests. 98 64 94 10 100 50
2 No cutting of trees within village ritual places. 98 72 96 40 96 74
3 No cutting of big trees in settlement areas. 94 66 70 44 90 54
4 No cutting of ficus trees. 82 46 78 20 52 28
5 No killing of gibbons. 70 22 68 22 56 18
6 No clearing of land without communal rites. 98 88 98 86 100 54
7 No eating of crops before harvest ritual. 98 88 100 82 100 64
Note:A = Awareness (% of households); C = Compliance (% of households); Sample
size for each case is 50.
6.3.2 Awareness and compliance of TEK practices
Although similar TEK practices were observed in all three case studies, individual
awareness and compliance scores are different across three cases. Comparative analysis
shows that total awareness scores for TEK practices are significantly different across the
three cases (χ2=17.95, p<0.001). Multiple comparisons indicate that the total awareness
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scores are significantly higher in Case-I (90%) and Case-II (87%) than Case-III (83%).
There is no significant difference in total awareness scores between Case-I and Case-II
(p>0.05) (Figure 6.10a). This indicates that households located outside the national
park are less aware of local traditional practices than those inside and bordering the
park. The total compliance scores are significantly higher in Case-I (65%) than Case-II
(58%) and Case-III (54%) (χ2=15.76, p<0.001). There is no significant difference in total
compliance scores between Case-II and Case-III (p>0.05) (Figure 6.10b). This implies
that households inside the park are more in compliance with TEK practices than those
bordering and outside the park.
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Figure 6.10: TEK awareness and compliance scores across three case studies
Regarding the distribution of TEK category, the awareness scores are significantly
different in resource use practices (χ2=13.89, p<0.01), rules and regulations (χ2=26.05,
p<0.001), and taboos and totems (χ2=8.78, p<0.05) across the three cases (Table 6.10).
Specifically, the awareness scores for resource use practices are significantly higher in
Case-I (83%) than Case-III (73%), whereas there is no significant difference for Case-II
(77%) compared to other two cases. A similar distribution is observed for local taboos,
where awareness scores are higher in Case-I (91%) than Case-III (85%). However, there
is no significant difference in taboos awareness scores for Case-II (86%) compared
to the other two cases. In terms of rules and regulations, awareness scores in both
Case-I (88%) and Case-II (92%) are significantly higher than the Case-III (80%), but
there is no significant difference between the former two cases. These patterns of
distribution indicate that households located closer to the national park have higher
knowledge about the majority of TEK practices than those located away from the
national park. In terms of local customs and rituals, the awareness scores are not
significantly different across the three cases (p>0.05). It means that households living
in both inside and outside the national park have similar knowledge of local customs
and rituals in relation to the TEK practices.
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Table 6.10: Distribution of awareness and compliance scores in TEK
category across three case studies
Sr. Type of TEK
Mean scores (%)
χ2Case-I Case-II Case-III
Awareness
1 Resource use practices 83a 77ab 73b 13.89**
2 Rules and regulations 88a 92a 80b 26.05***
3 Customs and rituals 97 93 94 5.92
4 Taboos and totems 91a 86ab 85b 8.78*
5 Total awareness 90a 87a 83b 17.95***
Compliance
1 Resource use practices 73a 69a 60b 14.64***
2 Rules and regulations 68a 78b 58c 32.50***
3 Customs and rituals 56a 44b 51ab 14.09***
4 Taboos and totems 64a 43b 49b 16.55***
5 Total compliance 65a 58b 54b 15.76***
Note:Values marked with the same superscript letters are not significantly
different (Dunn’s test, p>0.05); χ2=Kruskal-Wallis Chi-squared; *=p<0.05;
**=p<0.01; ***=p<0.001
Local compliance scores are significantly different in all TEK categories across the
three cases (p<0.001) (see Table 6.10). Particularly, households in Case-I show higher
compliance scores in terms of practices (73%), rules (68%), and taboos (64%) than Case-
III (60%, 58%, 49% respectively). Households in both cases show similar compliance
scores in terms of customs and rituals (56% and 51% respectively). This means that
except for customs and rituals, households inside the national park show higher
compliance with TEK practices than households outside the park. Comparisons of
TEK compliance scores between Case-I and Case-II show that households in Case-I
have higher compliance scores in terms of customs and taboos than Case-II, whereas
the latter have higher compliance scores in terms of rules and regulations than the
former case. This indicates households inside the national park are more in compliance
with local customs and taboos, but less compliance with rules and regulations than
households bordering the park.
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6.3.3 Pattern of changes in TEK practices
Despite local people are still aware of the identified TEK practices, local compliances
have declined in all three cases. The non-parametric Mann-Whitney-U tests show that
the average compliance scores are significantly lower than the awareness scores for
all TEK practices (p<0.0001). The patterns of TEK compliances among the four TEK
categories differ across the three cases (Figure 6.11). For Case-I, compliance scores for
customs and rituals are significantly lower than the other three categories (χ2=9.21,
p<0.05). However, there is no significant difference among compliance scores for rules,
practices, and taboos. In Case-II, both customs and taboos have significantly lower
compliance scores than the other two categories (χ2=85.22, p<0.001). In Case-III, there
is no significant difference in compliance scores among the four categories (p>0.05).
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Figure 6.11: Comparison of compliance scores across different TEK categories
In addition to TEK categories, compliance scores were further divided into two
different groups based on the nature of TEK development. The first group is TEK
evolved based on instrumental perspectives, such as rotation field selection, systematic
land clearing, controlled burning and so on. The second group of TEK is related to
normative perspectives, such as customs, taboos, or ritual practices. Results from non-
parametric Mann-Whitney-U tests show that local compliance scores are significantly
different between the two groups in all three cases (p<0.01). Specifically, compliance
scores for TEK related to normative perspectives are significantly lower than those
related to instrumental perspectives (Figure 6.12). This further confirms that TEK
based on normative belief systems are more likely to be decline than those evolved
from local understanding of ecological processes.
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Figure 6.12: Comparison of compliance scores between normative TEK and instrumen-
tal TEK
In terms of socio-economic characteristics, local compliance scores are significantly
different between religious groups (Table 6.11). Particularly, households who still
believe in traditional religions show higher TEK compliance scores than those who have
converted to the Christian religion. This is mainly because the majority of TEK practices
such as taboos, rituals, and customs are highly associated with traditional spiritual
beliefs. Within each individual case study, different socio-economic characteristics have
different influences on TEK compliances. For instance, in Case-I, the compliance scores
are significantly different across education categories (U=378, p<0.05). Specifically,
respondents who have secondary and higher education levels have lower compliance
scores than those who only have primary education. In Case-II, the compliance
scores are significantly different across age categories, where younger respondents
comply less than the medium and older respondents (χ2=7.28, p<0.05). In Case-III the
compliance scores show significant differences across religion (U=175, p<0.05) and
residency status (U=127, p<0.05) of the respondents. These particular results indicate
that despite being situated in a similar geographical location, local compliances with
TEK may differ depending on socio-economic characteristics of the respondents.
Apart from the socio-economic characteristics of the respondents, household surveys
indicate ten different factors that influence local compliances with TEK practices (Table
6.12). The resulting factors can further be classified into three different categories.
The first category belongs to normative factors that influence local perceptions of TEK
practices. The most common normative factor that influences TEK compliance is
changes in local religious beliefs, which represents about 27% of total responses in
Case-I, 32% in Case-II, and 21% in Case-III. Key informants mentioned that some
villagers no longer respect sacred forests or village ritual places after they have
converted to Christianity. Another normative factor is declining the legitimacy of TEK
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Table 6.11: Distribution of TEK compliance scores across socio-demographic
categories
Characteristics of respondents
Mean compliance scores (%)
Case-I Case-II Case-III Total
Age Young 63.60 52.54a 51.39 56.77
Medium 66.07 59.51b 52.99 59.33
Old 66.41 62.50b 57.64 61.40
χ2 0.04 7.28* 1.76 2.76
Education Primary 68.65 60.24 53.47 60.64
Secondary &
above
58.20 54.69 56.70 56.60
U 378* 332 222 2728
Religion Christian 62.62 n.a 51.07 57.38
Traditional 68.22 n.a 60.24 64.80
U 249 n.a 175* 1467***
Residency Resident 64.97 58.99 56.49 60.02
Migrant 66.41 43.75 46.88 56.51
U 241 3.5 127* 1316
Note: Values marked with the same superscript letters are not significantly different
(Dunn’s test, p>0.05); χ2=Kruskal-Wallis Chi-squared; U=Mann-Whitney U Test;
* =p<0.05, *** =p<0.001.
practices. This factor is more associated with TEK in terms of rules and regulations
such as the prohibition of cutting trees at mountain tops or from village-use forests
for commercial purpose. Key informants mentioned that they do not comply with
these rules mainly because other village members are not complying any more. Other
normative factors include increasing modernization and social conflicts which further
shape on local TEK compliances.
The second category belongs to instrumental factors that influence local needs of
TEK practices. The most common instrumental factor is the loss of knowledge of TEK
practices. About 25% of total responses in Case-I, 26% in Case-II, and 32% in Case-
III indicate that local compliance on TEK practices has declined mainly because the
respondents do not know or recognize the identified TEK practices. For example, local
knowledge on rotational grazing and pasture management practices have declined
mainly because most villagers no longer have grazing animals such as mithan for
their livelihood. Changes in livelihood activities also reduce local dependency on
TEK practices. For example, local compliance with shifting cultivation and hunting
practices has declined mainly because most farmers no longer engaged in those
livelihood activities.
The third category includes contextual factors mainly related to the changes in eco-
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Table 6.12: Reasons for decreasing compliance of TEK practices
Sr Main reasons
Response frequency*
Case-I Case-II Case-III
Normative factors
1 Changes in religious belief 141 (27%) 198 (32%) 147 (21%)
2 Decline in legitimacy of TEK practices 72 (14%) 51 (8%) 102 (15%)
3 Modernization (outdated practices) 23 (4%) 47 (8%) 47 (7%)
4 Social conflicts 3 (1%) 3 (0%) 8 (1%)
Instrumental factors
5 Loss of knowledge on TEK practices 131 (25%) 164 (26%) 225 (32%)
6 Changes in livelihood activities 24 (5%) 36 (6%) 35 (5%)
Contextual factors
7 Resource decline 70 (14%) 75 (12%) 80 (11%)
8 Increasing market access 34 (7%) 43 (7%) 34 (5%)
9 Increasing access by outsiders 13 (3%) 3 (0%) 21 (3%)
10 Park regulation 7 (1%) 1 (0%) 0 (0%)
Note: *Multiple responses possible. Sample size for each case is 50.
logical, socio-economic, and regulatory conditions. Regarding ecological context, the
respondents mentioned that local compliance with hunting customs and rituals has de-
clined mainly because of decreasing wildlife population. Resource decline is reported
more in Case-I (14%) than Case-II (12%) and Case-III (11%). In terms of socio-economic
context, increasing access to township market has influenced local compliance with
TEK practices. The respondents mentioned that local resource sharing practices such
as bamboo or wildlife products have declined due to increasing market demand. In-
creasing access by outsiders also influences local compliance with TEK-based rules and
regulations, such as the prohibition against taking wildlife from traps set up by other
villagers or collection of honey without permission from the owners. In terms of the
regulatory context, park regulations are reported to influence local customs for shifting
cultivation and hunting rituals. This is particularly reported in Case-I and Case-II,
although the proportions of responses are very low compared to other responses.
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6.4 Synthesis of Case Study Results
The three case studies show both similarities and differences in terms of land tenure
system, livelihood strategies, and traditional resource management practices. De-
spite the government introduces formal regulations, households in all three cases
still comply more with informal tenure rules in managing land and related natural
resources. This is mainly because the formal government regulations do not fit with
the local customary institutions. Especially, the formal land tenure regulations are not
compatible with traditional shifting cultivation practices. This particular conflict be-
tween formal and informal regulations has negative feedbacks on the social-ecological
system by increasing environmental degradation and social conflicts. This finding
reconfirms the conceptual explanation of the ‘problem of fit’ by Young et al. (2008)
who argued that the mismatch between formal and informal institutions may reduce
the legitimacy of resource management institutions. To reduce existing people-park
conflicts, government authorities should recognise and respect the informal tenure
rules particularly in developing and enforcement of conservation regulations.
Although the three case studies have similar land tenure systems, individual property
rights differ depending on particular products and services. For instance, the right to
cut timber is different between watershed forests and village-use forests, although the
right to collect NTFP is the same for both land-use types. The types of rights assigned
to each product are different across the three cases. For instance, hunting and NTFP
collection by outsiders are prohibited in Case-II although these activities are permitted
in Case-I and Case-III. This highlights the importance of legal pluralism, where
management interventions require to look beyond the simple tenure classification and
to recognise the bundle of rights associated with each tenure regime (Pradhan and
Rajendra, 2002).
Apart from differences in property rights, households’ compliances with tenure
rules also differ across the three cases. Particularly, households located outside the
national park are more in compliance with traditional tenure rules than those inside
and bordering the park. The results are in line with the findings of other studies (e.g.
Veit et al., 2008; Mascia and Claus, 2009), which imply that conservation regulations
undermine the legitimacy of local tenure rules among communities associated with
the national park. Local compliance with tenure rules differs depending on land
ownership types. For instance, the compliance rate for tenure rules regarding clan and
private lands are significantly different across the three cases. This dissimilarity in local
rule compliance may increase people-park conflicts, particularly if the park authorities
adopt the same regulations for all villages without individual consultations.
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The legitimacy of local tenure rules has declined among the case study villages.
Particularly, households inside and bordering the national park have lower compliance
scores for private tenure rules than those living outside the national park. It means
that the legitimacy of traditional landowners has declined in response to the national
park regulations. The allocation of agricultural lands by the park has also created
social conflicts between traditional landowners and the land recipients. Therefore,
it is essential to review the existing allocated lands inside the national park and to
revise the land allocation policy in line with the traditional tenure regulations. The
role of tribal leaders has declined in all case study villages. This particular trend is
mainly initiated by government regulations, improved access to public education and
the introduction of modern religious practices. Consequently, the local perception of
tenure security has declined due to increasing conflicts between formal and informal
regulations. Therefore, it is important to integrate both formal and informal institutions
in park management activities in order to achieve effective governance system and to
reduce social conflicts.
Regarding local livelihoods, most households engage in similar livelihood activ-
ities. The combination of livelihood strategies differs across the three cases. The
cluster analysis shows that households adopt four main types of livelihood strategies
(agriculture, non-farm, wage, and forest) to generate cash income. Among these,
agriculture-based strategies are common among households living inside and bor-
dering the park whereas non-farm-based strategies are common among households
outside the park. The forest-based strategy is observed only in a few households
inside the national park. This particular trend indicates that although forest plays
an important role in sustaining local livelihoods, the majority of households rely on
agriculture and non-farm livelihood strategies to generate cash income. The results
are similar to the findings of Kmoch et al. (2018) in the northern Chin State, except
for the fact that the remittance income is relatively higher in the latter due to a higher
migration rate.
In terms of total income, households bordering the park receive a significantly
higher amount of income than the other two cases. This result is in line with the
findings of Clements et al. (2014) where households bordering the park receive a
higher amount of income than those inside and outside the park. This is mainly
because households bordering the park have better access to both forest products and
other livelihood options. Income comparison between inside and outside the park
indicates that there is no significant difference between these two household groups. It
means that although households inside the park have limited livelihood options due to
conservation regulations, they have received a similar amount of income due to having
better access to forest resources.
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The comparison of forest income clearly shows that households inside and bordering
the park receive a significantly higher amount of forest income than those outside
the park. The contribution of forest income to poverty reduction is higher inside the
park than bordering and outside the park. The result indicates that under the current
situation, the national park does not have a significant impact on increasing local
poverty due to weak law enforcement and informal permission for local resource uses.
The enforcement of park regulations will have more negative impacts on households
inside the park than bordering and outside the park. Therefore, it is important for
policymakers to create alternative livelihood options before increasing law enforcement
in accordance with the national park regulations.
The three case studies also show that forest income also reduces income inequality
among households. It is no surprise since all households have equal informal rights
to forest resources within their respective village territories. The results are also in
line with the findings of the global study conducted by Angelsen et al. (2014) where
access to natural resources equalises income differences among rural households. The
effect of forest income is higher among households outside the park than inside and
bordering the park. It means that lower-income households outside the park are
using more forest income than higher-income households. This result indicates that
forest income is more pro-poor among households outside the park than inside and
bordering the park. The marginal effect analysis shows that forest income has negative
marginal effect among households inside and bordering the park. It means that the
promotion of forest income inside and bordering the park is likely to increase income
inequality in the future. This result contradicts with the findings of other studies (e.g.
M. Fisher et al., 2005; Fonta and Ayuk, 2013) which show that increasing forest income
reduces income inequality among rural households. Therefore, the promotion of forest
income should consider more pro-poor strategies in order to reduce income inequality
in the future.
In addition to the livelihood system, the three case studies also show that local
people still apply different types of knowledge and management practices in order
to sustain forest resources and associated ecosystem services. Although local TEK
practices are similar across the three case studies, the local compliance scores are higher
among households inside the park than bordering and outside the park. This is mainly
because households inside the park have better access to forests so that they have a
better chance to continue TEK practices. This indicates that access to forest resources
has a greater influence on local knowledge and compliance with TEK practices. The
results also support the findings of previous studies (e.g. Gómez-Baggethun and Reyes-
García, 2013; Kangalawe et al., 2014) and reconfirms that the differences in ecological
context highly influence on the ecological knowledge possessed by the local people.
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Despite local people still possess knowledge of different TEK practices, the legitimacy
of these practices have declined across the three cases. Particularly, local compliance
scores are significantly lower in TEK associated with taboos, customs, and rituals
than TEK associated with rules, regulations, and resource-use practices. This result
contradicts with the findings of Boafo et al. (2015) who found out that TEK related to
rules and regulations received the lowest compliance scores compared to other types of
TEK practices. The classification of TEK based on knowledge domains also shows that
TEK associated with normative beliefs has lower compliance scores than the TEK based
on the instrumental perspectives. It is mainly because the normative domain of TEK
is highly associated with traditional spiritual belief. Therefore local compliance with
these types of TEK has changed when traditional spiritual belief has declined within
the society in response to modernisation and acculturation processes. The results are
in line with other studies in rural Africa (e.g. Kangalawe et al., 2014; Osei-Tutu, 2017)
who found out that local compliance with resource management taboos had declined
due to the introduction of modern religions.
Aside from religious changes, local compliance with TEK practices has declined due
to decreasing engagement in forest-based livelihood activities. Especially, younger
people are less likely to comply with traditional resource management practices than
older people. It is mainly because younger people have better chances to engage in
non-farm activities so that they are less reliance on environmental resources for their
livelihood. Consequently, they no longer need to participate in collective activities
and associated cultural practices. The results are in line with the findings of other
studies (e.g. Gómez-Baggethun et al., 2010; Boafo et al., 2015; Siahaya et al., 2016),
where young and educated people are less likely to comply with traditional resource
management practices. This particular trend highlights that integrating TEK into
formal management practices should consider the consequences of cultural change
within the target society (Reyes-García et al., 2014).
CHAPTER 7
MANAGEMENT IMPLICATIONS
7.1 Identification of Management Scenarios for NTNP
Following Borrini-Feyerabend et al. (2013), this study proposes four management
scenarios based on different levels of devolution and local participation in resource
governance activities. The first scenario is the business-as-usual model, where manage-
ment activities will be continued without significant changes. The second scenario
is the strict protection model, where management activities are implemented by strict
regulations without the involvement of local people. The third scenario is the commu-
nity control model, where local people fully control the management authorities and
responsibilities without state intervention. The fourth scenario is the co-management
model, where management authorities and responsibilities are shared between the
state and local people. The management scenarios were presented to the local stake-
holders at the participatory scenario planning workshop. Based on the case study
results, the workshop participants discussed and evaluated the four management
scenarios in accordance with the three sustainable development criteria: 1) biodiversity
conservation, 2) livelihood improvement, and 3) social justice (see detail in Section
3.3.4).
7.1.1 Business-As-Usual (BAU) model
This model assumes that there will be no changes in park management activities in
the future. Patrolling and law enforcement will still be weak due to limited budget
and human resources. There will be no negotiation with local communities regarding
traditional land ownership inside the park. The villages inside the park will continue
to be illegal settlements without formal recognition. Shifting cultivation will continue
to be illegal inside the park although there will be no clear legal sanction against
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shifting cultivation on old fallow forests. Collection of forest products inside the park
will still be illegal although there will be no legal action against households own
consumptions.
Impact on biodiversity conservation
Biodiversity will decline due to increasing illegal activities amid weak law enforcement
by the park. As indicated in case studies, wildlife population and NTFP will continue
to decline mainly because of the overexploitation. Extraction of timber for commercial
purpose will be increased due to improved technology and market accessibility. The
numbers of households practising shifting cultivation will be decreased not only
because it is considered illegal but also due to the increasing market opportunities for
cash crops on permanent farms. This particular trend will have negative impacts on
remaining forests since shifting cultivation will become less systematic and collective
activities such as controlled burning will not be properly conducted. Encroachment
by outsiders will be increased due to declining compliances with traditional tenure
institutions. It will further increase deforestation and extinction of endangered wildlife
species inside the park.
The conservation practices will continue to be ineffective due to limited budget and
human resources. The annual park management budget is about 94 USD per km2
which is relatively lower than the required budget of 240 USD per km2 as indicated in
the park management plan (Forest Department, 2017). According to the park manager,
the potential to increase budget allocation is very low due to the country economic
situation. Therefore, the park authorities are not able to implement most of the
conservation activities indicated in the park management plan. There are only 16 park
rangers in NTNP to conduct patrolling and law enforcement activities. The limited
number of staff allocation is a major barrier to implement effective law enforcement
activities in accordance with the conservation regulations. The government policy only
allows recruiting educated staff in order to provide basic training on conservation
practices. Most educated people are not interested to work as park rangers in remote
areas with low salary payment. Therefore, the potential to increase staff is very low to
achieve effective conservation.
The legitimacy of formal rules will continue to decline because of its incompatibility
with local social-ecological conditions. Local people will continue to follow informal
rules due to the limited alternative options for their livelihoods. At the same time, local
compliances with informal rules will continue to decline mainly due to the absence of
formal recognition and socio-economic changes. Furthermore, conflicts between formal
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and informal land tenure system will continue to increase if the formal regulations do
not compromise with existing customary institutions. This particular trend will have
negative impacts on the environment as people will comply less with local resource
management practices.
Impact on local livelihood
Under the BAU scenario, households inside the park will continue agriculture as
the primary source for cash income. Household surveys show that at least 68%
of households across three cases will continue agriculture as their main livelihood
choice (Table 7.1). However, income from shifting cultivation inside the park will be
decreased due to limited land availability and social conflicts. It will have negative
impacts on local poor who mainly rely on shifting cultivation for their livelihoods.
The opportunities to step out of agriculture will still be limited because investment
opportunities will still be limited due to low productivity and high transportation
costs (Vicol et al., 2018).
Table 7.1: Households’ livelihood priorities for the next ten years
Future livelihood options
Percent of households
Case-I Case-II Case-III
Agriculture 72 68 78
Livestock 4 6 8
Non-farm employment 10 8 8
Migrate to city 10 6 6
Do not know. 4 12 0
Source:Household survey 2017.
Local dependency on forest income will be increased due to limited alternative
sources. Case study results have shown that at least 29% of household income is
contributed by forest under current situations. Cash forest income is likely to be
increased due to increasing market opportunities and accessibility. This further will
reduce local poverty by increasing household income. Cash forest income is mainly
received by wealthy households since it requires high input costs, such as chainsaws
or gasoline, which poor households cannot afford. Therefore, the contribution of cash
forest income on poverty reduction will still be limited among the poor. The cash forest
income will be available only for a short period due to higher risks of over-exploitation
under weak enforcement. Therefore, the role of forests for cash income will be reduced
in the future under current management scenario.
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Impact on social justice
Regarding social equity, households outside the park have more non-farm employment
options than inside the park. They have more investment opportunities on permanent
cultivation due to increasing market demand and less social conflicts. Households
inside the park will have less non-farm options mainly because of the park regulations.
They will have fewer investment opportunities in permanent farming due to tenure
insecurity and increasing land conflicts. Cash forest income will still be higher inside
the park because of having forest resources and increased market demand. It will
further increase income inequality not only between households inside and outside the
park but also among households within the same community inside the park. The Gini
decomposition analysis has shown that increasing forest income will increase income
inequality among community members. Some forest products such as construction
woods require initial investments for tools and transportation which poor households
could not usually afford to pay. It may lead to the problem of ’elite capture’ where
only wealthy households can exploit high-value forest products (Larson et al., 2010).
7.1.2 Strict protection model
This model assumes that the State will manage the national park by existing rules
and regulations. The current law enforcement activities will be increased in order to
achieve effective conservation. The park boundary will be demarcated in accordance
with the initial park notification. Traditional lands inside the national park will be
considered as state property in accordance with government regulations. Only the
villages which were inside the park before the park establishment will be allowed to
stay. The other illegal villages will be relocated outside the park. Local resource use
practices such as shifting cultivation or extraction of forest products will be completely
banned inside the national park.
Impact on biodiversity conservation
In this scenario, biodiversity will be increased because of the strict protection against
illegal human activities. Studies have indicated that well-managed protected areas
can reduce habitat losses and preserve biodiversity in the long run (Watson et al.,
2014). The intensity of hunting and NTFP collection will be reduced due to patrolling
and law enforcement activities. Forest cover inside the park will be increased due to
strict protection against illegal logging. Shifting cultivation areas inside the park will
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be decreased due to park regulations. Consequently, the flow of ecosystem services
including drinking water to the nearby cities will be increased in the future.
Although this scenario has positive impacts on conservation, the prospect of achiev-
ing this scenario is far away from reality. The main issue is related to limited options
to increase staff and budget allocation. At present, there are 25 staff members in NTNP
including office staff and rangers. This number is relatively lower than the optimum
staff requirement indicated in the park management plan, which is about 100 staff
members including the park manager (Forest Department, 2017). The current annual
park management budget is about 67,000 USD which is about three times lower than
the required annual budget of about 175,000 USD to achieve effective implementation
(Forest Department, 2017). As the probability for increasing staff and budget allocation
is very low due to the economic limitations of the country, the implementation of this
model will not be effective under the current situation.
Another factor that will limit the effective implementation of strict protection model
is due to the decreasing legitimacy of the existing rules and regulations. As indicated
by Sutinen and Kuperan (1999), people may follow the law if it is perceived as fair
and appropriate and the enforcement institutions are legitimate. The three case
studies indicate that the majority of households still neglect formal rules due to
incompatibility with local social-ecological context. Therefore, even if the government
increases law enforcement activities, local people are less likely to follow the formal
rules and regulations. It may also lead to social conflicts between local communities
and park authorities, which further may decrease local participation in conservation.
This particular trend will have negative impacts on biodiversity since the success of
conservation is highly associated with local participation in governance institutions
(Persha et al., 2011). The increased enforcement of formal regulations will undermine
the existence of informal rules regarding forest conservation. It can further increase
the risk of tree cutting by outsiders particularly in far remote areas where park rangers
are not regularly accessible.
Impact on local livelihood
The restrictions of human activities under this scenario will have a significant impact
on local livelihood system. Since the existing legal framework does not allow any use of
forest resource inside the park, the increase in law enforcement will decrease household
income. According to the case studies, households inside the park will reduce about
49% of their income due to limiting access to forest resources. Consequently, local
poverty will be increased among communities living inside the park. As indicated
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in case studies, about 46% of households will likely to be below the national poverty
line because of limiting access to forest resources. The poverty gap and severity will
be increased by 32% and 22% respectively. Due to limited availability of construction
wood, poor households will not be able to build wooden houses unless they buy timber
from other villages located outside the park.
Increasing formal regulations will reduce not only forest income but also agricultural
income. Case study results have shown that about 54% of farmers inside the park
still rely on shifting cultivation. If these practices are not allowed inside the park, the
farmers will lose at least 20% of total household income. Local livelihood strategies
will be changed due to increased state regulations. The case studies have shown that
about 12% of households inside the park adopt Forest-Wage strategy to generate cash
income. If the law enforcement activities are effectively conducted, these households
will have to change their livelihood strategies since forest income activities will no
longer be permitted inside the park. The off-farm activities will still be limited in the
future since business opportunities are still limited in the region (Vicol et al., 2018).
Consequently, both regional and international migration will be increased, which in
turn will reduce social resilience among remaining communities.
Impact on social justice
Strengthening law enforcement activities will increase income inequality between local
communities. The three case studies indicate that there is no significant difference in
total income between households inside and outside the park. However, under the
strict protection scenario, the amount of forest income inside the park will be decreased
due to government regulations. Since formal regulations will only affect communities
living inside the park, their income will become significantly lower than outside the
park. The impact will be higher in poor households because they depend more on
forest income than better-off households. Similar cases have been documented in many
tropical countries where government restrictions affect more to the poor who are the
most forest-dependent groups among communities (Larson et al., 2010). Limiting
forest income will also increase inequality among community members. As shown in
the case study results, limiting forest income will increase about 17% of total income
inequality among households living inside the park. Therefore, as long as there is
no additional government subsidy, income inequality will likely to be increased both
within and between communities inside the park. It may further lead to the social
differentiation between the park and non-park communities.
Increasing formal regulations will exclude local communities from decision-making
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processes. The three case studies indicate that land-use decisions are mostly made by
informal village councils which are internally recognised as the legitimate governance
institutions. The restrictions against traditional shifting cultivation inside the park will
reduce the role of village councils in making collective decisions. This will further
reduce local authority and legitimacy of village councils in resolving social conflicts. As
a result, traditional tenure institutions will decline in response to strict law enforcement
activities. This particular trend will have negative impacts on social resilience since
previous researches have indicated that traditional institutions play a critical role in
fostering the local adaptive capacity to cope with unexpected changes (see Young et al.,
2008; Agrawal, 2010; Kangalawe et al., 2014).
In addition to traditional institutions, local ecological knowledge and management
practices will decline in response to increasing law enforcement activities. As indicated
in three case studies, local farmers apply several TEK practices regarding shifting
cultivation and forest resources. More importantly, local compliances with TEK
practices are significantly higher among communities living inside the park than
bordering and outside the park. Therefore, restricting access to shifting cultivation and
forest resources will decrease local compliances with TEK practices. As TEK reflects
the cultural identity and social relationship with environment (Berkes, 2008), declining
TEK will reduce the cultural identity of indigenous communities and their spiritual
relationships with the natural environment. Furthermore, declining TEK will reduce
collective actions and related social mechanisms among communities. This particular
trend will have negative impacts on the social system by reducing social cohesions and
local adaptive capacity against environmental changes (Berkes et al., 2000).
7.1.3 Community control model
This model assumes that customary tenure rights regarding traditional village terri-
tories inside the national park will be granted to the respective communities. Both
management authorities and responsibilities will be held by traditional governance
institutions. The government will recognise customary land ownership and related
property rights including communal, clan, and private lands inside the park. Tradi-
tional shifting cultivation and resource-use practices will be controlled and managed
by customary tenure institutions and traditional management practices.
Impact on biodiversity conservation
In this scenario, biodiversity will increase more than in the BAU scenario. As indicated
by Larson et al. (2010), local empowerment through recognising traditional tenure will
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have positive impacts on forest conservation. Previous studies have confirmed that
community-managed forests have lower deforestation rates than government-managed
protected forests (see Hayes and Ostrom, 2005; Porter-Bolland et al., 2012). Therefore,
forest cover will be increased under this scenario particularly in watershed forests and
village-use forests. Illegal logging by outsiders will be reduced since it is prohibited
by local customary institutions. However, the open-access forests within the village
territory will continue to decline since there is no specific regulation regarding the
use of forest products in open-access forests. The population of wildlife and NTFP
will continue to be decreased since customary regulations permit hunting and NTFP
collection particularly among communities living inside the park.
The prospect of achieving conservation outcomes is higher than in the former
two scenarios. As highlighted by Larson et al. (2010), the increasing tenure security
for traditional territories will provide incentives to create new internal rules among
indigenous communities. The three case studies have shown that local communities are
highly aware of the potential ecosystem services provided by the forests. However, the
efficiency of local institutions to effectively manage local forest resources in line with
conservation goals is still in question (J. Sayer et al., 2007). As mentioned by Barrett
et al. (2001), local institutions may be strong in dealing with own community members;
however, they may be weak in dealing with outsiders seeking to exploit the resources.
In all three cases, the customary rules do not include clear punishment systems against
outsiders. Social sanctions are highly context-specific and less applicable to outsiders.
Furthermore, the local community will still be inefficient regarding the conservation
of endemic species that are not important for their livelihood and socio-cultural
practices.
The legitimacy of tenure rules will be higher than the strict protection model. The
case study results have shown that at least 85% of households are still aware of the
customary tenure regulations and more than 75% of households have expressed their
willingness to comply with them. However, it should be noted that tenure rules are not
static but are changing over time in response to changes in social-ecological conditions.
The three case studies has shown that there is a decreasing trend in local compliances
mainly because of changes in livelihood strategies and local cultural context. It could
further reduce the legitimacy of customary rules in the future mainly due to the
increasing livelihood options that do not require collective activities. Existing sanctions
against offenders are mainly related either with spiritual belief or social isolation from
the communities. Therefore, the legitimacy of social sanctions is likely to decrease due
to the increasing trend of Christianity. It can further diminish the local capacity to
resolve social conflicts in the future (see Kangalawe et al., 2014).
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Impact on local livelihood
The devolution of customary rights to the local community will have positive impacts
on local livelihoods. As indicated by Deininger and Jin (2003), increasing tenure
security tends to increase long-term investment in land-related livelihood strategies.
Therefore, investments in both shifting cultivation and permanent cultivation are likely
to be increased because of the increasing tenure security within the community. It will
have positive impacts on cash income since the agricultural sector contributes at least
32% of total cash income across the three cases. Although shifting cultivation is highly
criticised as destructive activities, other studies have shown that this practice plays
an essential role in maintaining livelihood resilience and adaptive capacity of local
farmers (see Cramb et al., 2009). As about 54% of households inside the park still rely
on shifting cultivation, their livelihood will be more secure if customary tenure rights
are recognised and protected by the state.
Forest income is likely to be increased since households will have more access to
forest products, which are considered illegal under park regulations. The impact will
be higher for cash forest income rather than subsistence forest income since people
will have legal rights to sell forest products collected within their village territories.
The increase in forest income will reduce poverty among households. Case study
results has shown that a 10% increase in forest income is likely to reduce at least 4% of
income poverty among households. However, this may have negative consequences on
local tenure institutions since increasing the market value of natural resources tend to
reduce collective tenure regulations (Fitzpatrick, 2006).
Impact on social justice
In this model, households inside the park will have equal livelihood opportunities
than households outside the park. The three case studies have confirmed that there is
no significant difference in household income between inside and outside the park.
Both communities will have similar opportunities to apply TEK practices since there
will be no further restriction by the park in this scenario. It can further provide equal
chances to maintain cultural identity and unique social practices.
There will be an unequal distribution of forest income between inside and outside
the park. Case study results have shown that forest income is significantly higher
among households inside the park than outside the park. Since households inside the
park have higher chances to collect forest products, they will have more forest income
if the state formally recognises customary institutions. It will further increase income
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inequality between inside and outside the park. The increasing opportunities for forest
income will also increase inequality within communities living inside the park. This
trend is clearly shown in the Gini decomposition analyses where increasing forest
income increases total income inequality inside the park. However, the inequality will
be lower than the BAU model because cash forest income from timber is restricted
under customary regulations.
In addition to income inequality, the devolution of forest tenure often results in
power inequity within local governance authorities (Ribot et al., 2008). The case
study results have shown that although village councils permit all village members
to participate in decision-making processes, customary landowners usually dominate
the land-use decisions. This power asymmetry is more prominent within communities
inside the park where the majority of households are still regarded as land borrowers
who have less influence on decision-making processes. Most villages in NTNP are
multi-lineage communities where one lineage may own a vast area of land. Therefore,
recognising customary tenure may also increase social differences among community
members. In addition, the local custom in Chin state is highly ’patriarchal’, where
women are always excluded from communal decisions. As indicated in case studies,
customary tenure systems do not permit women to inherit the lands. Therefore, the
devolution of customary tenure rights under community control model will even
increase social inequity among community members.
7.1.4 Co-management model
This model assumes that management power and responsibilities will be shared be-
tween park authorities and local people. Management goals will be set collectively
between park authorities and community leaders with a particular focus on conser-
vation and livelihood improvement. Traditional village territories will be formally
recognised by park authorities. Illegal logging, hunting, and NTFP collection by out-
siders will be restricted within each village territory. Traditional village councils will
be authorised to manage land and natural resources within their village territories. The
park rangers will provide technical and legal support to enforce legal actions against
offenders by traditional regulations.
Impact on biodiversity conservation
In this scenario, biodiversity is likely to be increased compared to the other man-
agement models. Conservation of watershed forests and village-use forests will be
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improved due to increased protection against outsiders. This further will enhance key
ecosystem services such as drinking water and construction wood to the surrounding
communities. The availability of NTFP and wildlife will be increased due to effective
protection and improved management. More importantly, the conservation of endan-
gered species will be improved due to better negotiation between park authorities and
local people in setting conservation objectives.
Regarding effectiveness, co-management is regarded as the most effective strategy in
reconciling tenure rights and biodiversity conservation (Kepe, 2008). Although transac-
tion costs will be higher due to long negotiation processes (Blore et al., 2013), previous
studies have shown that the co-management approach provides better conservation
outcome than the other community-based approaches (see Andrade and Rhodes, 2012;
Plummer et al., 2012). Local communities will have more power and authority in
protecting their resources against outsiders. It will further increase community partici-
pation in resource monitoring, which in turn will result in improved conservation with
fewer management costs. Conservation planning and decision-making process will be
improved since there is a high potential to integrate local knowledge and management
practices. The disadvantage of this model is the time constraint (Blore et al., 2013). It
requires a substantial amount of time in building trust and institutional capacity to
overcome power differences among community members and to find common ground
among relevant stakeholders. In addition, the outcome will not be visible within a
short period, which may further reduce the interests of policy-makers.
The co-management model has a better potential to improve the legitimacy of rules
and management institutions. Previous studies have confirmed that the conservation
rules that are crafted based on existing traditional institutions are more likely to be
followed by community members (see Berkes et al., 1998; Haller et al., 2016). The
three case studies have shown that at least 75% of households are still in compliance
with traditional tenure regulations. Therefore, the number of complying households is
likely to be increased if the rules are formalised under co-management arrangements.
Moreover, there is a better chance for crafting new institutional rules if the existing
ones are no longer fit with social-ecological conditions. In addition, formal recognition
by the government will improve the legitimacy of traditional institutions in dealing
with outsiders in accordance with existing legislations (Fitzpatrick, 2005).
Impact on local livelihood
The co-management model will have positive impacts on local livelihoods. The in-
creased tenure security under co-management arrangements will motivate the collective
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activities and improve local resilience. Improving tenure security will increase long-
term investment by local households (FAO, 2002). It may further motivate permanent
agriculture and livestock farming within village territories due to improved tenure
security. Formalisation of customary institutions will have positive impacts on shifting
cultivation. Particularly, there will be more systematic implementations of shifting
cultivation activities such as rotational planning and controlled burning. It will have
positive impacts on local livelihood security particularly among the poor households
who mainly rely on shifting cultivation to generate cash income.
The amount of forest income is likely to be reduced as there will be new regulations
in implementing co-management activities. Particularly, cash forest income will likely
to be reduced since traditional rules prohibit cutting timber for commercial purposes.
It means that the contribution of forest income will be reduced from 49% to 41%
among households inside the park. However, limiting cash forest activities do not have
significant impacts on rural poverty compared to limiting subsistence forest income.
For instance, subsistence forest income alone reduces about 40% of total poverty inside
the national park. Therefore, the contribution of forest income in poverty reduction
will still be high as long as subsistence forest income is available. Income from wildlife
will be declined since hunting is likely to be prohibited in co-management agreements.
Nevertheless, there will be less impact on local livelihoods since income contribution
from wildlife is relatively low compared to timber and other NTFP in all case study
village tracts.
Impact on social justice
Despite having positive conservation outcomes, the co-management model has the
potential to increase income inequality between inside and outside the park. The
amount of forest income inside the park will be lower than outside the park due to
the increased restrictions against cash forest income. Therefore, the co-management
model should provide additional livelihood opportunities in order to reduce income
inequality between inside and outside the park. Regarding income inequality within
the community, the co-management model has a positive equalising effect on in-
come differences among the households. For instance, the case study results show
that removing cash forest income will reduce the Gini coefficient from 0.31 to 0.27
among households inside the park. Therefore, reducing cash forest income due to co-
management agreements will reduce income inequality within community members.
Furthermore, formal recognition of communal lands under co-management model will
improve social equity mainly because poor households depend more on communal
lands due to having limited private lands.
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In addition to income inequality, the co-management model has the potential to
reduce power differences among local actors in decision-making processes (Berkes,
2009). The formalisation of traditional land tenure will provide opportunities for every
villager to participate in village council meetings. The formal recognition of tradi-
tional village councils will improve the local decision-making process. It will further
enhance the legitimacy of collective decisions and reduce social conflicts. However,
the implementation of this model should avoid power dominance by state actors in
decision-making processes. Previous studies have shown that government authorities
usually dominate the co-management decisions where local communities have limited
opportunities to share their views and interests to include in the agreements (Castro
and Nielsen, 2001). Therefore, implementing co-management activities should develop
mechanisms to reduce state dominance in order to improve social equity between state
and local actors.
The co-management model will provide opportunities to incorporate local knowl-
edge and cultural mechanism into formal resource management practices. The recogni-
tion of traditional tenure enables local farmers to continue the TEK practices associated
with shifting cultivation. It can further provide opportunities to evolve new knowledge
through social learning process (see Walker and Salt, 2012). Promoting TEK practices
can maintain cultural identity and social relations. It can further increase social cohe-
sion and improve communal resilience against unexpected changes in the future (see
Berkes and Ross, 2013).
7.2 Evaluation of Management Models
The participatory scenario planning workshop provides an opportunity to evaluate the
four management models based on local knowledge and experiences. Depending on
the background profession and interest, the workshop participants were divided into
three working groups: biodiversity conservation, livelihood development, and social
justice. Each group discussed the strength and weakness of the four management
models and presented the summary of discussions to the other groups at the plenary
section. Feedbacks from the other group members were taken into account in the
final workshop report (see details in the workshop report by P. S. Aung (2018)).
Theoretically, the strict protection model shows the highest potential for achieving
better conservation outcome. However, the participants mentioned that the prospect for
effective implementation of this model is very low due to the limited financial support
and the existing conflicts between the government and local people. The participants
highlighted that the government did not consider the livelihood conditions of local
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people in formulating the conservation regulations. Particularly, the conservation
regulations will not be legitimate under this model due to the lack of transparency
and accountability by the government and the limited livelihood options for local
people. The participants recommended promoting alternative livelihood opportunities
to achieve effective conservation and to minimise conflicts in the future.
Apart from the strict protection model, the community control model and the co-
management model have potentials to improve local participation in conservation.
However, the participants indicated that the community control model will have less
efficiency and legitimacy due to the declining compliance with customary regulations.
They also highlighted that the customary regulations will not be legitimate in the
long run because they are not documented as a written statue and may become less
applicable due to increasing contact with urban people. Furthermore, the local elites
will take the majority of benefits if the community alone protects the forests without
state intervention. To achieve effective conservation, the participants recommended that
the government should introduce locally acceptable rules and provide legal protection
for local people in dealing with rule-breakers and powerful outsiders.
In terms of livelihood aspects, the participants mentioned that the strict protection
model will have negative impacts on local livelihood. Since there is no legal provision
to permit local use forest products inside the national park, the strict protection model
will increase the poverty of local households who depend on forest products inside
the national park. Regarding community control model, the participants indicated that
the sustainability of forest products will be decreased due to the increasing demand
for forest products inside the national park. Especially, the increasing use of cash
forest products will also lead to privatization and social conflicts among community
members. The participants also discussed that the community control model will be
more beneficial to rich people since the extraction cost of timber is expensive for poor
households.
Apart from community control model, the participants indicated that the co-management
model will sustainably contribute local livelihoods due to the presence of legal supports
by park authorities to maintain collective institutions and to prevent land privatizations.
Under this model, local people will have a chance to negotiate with park authorities to
permit the utilization of certain forest products that are important for sustaining local
livelihoods. Incorporating local customary rules such as restrictions against hunting
and selling timber to outsiders will prevent over-exploitation of forest resources and
will achieve the long-term supply of important forest products.
In terms of social justice, the participants highlighted that the BAU model will
increase social inequality due to socio-economic differences within the community.
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Especially, income inequality will continue to increase due to the differences in local
land ownerships. The increasing conflicts between formal and informal land ownership
systems will demotivate landless farmers to maintain traditional sustainable land-use
practices. In regards to strict protection model, the participants mentioned that
increasing government regulations will increase income inequality because only the
elite farmers who can avoid the laws will get benefits from forest products due to
corruption and weak law enforcement.
Under community control model, social justice will be improved due to less re-
striction by the government. However, the participants indicated that the risk of elite
capture will continue to exist due to weak enforcement of customary regulations.
Although land-use decisions will be made by community members, the participants
mentioned that traditional landowners will dominate the decision-making processes.
Furthermore, customary negotiation processes will create more social conflicts since
the role of tribal leaders and village shaman have diminished within society. For
the co-management model, participants indicated that creating a joint-implementing
committee between the government and local people will reduce income inequality.
For instance, it will permit negotiating with traditional landowners to allow permanent
farming on the borrowed lands. It can also minimise social inequality since all villagers
can participate in planning and decision-making processes. The participants agreed
that the co-management model will promote the preservation of local knowledge
and cultural practices by creating opportunities to learn and share between the park
authorities and local people. The main limitation of this model is the risk of state
domination because most government officers are reluctant to share decision-making
power with local villagers.
After the group discussions, the multi-criteria decision analysis was conducted by
giving subjective ranking scores to each management model based on nine different
indicators as indicated in Section 3.3.4. The results show that the co-management
model has the highest ranking scores (3.7) compared to the other management models
(Table 7.2). The main argument for selecting the co-management model is because it
provides a platform to discuss between park authorities and local communities in order
to share local needs and interests in fulfilling basic livelihood needs. This model allows
the authorities to formally recognise the existing local institutions. It also supports
local participation in conservation and reduce management cost. The participants
agreed that the co-management model will enhance social equity in decision-making
and reduce the risk of elite capture among the villagers.
Apart from the co-management model, the community control and BAU models
are regarded as the second and third priorities with the average ranking scores of
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Table 7.2: Subjective ranking of management models by local stakeholders
Sr. Sustainability criteria
Average ranking scores* (n=25)
BAU
model
SP
model
CC
model
CM
model
1 Impacts on conservation
• Conservation outcome 3.0 3.0 2.0 3.0
• Legitimacy 2.0 2.0 3.0 3.0
• Efficiency 1.0 2.0 2.0 3.0
2 Impacts on local livelihood
• Meeting local needs 1.0 1.0 1.0 4.0
• Poverty reduction 1.0 1.0 2.0 4.0
• Livelihood sustainability 4.0 1.0 2.0 4.0
3 Impacts on social justice
• Income equality 2.0 2.0 2.0 4.0
• Equity in decision making 3.0 1.0 3.0 4.0
• Maintain cultural practices 3.0 1.0 4.0 4.0
Average scores 2.2 1.6 2.3 3.7
Note: *Priority ranking (1=low to 5=high); BAU=Business-as-Usual; SP=Strict Protection;
CC=Community Control; CM=Co-Management.
Source: Participatory scenario planning workshop, 2018.
2.3 and 2.2 respectively. The main criticism against community control model is
because local people will not be able to protect forest resources against powerful
outsiders without legal support from the government. The potential for meeting local
needs is very low mainly because of the risk of elite capture. For the BAU model,
the main arguments include poor implementation of conservation regulations and
potential negative impacts on local livelihoods. The strict protection model has the
lowest average ranking scores (1.6) mainly because of the potential negative impacts on
livelihood and social justice. The participants argued that although the strict protection
model will have positive impacts on biodiversity conservation, the applicability of this
approach will be limited due to local resistance against park regulations.
CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSIONS
8.1 Proposed Management Strategies for NTNP
This study has examined the dynamic relationship between the protected area and
local communities located in and around the Natma Taung National Park (NTNP).
The historical reviews highlight the long-standing conflicts between the government
and local people in Chin State. The political history indicates that the Chin people
have been living in the mountains for centuries without effective dominance by the
state regulations. This continuous isolation in the mountains enabled them to maintain
traditional institutions regarding access to land and forest resources. The limited
accessibility and economic opportunities also motivated them to rely on shifting
cultivation and forest resources for their livelihoods. These framework conditions
have created conflicts between the government and local people, particularly when the
national park introduces strict regulations without public consultation.
The in-depth analysis of the three case studies provides a further understanding of
the social-ecological relationship between protected area and local people (Figure 8.1).
The three case studies demonstrate that local people living around the NTNP greatly
rely on forests for their livelihoods. They have the ability to organise social institutions
in order to manage land and associated natural resources. They also possess a diverse
array of knowledge and management practices that enable them to achieve sustainable
use of natural resources. From an ecological point of view, the integrity and resilience
of the national park have declined mainly because of the local encroachments for
shifting cultivation and unsustainable use of natural resources. This particular trend
has reduced the provision of products and services that are important for local people.
From a social point of view, the local demand for products and services has increased
due to changes in livelihood strategies and socio-cultural situations. The increased
access to market, infrastructure and technology has motivated them to engage more in
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the market economy and modern way of life. Consequently, local compliances with
traditional practices and associated institutions have declined resulting in negative
impacts on the natural system and its capacity to provide the ecosystem services.
Figure 8.1: The coevolutionary linkages between protected area and local people in
NTNP with proposed management interventions
Source: Adapted from Pretzsch et al. (2014)
The scenario analysis provides both opportunities and challenges in implementing
conservation activities under each management model. Results from the three case
studies justify the four management scenarios with different levels of local participation.
The multi-criteria decision analysis indicates that integrating local stakeholders under
the co-management scenario is the best option to promote effective conservation,
livelihood improvement, and social justice. Based on the outcomes of three case
studies and the participatory scenario planning workshop, this study proposes five
management strategies in order to achieve effective conservation and to reduce social
conflicts (see Figure 8.1).
1. The recognition of customary land tenure inside the park is essential to promote conserva-
tion and reduce social conflicts.
The introduction of state regulations without understanding local land tenure
arrangements have induced conflicts between formal and informal tenure regimes.
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On the one hand, state regulations have failed since they do not fit with local
socio-cultural practices. On the other hand, the informal rules are not legitimate
against outsiders due to the lack of legal enforcement. Therefore, the integration
of informal rules into formal government institution is essential to increase both
the legitimacy and effectiveness of the conservation initiatives. As indicated in
the case studies, local people comply more with informal rules than with formal
government regulations. However, challenges remain in determining how to
integrate informal regulations without unintended consequences on the social
system and natural environment.
The conventional buffer zone approach will not be sufficient to reduce people-
park conflicts in NTNP. Firstly, the conventional approach tends to demarcate
buffer zones based on ecological conditions without considering local needs and
traditional practices. Most of the past buffer-zone projects usually demarcated
the buffer zones within the degraded habitats that are unable to support sufficient
products to meet the local livelihood needs (Martino, 2001). Secondly, territorial
differentiation among tribal groups is still common in Chin State. Therefore,
the demarcation of buffer zones outside the traditional territories will increase
social conflicts among different tribal groups. Thirdly, local people are highly
dependent on shifting cultivation which requires extensive areas of fallow forests
to complete a rotation cycle. Therefore, demarcation of buffer zones without
considering rotational fallow cycle will not be applicable unless better livelihood
options are available to reduce local dependence on shifting cultivation.
Instead of creating buffer zones, one alternative approach is to formally recognise
the customary land ownership and delegate power and responsibilities to manage
the land (Andersen, 2016). As the customary tenure rules are complex and may
vary depending on particular land-use practices, a simple classification—such as
private, common, or state ownership—will undermine the complexity of local
tenure arrangements and induce additional conflicts (Pradhan and Rajendra,
2002). However, the degree of legal recognition should be determined based on
the nature of tenure rules and local governance institutions (Fitzpatrick, 2005).
The choice of a local agency or informal governance institution should reflect the
local cultural system in order to increase the legitimacy of conservation regula-
tions (Larson et al., 2010). Nevertheless, as indicated by Ribot et al. (2008), the
local political system should carefully be investigated before formal recognition
in order to avoid the risk of elite capture in decision-making processes.
Existing policies and regulations provide enabling conditions to implement
the formal recognition of customary lands under the co-management scenario.
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For example, the National Land Use Policy (2016) encourages to recognise
the customary tenure and related institutions among indigenous ethnic people
(Government of Myanmar, 2016). The National Biodiversity Strategy and Action
Plan (NBSAP) also includes targets and action plans to promote co-management
activities in biodiversity conservation (Forest Department, 2015). The presence
of these policy frameworks will enhance the legitimacy and effectiveness of this
scenario in NTNP since the success of co-management approach highly depends
on enabling policy conditions (Armitage et al., 2009).
2. Conservation regulations should be flexible and site-specific in order to support poverty
alleviation and increase public participation in conservation.
The conservation laws in Myanmar do not permit any resource use within
the national park. On the contrary, this study shows that local communities
are highly dependent on forest products for their livelihoods. Particularly, the
subsistence use of forest products is crucial for reducing poverty within the
community. Limiting access to subsistence forest uses will put local people more
into poverty. The study also shows that there is no significant difference in
subsistence forest use between inside and outside the park. Limiting subsistence
forest uses inside the park will increase inequality between the communities.
It means that enforcement of existing conservation regulations will increase
local resistance against the park. To achieve both conservation and livelihood
objectives, park regulations should be flexible and target-specific to allow local
communities to continue their way of life.
One possible solution is to permit local people the subsistence-use of forest
products inside the park. Focus group discussions with park rangers revealed
that they informally permit subsistence use of forest products by local villagers
although it is prohibited by the law. Nevertheless, local people still perceive the
park as a major constraint for their livelihoods. Although they continue to use
forest resources inside the park, they consider that the park has prohibited their
rights over land and forest resources inside the park. In order to reconcile between
the park and local people, the park needs to deliver more tangible benefits that
are visible and recognised by local people (Hoole and Berkes, 2010). Therefore,
formal permission of subsistence forest uses will change local perception of the
park and will improve collaboration for conservation. However, the government
should provide formal permission in line with the customary regulations. The
regulations should be site-specific and adaptive to local cultural conditions. For
instance, the collection of NTFP within village territories can be permitted in
Case-I but it will lead to social conflicts if it is legally permitted for outsiders
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in Case-II. Similarly, cutting trees within the sacred forest can be permitted in
Case-II although it will not be applicable in Case-I due to the potential conflicts
between traditional and modern religions.
A major constraint of this approach is that the policymakers are usually reluctant
to permit local resource use inside the conservation areas. Previous studies have
shown that one of the factors that contributed to the failure of community-based
conservation projects was the presence of too little incentives for local commu-
nities to participate in collaborative management practices (see Berkes, 2004;
Winkler, 2011). The win-win scenario, as expected by most policymakers, is
hardly realistic between the competing goals of conservation and development
initiatives (Ferraro and Hanauer, 2011). In order to achieve conservation with
minimum livelihood impacts, the policymakers need to prioritise key conserva-
tion objectives and should allow activities that could impact to less important
objectives (McShane et al., 2011).
3. The conservation authorities should incorporate local knowledge and experiences to
improve collaboration and social learning.
The three case studies have shown that local people apply diverse knowledge and
management practices to ensure the sustainable provision of ecosystem services
and to minimise future livelihood risks. The majority of these practices share the
same purpose as the park management objectives. Therefore, incorporating these
practices into formal park management plan will achieve effective conservation
and reduce administrative costs (Colding et al., 2003). For instance, providing
legal assistance to watershed protection and village-use forests will improve
local conservation initiatives and reduce additional management cost. Similarly,
participating in field selection meetings for shifting cultivation will support
effective land-use practices and will help to negotiate to avoid critical habitats for
conservation.
People-park reconciliation is a long-term process and should not be implemented
by using top-down interventions (Hoole and Berkes, 2010). First, it is essential
to re-establish trust between the park authorities and local people in order to
achieve a long-term collaboration (Wells and McShane, 2004). Establishing a
communication platform between park authorities and local people is essential
to induce local trust-building process (Berkes, 2009). Such platform should be
simple and less bureaucratic where the stakeholders could easily share their
knowledge and negotiate competing interests among them. Community-based
innovation tools, such as Participative Innovation Platform (PIP), will serve as
a bridge between park authorities and local people to share knowledge and to
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improve social learning processes (Alemu and Auch, 2016). Second, the park
should support the implementation of local cultural practices such as collective
rituals or traditional ceremonies to promote cultural transmission and social
learning processes. These activities will improve communication and interaction
among community members and will support achieving collective agreements
through interactive discussions and feedbacks (Muro and Jeffrey, 2008).
4. Adaptive monitoring and feedback mechanisms should be established in order to cope and
adapt with unforeseen social-ecological changes.
The historical reviews show a wide range of changes among the social system in
NTNP in response to the changing political and social-cultural conditions. Case
study results indicate that changes in the social system have influenced local
resource demand and management practices which in-turn produce impacts on
biodiversity and ecosystem services. Moreover, these changes are mostly induced
by external drivers that are beyond the control of the park management office. In
order to minimise the adverse impacts of these changes, the park authorities need
to revise and adjust the conservation goals regularly in line with the changes in
societal needs and ecological conditions (Andrade and Rhodes, 2012). Therefore,
it is essential to integrate adaptive management principles into conservation
planning in order to cope with unforeseen changes in the future.
Effective implementation of adaptive management in NTNP requires three main
preconditions. First, adaptive management requires continuous monitoring and
feedback mechanism to modify conservation goals and management options
(Allen and Garmestani, 2015). Generally, the park managers in Myanmar are
allowed to revise annual management activities within the framework of allo-
cated budget (Emerton et al., 2015). The monitoring and evaluation processes are
usually conducted by the general audit department where the auditors mainly
focus on accounting and financial procedures rather than the conservation out-
comes. Therefore, the establishment of an impact monitoring mechanism is
essential to evaluate management outcomes and provide feedback for setting
new conservation goals.
Second, the key process of adaptive management is setting conservation goals,
management objections, and implementation options based on the outcome from
continuous evaluation and feedbacks (Allen and Garmestani, 2015). However,
conservation goals in Myanmar are mostly determined by high-level authorities
rather than local park management office (M. Aung, 2007). This process limits
to predict future scenario at the local level in order to minimise uncertainty
in decision making. Therefore, it is essential to establish a decision-making
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mechanism at the local level in order to reflect actual conditions and reduce
uncertainty. This can be achieved by using Participative Innovation Platform (PIP)
that allows participation of all stakeholders to diagnose complex social-ecological
problems, identify opportunities based on local experiences and find options
to achieve common goals in a more transparent way (Pali and Swaans, 2013;
Alemu and Auch, 2016). Third, the success of adaptive management approach
greatly relies on the role of managers in facilitating decisions, in incorporating
local knowledge, and in collaboration with external organisations (Allen and
Garmestani, 2015). Therefore, capacity building programs at park management
level should focus on creating visionary leaders in order to facilitate the adaptive
governance processes effectively.
5. Integrated planning and management approach is essential, particularly at the regional
level, in order to improve collaboration among local government organisations.
The problems facing in NTNP are not merely a local level issue. As indicated
in the three case studies, the majority of conservation and livelihood issues
had evolved in response to the long-term political conflicts between the central
government and local ethnic people. For centuries, the Chin people had enabled
to avoid state domination due to limited accessibility and the failures in govern-
ment institutions (Scott, 2009). Therefore, most government regulations were
not effectively enforced in Chin State. The local farmers were used to be living
without complying with government regulations. However, the national park
has introduced actual law enforcement activities with financial support from
international organisations. As a result, only the communities associated with
the national park have to follow the formal regulations whereas the communities
outside the park are still enjoying traditional customary rights. These asymmetric
legal pressures have created inequality between park and non-park communities
inducing local resistance against the national park. Therefore, creating legiti-
mate governance structures in other administrative sectors is necessary before
imposing conservation regulations inside the national park.
Land tenure and poverty issues should be addressed at the regional level rather
than the park authorities alone. Land tenure is a complex issue and related to
other government agencies such as the departments of agriculture, livestock, and
rural development. Therefore, a broader policy framework is necessary to initiate
collaboration among these departments in recognising customary land tenure
not only inside the park but also throughout the whole Chin State. Moreover,
poverty is not a localised issue in NTNP. More than 70% of the population in
Chin State is already under poverty (UNDP, 2011). Therefore, the park authorities
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alone could not reduce poverty issue in NTNP. A more comprehensive regional
development plan is necessary that integrates common visions and goals among
relevant departments and administrative organisations.
8.2 Analytical Generalisation and Contributions of the Research
The scope of this thesis is localised and context-specific so that it is not possible to
generalise the results statistically to a broader population. As indicated by Yin (2009),
the primary goal of case study research is to generalize the lessons learned to other
studies with similar contextual situations and to contribute to further development
of theoretical propositions. Unlike the large scale empirical studies that allow statis-
tical generalization, case study findings are more useful to pose the hypotheses and
propositions at a conceptual level (Mills et al., 2010). In this research, a generalisation
can primarily be made in terms of the analytical framework and the phenomenon of
interactions between the social system and natural environment. The social-ecological
coevolution model, which is modified for this study, can further be applied in other
protected areas facing conflicts with local people. Particularly, the model provides a
holistic understanding of how current management issues have evolved in response
to the particular changes in society and indicates future pathways to minimise them.
The focus of three different thematic areas—land tenure, livelihoods, and traditional
knowledge—allows explaining the inter-linkages among them. This particular aspect
makes the model more robust compared to the previous studies in the region (e.g.
Andersen, 2015; Vicol et al., 2018; Kmoch et al., 2018) which primarily focused on each
thematic topic and undermined the inter-linkages among them.
In regard to the objective one, this study demonstrates how local land tenure
system has influenced access to and control of land and ecosystem services. Empirical
evidence has shown that local households tend to follow more on local tenure rules
that fit with their livelihood strategies and socio-cultural context. The study argues
that the top-down enforcement of formal rules undermines the legitimacy of local
tenure rules and imposes social conflicts. To achieve effective conservation, the study
recommends formulating formal regulations that fit with the local livelihood strategies
and socio-cultural context. These particular implications can be taken into account in
other conservation areas facing similar social conflicts. For instance, a global review
by Garnett et al. (2018) indicates that at least 40% of the global protected areas are
overlapping with customary lands owned by the indigenous people. In managing
these protected areas, one should expect to face conflicts if customary land tenure
systems are not taken into account in formulating conservation regulations. At the
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same time, the customary land tenure systems may change in response to changes in
local livelihood strategies and socio-cultural context. Therefore, integrating customary
regulations into formal management practices should be adaptive to local situations
and cultural context.
Objective two highlights the important role of forest income in reducing poverty
and inequality of local households. The results show that households depend more
on forest resources if they have better access to forest resources and limited options
for alternative livelihoods. The study demonstrates that increasing law enforcement
activities will increase local poverty and inequality and will escalate more conflicts
between conservation authorities and local people. The study argues that formulating
conservation regulations that allow subsistence use of forest products will reduce
local poverty and inequality and minimise people-park conflicts. The implications for
reducing poverty and inequality are important not only for NTNP but also for other
protected areas in the tropics, mainly because most of the global key conservation
areas are situated in the regions with population facing severe poverty issues (B. Fisher
and Christopher, 2007). A global review by Soliku and Schraml (2018) has shown that
restricting access to resources inside the park is one of the most commonly reported
conflicts in protected area management. To minimise people-park conflicts, protected
area managers should consider the important role of forest resources in reducing
local poverty and inequality and should introduce adaptive regulations that allow
the sustainable use of certain forest products that are important for sustaining local
livelihoods. However, it should be noted that increasing forest income opportunity does
not always reduce income inequality. Pro-poor management strategies are necessary
to avoid the problem of elite capture by wealthy households.
Objective three explores the potential role of traditional ecological knowledge in
conservation and natural resource management. Empirical evidence reaffirms that local
people possess diverse knowledge and practices that are important for conservation
and sustainable management of natural resources. Previous studies (e.g. Berkes et al.,
2000; Hayes and Ostrom, 2005; Ruiz-Mallén and Corbera, 2013) have argued that the
integration of local knowledge and experiences into formal management practices will
increase local participation in conservation and will produce effective conservation
outcomes. However, this study indicates that the ability to apply such knowledge is
greatly influenced by local ecological conditions and cultural context of the society.
Especially, knowledge and practices that are associated with normative beliefs are likely
to be changed when local belief systems have changed in response to modernisation
and acculturation processes. Therefore, protected area managers should consider
the dynamic changes in socio-cultural context while attempting to integrate local
knowledge into formal management practices.
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Objective four demonstrates the selection of management options in accordance
with the priorities and interests of local people. The multi-criteria decision analysis
indicates that integrating local stakeholders under the co-management scenario is the
most effective option to achieve both ecological and social outcomes. Although this
outcome is context-specific, the analytical approach could be generalised into other
protected areas facing both ecological degradation and social conflicts. The study
demonstrates that the identification of different management scenarios permits local
stakeholders to trade-off between conservation and development objectives based on lo-
cal priorities and interests as well as the ecological conditions of natural resources. The
use of participative innovation platforms (PIPs) also ensures that different stakeholder
interests are taken into account in setting conservation goals and finding solutions to
common challenges. This process is particularly important to promote collaboration
and learning among stakeholders to ensure long-term conservation outcomes. There-
fore, instead of setting top-down conservation goals, protected area managers need to
adopt more collaborative approaches that consider both stakeholders’ interests and
local social-ecological conditions.
In regard to theoretical aspects, the thesis contributes to three major theoretical
development in natural resource management. Firstly, the thesis contributes to the
theory of coevolution between the social system and natural environment (Norgaard,
1994; Berkes et al., 1998) by providing an empirical case of the Chin indigenous
communities in NTNP. For centuries, local people in Chin State had relied on the forest
ecosystem for their livelihoods. They had adopted particular livelihood strategies
that fit with the social system and natural environment. In order to sustain the local
livelihood system, the people had developed tenure institutions and management
practices based on traditional knowledge and past experiences. These institutions and
management practices were further reinforced by various social mechanisms—such as
taboos, rituals, and social sanctions—that had evolved based on local religious belief
and cultural practices. These particularly social mechanisms had positive feedbacks on
the natural system by maintaining the resilience of the ecological processes. Therefore,
analysing resource-use conflicts requires to explore the coevolutionary relationship
between the society and natural environment in order to understand the causal linkages
between them and to minimise negative feedbacks in the long run.
Secondly, the thesis supports further understanding of the resilience theory by
highlighting the important role of social institutions and traditional knowledge in
conservation and sustainable management of natural resources. The three case studies
have shown that local people are able to develop and apply customary rules and
management practices in order to manage land and natural resources. This indicates
that the social system has the ability to reorganise and transform its characteristics
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in order to adapt to the changing natural environment. The application of different
management practices based on local ecological knowledge also indicates that the
social system has the ability to observe changes in the natural system and to develop
new knowledge by learning through the crisis and experiences. Such knowledge is
transmitted through local cultural mechanisms and shared among the communities to
avoid further challenges. Therefore, maintaining traditional knowledge and cultural
institutions is crucial to promote social-ecological resilience and to achieve the long-
term conservation outcome.
Thirdly, the thesis contributes to the theory of change within the social-ecological
system by highlighting the patterns of transformation in local tenure regulations,
livelihood activities, and cultural practices. For instance, the introduction of formal
rules and governance structures have disrupted local institutions by reducing local
compliance with tenure regulations. The transition towards the market economy
has induced to changes in local livelihood strategies and socio-economic conditions.
This particular trend has contributed to the changes in local resource-use patterns by
increasing the demand for commercial selling of forest products. Changes in local belief
systems also influence socio-cultural practices and reduce local compliance with social
sanctions and resource management practices. Therefore, managing social-ecological
systems requires understanding social transformation within the society to predict
future pathways and to enhance adaptive capacity against undesired changes.
8.3 Critical Reflections and Limitations
The thesis applies the case-study approach to understand the relationship between the
national park and local people. Previous studies have indicated that the conservation
issues are complex and context-specific so that it requires a diagnostic approach to
understand the problems and to identify potential solutions in a particular context
(Honadle, 1999; Ostrom, 2007). The case study approach is suitable for this research as
it allows to analyse the comprehensive details of the real-life situations and provides
context-specific knowledge for further theoretical explanation (Yin, 2009). One critical
drawback of the case study approach is the representativeness of the cases towards the
whole target population (Thomas, 2014). However, this does not limit the outcome of
this thesis since its primary goal is to understand the phenomenon of conflicts and to
find out possible pathways for preventing such conflicts in the future.
The three cases were purposively selected rather than using random sampling
techniques. This strategy is particularly useful to capture the most common conflicts
between the park and local people, which may be undermined if the random sampling
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techniques are applied (Flyvbjerg, 2006). The use of embedded case studies allowed
applying the counter-factual technique to understand the impact of conservation
regulations on local indigenous people. In particular, the comparative analyses between
communities located inside, bordering, and outside the national park provided an
opportunity to filter out the problems that were (not) explicitly related to the protected
area regulations (Clements et al., 2014). The mixed-method approach also permitted
capturing the complex societal problems in a more holistic way. Especially, the
qualitative interviews provided a comprehensive description of local situations and
associated challenges based on the participants’ knowledge and past experiences,
whereas the quantitative surveys allowed applying the inferential statistics to draw the
empirical conclusions (Creswell, 2009).
Regarding analytical methods, the participatory land-use mapping exercises helped
to explore the detailed arrangements of the local land tenure system. Instead of using
the official cadastral maps, this method allowed understanding not only local tenure
arrangements but also the history of land ownership and land-use conflicts within
the community. Since local people were not familiar with the topographic maps, the
use of high-resolution Google-Earth images provided visual aids during the mapping
processes. The property right concept also helped to explore the detailed insights of
local tenure arrangements among the case study communities. The bundle of rights
associated with each property regime also offered more profound understandings of
the conflicts between customary and state land tenure systems. However, as argued by
Ribot and Peluso (2003), the property rights concept failed to capture the bundles of
power in order to understand the local ability to enjoy the rights.
The classification between cash and subsistence income offered a unique oppor-
tunity to highlight the relative importance of forests for local livelihoods. Previous
studies in southern Chin State (e.g. UNDP, 2011; Vicol et al., 2018; Win et al., 2012)
primarily focused on cash income only in determining household livelihood condi-
tions. The exclusion of subsistence income often undermined the role of forests in
poverty alleviation and may lead to the conversion of forest into other land-use types.
The classification of household livelihood strategies often faced challenges due to
the diversification of income sources (Ellis, 1998). In this study, the agglomerative
hierarchical clustering technique was applied together with the PCA to differentiate
livelihood strategies of rural households. Although the clustering can be done by using
Hierarchical Cluster Analysis (HCA) alone, the application PCA prior to clustering
produced more homogeneous clusters than direct clustering without using PCA (see
Tesfaye et al., 2011; Chilongo, 2014). In addition to simple differentiation between rich
and poor (e.g. P. S. Aung et al., 2015), the comparison of forest income among different
livelihood clusters further explains the inter-relations between forest dependency and
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households’ livelihood choices. This information is particularly important to identify
targeted-oriented interventions that promote livelihood strategies with less dependency
on forest resources.
The comparison of poverty measures between with and without forest income
provides simple but powerful insights for policymakers regarding the impact of con-
servation regulations on poverty reduction. The use of FGT decomposable framework
(Foster et al., 1984) allowed analysing not only the proportion of poor households
but also the severity and differences in poverty impacts by conservation regulations.
Moreover, the FGT method provided better understandable, theoretically sound, and
applicable poverty measures compared to other assessment methods (Foster et al.,
2010). Regarding the effect of forest income on inequality, the use of Gini decompos-
able technique proposed by Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985) offered more useful insights
than using the standard Gini coefficient methods. For instance, the results show that
although forest income reduces inequality in the current situation, the Gini decompo-
sition results indicate that increasing forest income may increase income inequality
among households. This particular knowledge is essential in promoting forest-related
rural development strategies in order to reduce income inequality among rural house-
holds.
The informant consensus approach allowed measuring the variations in individual
knowledge regarding TEK-based management practices. The use of this approach
for quantitative measurement is important for policymakers in selecting a particular
TEK to be integrated into formal management practices. The separation between
awareness and compliance scores helped to indicate the gap between knowing a
particular practice and the actual compliance with it. Therefore, the difference between
these two domains should be taken into account in assessing local knowledge for
sustainable resource management (Byg and Balslev, 2001).
The participatory scenario planning approach supported to identify options for
trade-offs between conservation and development in the future. The combination
with Multiple Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) method enabled to select the most
relevant option to achieve the desired objectives. However, one should be noted that
although MCDA provides the optimal solution, it does not necessarily mean that
it will provide the right decision. The potential for achieving the right decision is
usually shaped by several factors including the selection of criteria and the relative
weight given to each criterion (Belton and Stewart., 2002). Furthermore, the results
from the participatory scenario planning workshops are usually subjective and are
highly associated with participant representation and the potential rejection by the
non-participants (Rowland et al., 2014). These types of uncertainties were minimised
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in this study by inviting the village administrators who are responsible for the future
development of their respective villages. The criteria for MCDA were selected based on
sustainable development perspectives. Moreover, each criterion was discussed with lo-
cal stakeholders for approval before conducting the analysis process. Nevertheless, the
results of the thesis can only be considered as subjective outcomes. Further discussions
are necessary to achieve the optimal decision before actual implementation.
Apart from the methodological critics, the thesis has several limitations. First, the
historical interrelations between the national park and local people were discussed
based on previous literature and key informant interviews rather than based on contin-
uous monitoring of key indicators to determine the changes. To achieve an empirical
model of coevolutionary change, it is necessary to establish a long-term monitoring
framework with specific indicators that can verify the reciprocal relationships among
the components of the target social-ecological system (Norgaard and Kallis, 2011).
Second, local compliance with tenure rules was determined based on the self-evaluated
responses instead of direct monitoring of the respondents’ actual compliances. How-
ever, this research tried to minimise the respondents’ bias by a careful explanation
of research purposes and modification of interview questions in accordance with the
local context. For instance, instead of asking whether the respondent followed the
identified tenure rules or not, the question was modified in a way that whether the
respondent will be able to follow if the rule is legalised as formal regulation.
Third, there is a limitation regarding the seasonality of local livelihood activities.
All data were mainly collected during the open season (from January to June) so
that the author could not participate in major livelihood activities during the rainy
season. Although the author recognises the importance of direct observations in social
research, the combination of heavy rainfalls and mountainous topography made it
difficult to access the study villages during monsoon period. Therefore, the majority
of livelihood activities in that period had to be validated based on the focus group
discussions with park rangers and local experts. Fourth, although this research tried to
explore local TEK practices, it was not possible to uncover all TEK practices used by the
study communities in a short period. The language barriers between the author and
local respondents made it difficult to have more interactive discussions regarding TEK
practices. Furthermore, it should be noted that this research is highly ethnographic
and does not include ecological analyses in order to provide scientific proof regarding
the actual impact of TEK practices. However, the potential effects of TEK practices
were validated with local experts and workshop participants. Nevertheless, empirical
assessments are still necessary in order to verify the actual effectiveness of TEK
practices on the sustainability of natural resources.
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8.4 Outlook and Suggestions for Further Research
Despite the increasing critics, protected areas are still crucial to preserve the global
biodiversity and related ecosystem services. The expansion of protected areas has
rapidly increased due to increasing advocates by national governments, international
organisations, and conservation activists. Moreover, the purpose of protected areas
has become not only to protect the endangered species and related habitats but
also to achieve broader objectives including national economic development through
tourism revenue, preservation of cultural identity, and improving resilience against
climate change. The increasing number of protected areas has induced conflicts with
local communities in fulfilling livelihood needs and economic development to step
out of poverty. The conflicts have become more prominent in developing countries
particularly among communities who rely on land-based economic activities. The
rapid growth of rural population has increased local demand for land and forest
products. The political movements for indigenous rights have worsened the conflicts
since many of the remaining natural landscapes are overlapping with the land owned
by indigenous people. These conflicts have driven the protected area managers to find
a way to achieve conservation and minimise conflicts with local people.
The thesis indicates that the integration of local resource need, cultural institutions,
and traditional knowledge into conservation practices is crucial not only to achieve
long-term protection of natural resources but also to reduce people-park conflicts.
These objectives can be achieved by establishing co-management arrangements that
enable to share the decision-making power and management responsibilities between
the government and local people. The outcomes will lead to the self-enforcement of
conservation practices within the communities instead of forced regulations. The thesis
highlights that local institutions, livelihood strategies, and management practices are
not static but are changing over time in response to the changes in technology, market,
and cultural beliefs within the society. Therefore, it is crucial to design co-management
strategies that are adapted to changing social and environmental conditions.
Although adaptive co-management is a potential tool to reduce social conflicts and
to enhance local participation, challenges remain in implementing this approach effec-
tively. Particularly, adaptive co-management is a long-term process with continuous
learning and adjustments in response to changes in the social-ecological system. This
process requires creating a policy environment that enables better collaborations at
both national and regional government organisations. The co-management arrange-
ments should be flexible to motivate social learning and adaptation without having
complex bureaucratic procedures to re-organise the management objectives. It should
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minimise power asymmetry among local stakeholders to allow the actual participa-
tion of all stakeholders in decision-making processes. It should also increase public
incentives to achieve the continuous commitments of the participants throughout the
implementation phases.
Future studies should focus on four main thematic areas to ensure effective imple-
mentation of adaptive co-management activities. First, research on political economy
is needed in order to understand the political, economic, and social forces that influ-
ence the social-ecological transformation at local levels. Second, research on social
networks should be conducted in order to understand the relationship and communi-
cation networks among the stakeholders. It is particularly important to initiate social
learning processes to achieve trust-building, information sharing, and collaborative
decision-making practices (Calvet-Mir et al., 2015). Third, future research should focus
on power relationships among the stakeholders in order to achieve the long-term
implementation of local governance structure and conflict resolution processes. Careful
examination of local power sources and its manifestation on collaboration and conflict
resolution is essential in order to build individual trusts and social learning process
among the participants (Armitage et al., 2009). Fourth, future research should find out
not only alternative livelihood opportunities but also options to improve pre-existing
livelihood strategies in order to increase local resilience against poverty (Sene-Harper
et al., 2019). Although promoting ecotourism is considered a noble strategy to achieve
both conservation and economic development (Sims, 2010), studies have shown that
the majority of tourism benefits are obtained by a smaller group of powerful actors
who mainly live closer to the most tourist attraction areas (see Adams and Infield,
2003; Ezebilo and Mattsson, 2010). Greater attention should be given towards liveli-
hood diversification studies and value chains analysis of certain products in order to
maintain local resilience and to achieve economic development at the regional level.
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APPENDIX A
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
Case-I: Makyar Village Tract
Biophysical information: Makyar village tract is located in Kanpetlet township at approximately
about 25 km from the town. The village tract is situated on a steep mountain slope with an
elevation ranging from 1,000 m to 2,500 m above sea level. The vegetation structure around
the village tract is characterised by three different forest types: laurel and stone oaks forest,
semi-evergreen montane forest, and the secondary fallow forest. Most common tree species
are Schima wallichii, Engelhardia spicata, Lithocarpus xylocarpus, and Pinus kesiya. There are four
villages in Makyar village tract, namely Makyar A, Makyar B, Makyar C, and Makyar D villages.
The general characteristics of villages in Makyar village tract is presented in Table (A.1).
Table A.1: General characteristics of Makyar village tract
Descriptions
Villages
Makyar A Makyar B Makyar C Makyar D
Village area [km2] 4.88 21.37 2.95 3.23
No. of household 21 26 23 42
Total population 121 145 140 241
Population density [per km2] 24.8 6.79 47.46 74.61
No. of clans 4 4 2 2
Source: Field survey (2017)
Settlement history: Originally, Makyar village tract belongs to the Nga tribal group. During
the pre-colonial time, there was only one village in the area, namely Makyar village. It was
founded by one of the Aum Laung clan members. When the founder passed away, his younger
son separated the territory and established a new settlement, namely Makyar A village. Later
in 1945, a few migrants from Mindat requested Makyar A Chief to let them stay in his territory.
Since they came from a different tribal group, the newcomers established a new village within
Makyar A territory, namely Makyar B village. A few years later, another group of migrants
from Mindat requested the Chief to establish a new village, namely Makyar C village. Later
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in 1970, the Makyar B had divided due to social conflicts and founded a new village namely
Makyar D village. When the national park was established, most agricultural and forest areas
owned by these villages were included in the national park. However, later in 2013, all of the
four settlements had moved into the national park area in order to get better access to the road.
As of 2017, only one village had legal permission and the other three villages are still regarded
as ‘illegal settlements’ inside the park (Figure A.1).
Figure A.1: Land-use map of Makyar village tract
Source: Participatory land-use mapping, 2017.
Livelihood activities and income sources: Collection of forest products is the most common
livelihood activity in Makyar village tract. The average annual forest income is about 680.48
USD1 per household. The majority of forest income is contributed by subsistence use of forest
products. Only 34% of households receive cash forest income that represents about 8% of total
household income (Table A.2). About 92% of households reported to engage in agriculture
within the last twelve months. About 54% of farmers practise shifting cultivation whereas only
a few farmers have started permanent farming. The main types of crops are maize, potato,
and yam whereas a few farmers grow other cash crops such as black pumpkin, avocado, and
millets. The average agricultural income is about 273.71 USD per household, of which 83% is
received as cash income. More than 80% of households raise livestock with an average TLU
of about 0.71 per household. The most common type of livestock is chicken raised by 82%
of households. Moreover, about 72% have pigs, 66% have goats, and 10% have mithan on
their farms. Livestock is raised at a small scale mainly for subsistence consumption. However,
occasional selling of livestock is done within the village tract. The average livestock income is
about 153.29 USD, of which cash income contributes about 41% of total livestock income.
1The exchange rate for one US Dollar is 1,234 Myanmar Kyats in 2016.
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Table A.2: Income structure in Makyar village tract (n=50)
Income sources
All sample [USD/year] Earners [USD/year]
mean min max SD % hh mean %
Forest 680.48 118.68 2749.23 455.96 49 50 680.48 49
sale 115.35 0.00 1620.75 320.85 8 17 339.26 24
use 565.13 112.52 1172.97 307.13 41 50 565.13 41
Agriculture 273.71 0.00 1081.85 191.95 20 46 297.51 21
cash crop 227.03 0.00 1081.85 196.59 16 44 257.98 19
food crop 46.68 0.00 245.54 55.29 3 32 72.94 5
Livestock 153.29 0.00 688.82 146.33 11 46 166.62 12
sale 64.13 0.00 615.88 105.8 5 29 110.57 8
consume 89.16 0.00 421.39 96.04 6 44 101.32 7
Wages 160.36 0.00 1134.52 284.19 12 24 334.07 24
Non-farm 117.59 0.00 1653.16 297.48 8 19 309.44 22
Total 1385.42 481.52 3018.38 598.23 100 50 1385.42 100
Note: SD=standard deviation; %=share of total income; hh=income earning households
About 48% of households receive cash income from wage labour, mainly from working in
other farms or at government projects near the villages. An average income from wage labour
is about 160.36 USD per year which are received as cash income only. In addition to wage
labour, about 38% of households engage in non-farm activities such as petty trades, gifts, and
remittance from family members. The average non-farm income is about 117.59 USD per year
mainly contributed from household members who are working in the cities. A total of eleven
people has been working in Malaysia. However, it is reported that most emigrants do not
provide any remittance to their families.
Classification of livelihood clusters: The principal component analysis shows three main compo-
nents with eigenvalues greater than 1.0. Using the first three components, the hierarchical
cluster analysis (HCA) identifies three distinct combinations of livelihood clusters as indicated
in Figure A.2. Each livelihood cluster is named according to relative contributions of cash
income from each source. The reason to use cash income to name the livelihood clusters
is that the villagers usually mention about their livelihood strategies based on cash income
sources. Among the three clusters, the first cluster is named as Agriculture–Non-farm cluster
since the majority of cash income is contributed from agriculture (29.84%) and no-farm income
sources (12.98%) (Table A.3). The second cluster is Agriculture–Wage cluster since the majority
of cash income come from agriculture (13.97%) and wage labour (13.57%). The third cluster
is Forest–Wage cluster as the majority of income is contributed by forest income (32.34%) and
wage labour (25.13%).
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Figure A.2: Cluster dendrogram of sample households in Makyar village tract (n=50)
Table A.3: Share of sectoral income by livelihood clusters in Makyar village tract
Category
Agri–Non-farm Agri–Wage Forest–Wage
χ2
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3
Agri share 32.59a 18.80a 0.52b 18.89***
cash 29.84a 13.97b 0.45c 19.34***
subsistence 2.76a 4.83b 0.07a 11.72**
Forest share 37.82a 51.85b 60.41b 11.53**
cash 4.50a 2.48a 32.30b 11.25**
subsistence 33.32a 49.37b 28.11ab 10.85**
Livestock share 16.37a 11.03a 2.04b 6.46*
cash 10.21a 2.67b 0.87b 9.46**
subsistence 6.16ab 8.36a 1.17b 8.98*
Wages share 0.23a 13.57b 25.13b 21.39***
Non-farm share 12.98 4.75 11.90 3.52
Total income [USD] 1,162 1,392 2,026 5.13
% of households 36 52 12
Note: Values marked with the same superscript letters are not significantly different (Dunn’s test, p>0.05); χ2 =
Kruskal-Wallis Chi-squared; Agri = Agriculture; *=p<0.05; **=p<0.01; ***=p<0.001. n=50.
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Case-II: Ung Village Tract
Biophysical information: Ung village tract is located in Mindat township. The village tract is
characterized by steep mountainous terrains with an elevation ranging from 900 m to 2,500 m
at its peaks. There are three different forest types in Ung village tract: i) degraded secondary
forest, ii) montane evergreen forests, and iii) pine forests. Most common tree species are
Lithocarpus xylocarpus, Quercus semecarpifolia, Pinus kesiya, and other sub-tropical montane
species. Ung village tract is composed of four villages namely, Ung A, Ung B, Ung C, and Ung
D. The general characteristics of Ung village tract is presented in Table (A.4).
Table A.4: General characteristics of Ung village tract
Descriptions
Villages
Ung A Ung B Ung C Ung D
Village area [km2] 31.8 24.61 16.16 23.38
No. of household 58 55 26 22
Total population 340 327 165 119
Population density [per km2] 10.69 13.29 10.21 5.09
No. of clans 1 1 2 1
Settlement history: All villages in Ung village tract are located along the western border of
the national park. The villages were established since the pre-colonial period. Originally, the
villages were situated in the valley near to the Mon Chaung stream. Later, they have moved
closer to the national park in order to avoid landslides and to have better access to the roads.
The village territories and locations are presented in Figure (A.3).
Figure A.3: Land-use map of Ung village tract (Source: Participatory land-use mapping, 2017)
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Livelihood activities and income sources: Collection of forest product is the most common livelihood
activity in Ung village tract. On average, households receive about 944.16 USD per year from
the sale and consumption of forest products. About 62% of households reported to receive
cash forest income with an average of about 145.36 USD per year (Table A.5). The average
agricultural income is about 592.86 USD per year contributing about 22% of total household
income. The most common cash crop is yam cultivated by 94% of households. Other important
crops include red millet, maize, and potato.
Table A.5: Income structure in Ung village tract (n=50)
Category
All sample [USD/year] Earners [USD/year]
mean min max SD % hh mean %
Forest 944.16 208.31 2361.22 610.31 35 50 944.16 35
sale 145.36 0.00 854.94 215.68 5 31 234.46 9
use 798.79 193.68 1974.31 548.39 30 50 798.79 30
Agriculture 592.86 85.09 1495.14 316.97 22 50 592.86 22
cash crop 543.14 85.09 1456.65 301.00 20 50 543.14 20
food crop 49.71 0.00 184.18 49.53 2 36 69.05 3
Livestock 707.97 0.00 3330.63 679.62 27 47 753.16 28
sale 584.70 0.00 2917.34 612.81 22 44 664.43 25
consume 123.27 0.00 729.34 166.59 5 40 154.09 6
Wages 140.23 0.00 1215.56 324.72 5 15 467.42 18
Non-farm 285.74 0.00 2431.12 528.16 11 19 751.94 28
Total 2670.95 897.65 6011.82 1214.00 100 50 2670.95 100
Note: SD=standard deviation; %=share of total income; hh=income earning households.
The average income from livestock is about 748.49 USD per year, of which 80% is contributed
as cash income. The most common livestock is Mithan raised by 68% of total households.
Other important livestock includes pig and chicken, raised by 56% and 64% of households
respectively. About 36% of households have reported receiving income from wage labour
mainly working for wealthy farmers during weeding and crop harvesting. The average wage
income is about 140.23 USD per household that contributes about 5% of total income. In
addition to wage labour, about 34% receive income from non-farm employment activities such
as trade business, remittance, gifts, and support from rural development projects. The average
non-farm income is about 285.74 USD per year contributing about 11% of total income.
Classification of livelihood clusters: The principal component analysis produces four main com-
ponents with eigenvalue greater than one. The hierarchical cluster analysis (HCA) indicates
three distinct combinations of livelihood clusters in Ung village tract (Figure A.4). Each cluster
is named based on the contribution of cash income from each source (Table A.6). The first
cluster is considered as the Agriculture–Wage strategy because the majority of cash income is
contributed by agriculture (31.39%) and wage labour (14%). The second cluster is Non-farm–
Livestock strategy, where the majority of cash income is received from non-farm employment
(28%) and livestock farming (25.88%). The third cluster is Livestock–Agriculture strategy because
cash income is mainly contributed by livestock (26.15%) and agriculture (18.76%).
187
?? ? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ? ?? ?? ? ? ?? ? ?? ? ?? ? ?? ?? ? ?? ??
?
?
?
?
?
??
??
????????????????????????????
?????????????????????
?
??
???
?
Figure A.4: Cluster dendrogram of sample households in Ung village tract (n=50)
Table A.6: Share of sectoral income by livelihood clusters in Ung village tract
Category
Agri–Wage Non-farm–
Livestock
Livestock–Agri
χ2
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3
Agriculture share 33.98a 8.84b 21.02a 20.12***
cash 31.39a 8.84b 18.76a 17.99***
subsistence 2.59a 0.00b 2.26a 23.99***
Forest share 30.26a 32.85a 39.65b 14.89***
cash 4.90a 4.03a 6.43b 7.83*
subsistence 25.36a 28.82ab 33.22b 14.25***
Livestock share 16.59a 29.94ab 31.07b 13.10**
cash 12.05a 25.88ab 26.15b 14.57***
subsistence 4.54 4.06 4.92 5.50
Wages share 14.00a 0.37b 2.07b 7.90*
Non-farm share 5.17a 28.00b 6.19a 15.17***
Total income [USD] 1990a 2678ab 3383b 6.36*
% of households 40 22 38
Note: Values marked with the same superscript letters are not significantly different (Dunn’s test, p<0.05); χ2
= Kruskal-Wallis Chi-square; Agri=Agriculture; *=p<0.05; **=p<0.01; ***=p<0.001; n=50.
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Case-III: Kitaw Village Tract
Biophysical information: Kitaw village tract is located in Kanpatlet township. The village tract is
situated on rough mountains ranging from 800 m to 2,100 m above sea level. The vegetation
structure is characterised by secondary dipterocarpus forests in lower altitudes and several
patches of alpine forests at top ridges. Most common tree species are Pinus kesiya, Dipterocarpus
tuberculatus, Shorea obtusa, and Alstonia spp.. There are four villages in Kitaw village tract,
namely Kitaw A, Kitaw B, Kitaw C, and Kitaw D. The general characteristics of Kitaw village
tract is presented in Table A.7.
Table A.7: General characteristics of Kitaw village tract
Descriptions
Villages
Kitaw A Kitaw B Kitaw C Kitaw D
Village area [km2] 7.87 25.85 6.53 0.67
No. of household 40 44 33 10
Total population 208 268 217 64
Population density [per km2] 26.43 10.37 33.23 95.52
No. of clans 1 1 2 1
Source: Field survey (2017)
Figure A.5: Land-use map of Kitaw village tract
Source: Participatory land-use mappings, 2017.
Settlement history: All villages in Kitaw village tract are located outside the national park (Figure
A.5). Among the four villages, Kitaw A was established before the British occupation. Kitaw B
and Kitaw C were established during British administration, and Kitaw D was established after
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the independence. All villages are located outside the national park. Originally, the settlements
were located on the steep mountain slopes. The old locations were closer to the streams where
they had better defence position and easier access to the stream water. Later, the settlement
areas were moved up to the mountain ridges where they had better access to the roads.
Local activities and income sources: Forests contribute the highest share of income in Kitaw village
tract. The average forest income is about 485.67 USD per year. The majority of forest income is
contributed by subsistence use of forest products, where only 20% of households receive cash
income from selling forest products (Table A.8). The average contribution of cash forest income
is 2% which is relatively low compared to subsistence forest income (26%).
Table A.8: Income structure in Kitaw village tract (n=50)
Category
All sample [USD/year] Earners [USD/year]
mean min max SD % hh mean %
Forest 485.67 157.41 1442.95 280.65 29 50 485.67 29
sale 36.22 0.00 810.37 127.39 2 10 181.12 11
use 449.45 157.41 1256.12 243.61 26 50 449.45 26
Agriculture 477.65 0.00 1799.03 347.81 28 49 487.40 29
cash crop 383.52 0.00 1799.03 350.24 23 44 435.82 26
food crop 94.13 0.00 357.37 84.93 6 38 123.86 7
Livestock 225.35 0.00 1455.43 304.72 13 47 239.73 14
sale 101.81 0.00 1280.39 222.38 6 29 175.54 10
consume 123.53 0.00 1049.43 179.64 7 43 143.64 8
Wages 109.32 0.00 1458.67 262.13 6 23 237.65 14
Non-farm 403.79 0.00 6320.91 1136.22 24 18 1121.65 66
Total 1701.79 511.14 7225.36 1366.44 100 50 1701.79 100
Note: SD=standard deviation; %=share of total income; hh=income earning households.
About 98% of total households reported receiving income from agriculture within the last
twelve months. The main crops used for agriculture are yam and maize, which are grown by
84% and 82% of households respectively. The average income from agriculture is about 477.65
USD per year representing about 28% of total household income. About 94% of households
raise livestock in their farm. The most common livestock are chicken, pig, goat, and mithan with
an average TLU of 0.7 per household. The average income from livestock is about 225.35 USD
per year contributing about 13% of total household income. About 58% of households reported
receiving cash income from livestock contributing about 45% of total livestock income.
About 46% of households received cash income from wage labour, particularly in government
construction projects as well as weeding and harvesting of yam in other farms. The average
income from wage labour is about 109.32 USD per household, contributing about 6% of total
household income. Income from non-farm activities is also common in Kitaw village tract.
About 48% of households reported receiving cash income from non-farm activities, particularly
from government salaries, petty trades, and remittance from family members. The average
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income from non-farm activities is about 403 USD per year contributing about 24% of total
household income. The maximum amount of non-farm income is about 6320.91 USD per year,
mainly received from government salaries of the family members.
Classification of livelihood clusters: The principal component analysis produces four main compo-
nents with eigenvalue greater than one. The hierarchical cluster analysis (HCA) indicates three
distinct combinations of livelihood clusters in Ung village tract (Figure A.6). Each cluster is
named based on the contribution of cash income from each source (Table A.9). Among the
three clusters, the first cluster is considered as Non-farm–Agriculture cluster mainly because
households in this cluster receive the highest share of cash income from non-farm employment
(32.36%) and agriculture (25.78%). The second cluster is considered as Non-farm–Agri–Wage
cluster, where households received the majority of cash income from non-farm employment
(27.42%), agriculture (22.84%), and wage labour (14.30%). The third cluster is named as Wage-
Agriculture cluster where households receive the majority of cash income both from wage
labour (14.99%) and agricultural crops (14.49%). In contrast to the first two clusters, households
in this cluster do not receive any income from non-farm employment.
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Figure A.6: Cluster dendrogram of sample households in Kitaw village tract (n=50)
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Table A.9: Share of sectoral income by livelihood clusters in Kitaw village tract
Category
Non-farm–
Agri–Livestock
Non-farm–
Agri–Wage
Wage–Agri–
Forest χ2
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3
Agri share 30.08a 28.49ab 22.89b 15.87***
cash 25.78a 22.84ab 14.49b 14.96***
subsistence 4.30 5.65 8.40 1.61
Forest share 21.82a 19.24b 52.17c 15.70***
cash 0.17a 0.04a 8.51b 8.34*
subsistence 21.64a 19.20b 43.67a 11.02**
Livestock share 15.51a 10.55ab 9.94b 7.87*
cash 9.39a 0.36b 2.31b 21.27***
subsistence 6.13 10.19 7.63 3.22
Wages share 0.23a 14.30b 14.99b 22.12***
Non-farm share 32.36a 27.42a 0.00b 13.79**
Total income [USD] 2211 1476 1189 10.70
% of households 44 22 34
Note: Values marked with the same superscript letters are not significantly different (Dunn’s test, p<0.05);
χ2 = Kruskal-Wallis Chi-square; Agri = Agriculture; *=p<0.05; **=p<0.01; ***=p<0.001; n=50.
APPENDIX B
LIST OF KEY INFORMANTS AND WORKSHOP
PARTICIPANTS
Table B.1: List of key informant interviews
ID Date Interviewee Organization/village
KI-1 18/5/2016 Park Warden Natma Taung National Park
KI-2 20/5/2016 Assistant engineer Kanpatlet Municipality
KI-3 2/6/2016 Township Officer Mindat Municipality
KI-4 20/5/2016 Township Officer Rural Development Department
KI-5 23/5/2016 Township Officer Department of Agriculture
KI-6 23/5/2016 Township Officer Department of Cooperatives
KI-7 24/5/2016 Township Officer Township Forest Department
KI-8 2/6/2016 Assistant Director District Forest Department
KI-9 8/2/2017 Traditional head Makyar A village
KI-10 8/2/2017 Villager Makyar A village
KI-11 19/2/2017 Committee member Ung B village committee
KI-12 18/2/2017 Administrator Ung village tract
KI-13 19/2/2017 Committee member Ung B village committee
KI-14 22/2/2017 Village headman Ung C village
KI-15 23/2/2017 Village elder Ung C village
KI-16 23/2/2017 Village elder Ung C village
KI-17 24/2/2017 Village headman Ung D village
KI-18 24/2/2017 Village council member Ung D village
KI-19 25/2/2017 Village elder Ung A village
KI-20 11/2/2017 Village headman Makyar B village
KI-21 9/2/2017 Village elder Makyar A village
KI-22 24/3/2017 Administrator Kitaw village tract
KI-23 13/5/2017 Village elder Ung A village
KI-24 1/4/2017 Village elder Kitaw C village
Continued on next page
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Table B.1: (continued)
ID Date Interviewee Organization/village
KI-25 2/4/2017 Village elder Kitaw A village
KI-26 2/4/2017 Village headman Kitaw A village
KI-27 31/3/2017 Village headman Kitaw C village
KI-28 3/4/2017 Village headman Kitaw D village
KI-29 3/4/2017 Village headman Makyar C village
KI-30 15/2/2017 Village headman Makyar D village
KI-31 14/5/2017 Village priest Ung B village
KI-32 1/4/2017 Village elder Kitaw C village
KI-33 16/5/2017 Township Officer Department of Agriculture
KI-34 16/5/2017 District Officer Land Administration Department
KI-35 15/5/2017 District Officer Department of Livestock and Veterinary
Science
KI-36 16/5/2017 Chairman Cho Ethnic Association, Mindat
Table B.2: List of focus group discussions
Sr. Date Location Topic of discussion
1 6/4/2016 Ung A village Situational analysis: village information, land-use,
livelihoods, local traditions
2 25/5/2016 Kitaw A village Situational analysis: village information, land-use,
livelihoods, local traditions
3 15/6/2016 Park office Status and challenges regarding law enforcement
activities
4 20/6/2016 Makyar village Situational analysis: village information, land-use,
livelihoods, local traditions
5 9/2/2017 Makyar A village Participatory mapping, land use, and traditional
practices
6 10/2/2017 Makyar B village Participatory mapping, land use. and traditional
practices
7 13/2/2017 Makyar C village Participatory mapping, land use, and traditional
practices
8 15/2/2017 Makyar D village Participatory mapping, land use, and traditional
practices
9 17/2/2017 Ung B village Participatory mapping, land use, and traditional
practices
10 22/2/2017 Ung C village Participatory mapping, land use, and traditional
practices
Continued on next page
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Table B.2: List of focus group discussions (continued)
Sr. Date Location Topic of discussion
11 24/2/2017 Ung D village Participatory mapping, land use, and traditional
practices
12 25/2/2017 Ung A village Participatory mapping, land use, and traditional
practices
13 4/3/2017 Kitaw A village Participatory mapping, land use, and traditional
practices
14 4/3/2017 Kitaw D village Participatory mapping, land use, and traditional
practices
15 24/3/2017 Kitaw B village Participatory mapping, land use, and traditional
practices
16 31/3/2017 Kitaw C village Participatory mapping, land use, and traditional
practices
Table B.3: List of workshop participants
Sr. Name Position Organization/Village
1 U Lane Aum Administrator Kitaw village tract
2 U Hone Htang Administrator Markyar village tract
3 U Kee Hong Village headman Htang Aum village
4 U Kee Manar Village headman Chaing village
6 U Htang Lane Lway Village headman Ung village
6 U Aung Kee Administrator Makyar village tract
7 U Khaw Gay Ngai Administrator Khat Chan village tract
8 U Aung San Staff member KawNuCun Region Development
Organization
9 U Hone Kee Village headman Hla Laung Pan village
10 Dr. Hnin Sandar Bo Deputy Officer Department of Livestock and Veterinary
Science
11 U Phyo Min Oo Deputy
Administrator
General Administration Department
12 U Kee Manar Hong Staff member Tong Nge village tract
13 U Ye Yint Aung Range Officer Forest Department
14 U Lane Maung Shane Staff member Department of Hotels and Tourism
15 U Htang Aum Village headman Htet Shwe village
16 U Tam Lane Village headman Kauk Tu village
17 U Lane Kee Forester Natma Taung National Park
18 U Maung Nu Ranger Natma Taung National Park
Continued on next page
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Table B.3: List of workshop participants (continued)
Sr. Name Position Organization/Village
19 Daw The Ei Hlaing Deputy Officer Department of Agriculture
20 Daw Nane Manar Staff member Department of Agriculture
21 U Nay Shine Tun Forester Natma Taung National Park
22 U Tin Mya Soe Park Warden Natma Taung National Park
23 U Ye Lin Aung Research assistant Wildlife Conservation Society
24 U Pyi Soe Aung Doctoral student Technical University Dresden
25 Prof. Jürgen Pretzsch Professor Technical University Dresden
APPENDIX C
LIST OF QUESTIONNAIRES
Interview Guide for Land Tenure System
1. Please indicate the village territory and the history of village establishment. Please indicate
private, communal and open-access areas within village territory?
2. How do people usually acquire private own land within the community?
3. Who has the right to own private land? Are there any limitations in terms of area of land
owned by a household or individual?
4. What kind of rights does the customary landowner have in relation to his property? How
has the customary land ownership system changed within the last 10 years?
5. What are the rights of tenants in relation to the private land and what are their duties and
responsibilities? Are there any changes in the rights of tenants within the last 10 years?
6. What are the rights of other villagers in relation to the private land? Are there any changes
in the rights of villagers within the last 10 years?
7. What are the rights of villagers in relation to village communal lands? Are there any changes
in the rights of villagers compared to the last 10 years? What are the rights of outsiders in
relation to village communal?
8. What are the rights of villagers in relation to open access land? Are there any changes in the
rights of villagers compared to the last 10 years? What are the rights of outsiders in relation
to open-access land?
9. How has the boundary for land property defined within the community? Who has the
authority in defining boundary for land property and how has it changed within the last 10
years?
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10. Who has the authority to give permission for different types of rights within the community?
How does it changed compared to the last 10 years?
11. How do you know if someone breaks the rules? Is there any monitoring system in relation
to communal regulations?
12. What kinds of sanctions are practiced if someone violates local rules? How many violations
have already sanctioned within the last 12 months? Are sanctions the same for the repeated
violators? What would be further actions if violators do not accept local sanctions?
13. How many conflicts have occurred within the last 12 months? How do the conflicts among
the community members are solved within the community? How does it changed compared
to the last 10 years?
14. How are the rules and regulations created within the community? Who participate in local
rule making? How has it changed compared to the last 10 years?
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Questionnaires for Household Survey 
Village name:   Date:            
Household ID:          Name of HH head:         
 
PART-I 
A. BASIC INFORMATION OF THE HOUSEHOLDS 
1.? Household composition 
1.1.?How many household members do your household have? __________ numbers 
1.2.?Please indicate details on the members of your household. 
Sr. Name Sex Age Education Current employment 
1.      
2.      
3.      
1.3.?Was the household head born in this village?  ? Yes  ? No 
1.4.? If ‘no’, how long has the household head lived in this village?  _______ years 
1.5.?Which ethnic groups does the household head belong to?  _______ 
1.6.?What is the religion of the household head? ? Christian ? Buddhist  ? Others,______ 
1.7.?How many family labours are available in your household? 
Employment category Number of available labour 
Full time Part time 
Agriculture   
Off-farm   
Non-farm   
Others,   
 
1.8.?How many houses (including farm hut) do your household own? Please describe in detail. 
Sr. Dimension Materials used Year Source of 
materials 
Estimated 
price [MMK] Wall Floor Roof 
        
        
 
2.? Land ownership 
2.1.?Do you own any agricultural land? ? Yes  ? No 
2.2.? If ‘yes’, please describe the area of agricultural land that you own. ___________ acres 
2.3.?How many hours does it take to reach to your current agricultural land? _______ hours  
2.4.?Do you also own fallow lands other than agricultural land? ? Yes ? No 
2.5.? If yes, how many plots of fallow land that your household own? 
Plot no. Area 
[acre] 
Fallow 
period 
Location Current status 
     
     
2.6.?Have you ever rented any land from other people?  ? Yes  ? No 
2.7.? If yes, how much do you have to pay as rent for the land? _________kyats/_______ 
2.8.?Have you also rented out your land to other households? ? Yes  ? No 
2.9.? If yes, how much did you get for rent of your land within the last 12 months? 
Type of payment Amount 
[MMK] 
Remarks 
Cash   
In-kind   
2.10.?Do you also own forest land other than agriculture and fallow land? ? Yes ? No 
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2.11.?If yes, please indicate estimated area of land and current land uses.  
Area [acre] Current land use 
  
  
2.12.?How long have you been in possession of all of your land? __________ years 
2.13.?How have you acquired all your land? 
? Inheritance ? Purchase ? Government allocation  ?Own clearance 
? Others, _____ 
2.14.?Do you have to share the ownership of your land with others? 
☐ No;  ☐ Yes, with my siblings; ☐ Yes, with other kin; ☐ Others, __________ 
2.15.?Do you have formal land title or other document for your land ownership?  ☐ Yes;  ☐No 
2.16.?How often do you visit your fallow land in the last 12 months? 
☐ Never;  ☐ Occasionally;  ☐ Seasonally;  ☐ Year around 
2.17.?Do you think you have exclusive right to manage your own land?  
? Yes, without approval;  ☐ Yes, with approval from__________________; ? No 
2.18.?If no, what would be the reason that you do not have the right to manage your own land? 
Reasons:  
  
  
2.19.?Do you think you have the right to exclude others from your land?  ☐ Yes ☐ No 
2.20.?If no, what would be the reason that you could not exclude others from your land? 
Reasons:  
  
  
2.21.?Have you ever sold or transfer your land to other people? 
☐ Yes, within family; ☐ Yes, within community; ☐ Yes, outside community; ☐ Never 
2.22.?Do you think you have the right to sell your land? ? Yes ? No 
2.23.?If no, what would be the reason that you do not have the right to sell your land? 
Reasons  
  
  
2.24.?Have you ever had any conflict in relation to land within the last 10 years? ☐ Yes ☐ No 
2.25.?If yes, please indicate the type of conflicts and how you have solved those conflicts. 
Type of conflicts Year Solutions 
   
   
2.26.?How would you rate about the tenure security of your land? 
☐ Very secure;  ☐ Somehow secure; ☐ Unsecure; ☐ Very unsecure 
2.27.?If the answer is unsecure, what would be your opinion to secure land tenure? 
☐ Having formal land title; ☐Agreements with other communities; ☐ Others,__________ 
 
 
B. HOUSEHOLD LIVELIHOOD ACTIVITIES 
3.? Agriculture 
3.1.?What types of crops did you plant in your land during the last 12 months?  
Types of crop 
 
Area 
[acre] 
Seeds 
input 
[Qty] 
Market 
price 
[MMK] 
Output [Qty] 
 
Price 
[MMK/ 
quantity] Consumption Sale Transfers 
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3.2.?How many household members work full-time for agricultural activities? 
3.3.?Did you hire any daily labour for your agricultural activities? ☐ Yes  ☐ No 
3.4.? If yes, please indicate the number of labour that you paid within the last 12 months. 
Activity No. of 
Labour 
Working 
days 
Daily wages 
[MMK] 
In-kind 
payment 
Price 
[MMK] 
Land preparation      
Planting      
Weeding      
Harvesting      
Transport      
Others      
3.5.?Did you change the main crops in compare to the last 10 years ago? ☐ Yes    ☐ No 
3.6.? If yes, what type of main crop did you grow in the last 10 years ago? 
Type of crops Reasons for change 
  
  
  
3.7.?How have the functions of agriculture for your household changed in compare to the last 10 
years? 
  ☐ Increased subsistence crop  ☐ Increased commercial crops  ☐ Unchanged 
3.8.? If there are changes, what would be the main reason for these changes? 
Reasons:  
  
  
3.9.?How has the productivity of your land changed in compare to the last 10 years ago? 
☐ Increased  ☐ Decreased   ☐ Unchanged 
3.10.?What would be the main reasons for changing crop productivity? 
Reasons:  
  
  
3.11.?Do you use additional fertilizers to improve the productivity of your land? ☐ Yes  ☐ 
No 
3.12.?If yes, please indicate the amount of fertilizer that you use within the last 12 months. 
Main crops Quantity of fertilizer Price (MMK) 
   
   
3.13.?Did your household need to buy rice from market in last 12 months? ☐ Yes  ☐ No 
3.14.?If yes, how many months did your household rely on extra food in addition to own 
product? _____ 
3.15.?Where do you usually sell your products? ☐ Within the village ☐ At township market 
3.16.?Do you think you have good communication with traders or middle-men? ☐ Yes ☐ No 
3.17.?If yes, how many of them you have with good relationship? ______ numbers 
3.18.?How often do you go to the market? ☐ Weekly ☐ Monthly ☐ Quarterly  ☐ 
Occasionally 
3.19.?How do you usually go to the market? ☐ By car ☐ Motorbike ☐ On-foot  ☐ Others,___ 
3.20.?What was your main reason to go to the market? 
Reasons:  
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3.21.?Do your household own any transport facility to go to the market?  ☐ Yes   ☐ No 
3.22.?If yes, please describe the type of transport facility and the estimated price. 
Type Number Years owned Estimated price 
    
    
3.23.?How has access to market changed compared to the last 10 years?  
 ☐ Improved    ☐ Worse    ☐ Unchanged 
3.24.?If there are changes, what would be the main reasons for these changes? 
Reasons:  
  
3.25.?How does changes in access to market influence the livelihood of your household? 
Reasons:  
  
 
4.? Livestock  
4.1.?Does your household own livestock?  ☐ Yes  ☐ No 
4.2.? If yes, please indicate the number of livestock that your household own. 
Type of livestock Adult male Adult female Juvenile 
male 
Juvenile 
female 
     
     
4.3.?Where do you usually get the fodder for your livestock? 
  ☐ Own farm ☐ Communal land  ☐ National park ☐ Open access land 
4.4.?What would be your main reasons for farming livestock? 
Reasons:  
  
4.5.?How many livestock did you sell within the last 12 months? 
Type of livestock sold Quantity Market price Purpose 
    
    
4.6.?How many livestock did your household consume within the last 12 months? 
Type of livestock sold Quantity Market price Purpose 
    
    
4.7.?Do you use family labour for livestock husbandry activities? ☐ Yes  ☐ No 
4.8.?How has the number of livestock changed in compare to the last 10 years ago? 
☐ Increased  ☐ Decreased  ☐ Unchanged 
4.9.?What would be the main reason for decreasing or increasing number of livestock in 
compare to the last 10 years ago? 
Reasons:  
  
4.10.?How have the functions of livestock for your household changed in compare to the last 10 
years?  ☐ Increased consumption  ☐ Increased sale  ☐ Unchanged 
4.11.?If there are changes, what would be the main reason for these changes? 
Reasons:  
  
4.12.?Have your household ever faced any conflict in relation to livestock raising? ☐ Yes ☐ No 
4.13.?If yes, what kind of conflicts have you faced within the last 12 months? 
Type of conflict/challenges Resolutions Rank (1-5) 
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5.? Off-farm activities 
5.1.?Did you or any other household members undertake off-farm activities to generate income 
within the last 12 months?   ? Yes  ? No 
5.2.? If yes, please indicate the types of activities and income generated from each activity. 
Off-farm activities Working days Daily rate Income 
    
    
5.3.?How do you get access to the above mentioned off-farm activities? 
? Direct contact with employer ? Contact from relatives ? Contact from other community 
members ? Others, please specify_______________ 
5.4.?How has engagement in off-farm activities by your household changed over the last 10 
years?  ? Increased  ? Decreased  ? Unchanged 
5.5.? If increased, what would be your reason for increasing engagements in off-farm activities? 
? Decline in crop productivity ? Decline in forest resources ? Less availability of 
agricultural land ? Improve market access  ? Others, ___________ 
5.6.?How do you expect future livelihood activities of your household? 
? Increase agriculture ? Increase livestock ? Increase off-farm  ? Migrate within 
localities ? Migrate to cities  ? Others,_______________ 
5.7.?What would be your main reasons for these changes? 
Reasons:  
  
 
6.? Gifts, transfer or remittances 
6.1.?Did you or any of your household member receive any gifts from relatives, friends etc. 
within the last 12 months? ? Yes ? No 
6.2.? If yes, please indicate the types, sources, and value of the gifts that you had received within 
the last 12 months. 
Types of gift From whom Value 
[MMK] 
Remark 
    
    
6.3.?Did you or any of your household member receive remittances from relatives, friends etc. 
within the last 12 months? ? Yes ? No 
6.4.? If yes, please indicate the amount of remittances that you had received within the last 12 
months. 
From whom Amount 
[MMK] 
Remark 
   
   
 
7.? Social capital 
7.1.?How many households who are relatives to you within the community? ________ 
7.2.?Do you have relatives in the city? ☐ Yes  ☐ No 
7.3.? If yes, how often do you communicate with them? ☐ Regularly ☐ Sometimes ☐ Seldom 
7.4.?With whom do you communicate if you need any help?  
☐ Within community ☐ Relatives at city  ☐ Both  ☐ Never asked for help 
7.5.? If yes, what would be the main reasons that you asked for help? 
Reasons:  
  
7.6.?Are you currently a member of any social organization? ☐ Yes ☐ No 
7.7.? If yes, please indicate the name of the organization and your responsibilities. 
Name of organization Year* Main responsibilities 
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7.8.?How often do you participate in village meetings? ☐ Regularly  ☐ Sometimes  ☐ 
Seldom 
8.? Financial capital 
8.1.?Do you participate in local saving groups?  ☐ Yes   ☐ No 
8.2.? If yes, what would be your main reason to participate in local saving group? 
Reasons:  
  
8.3.?When did you start to participate in the cash saving groups? 
8.4.?Can you state how much do you have to contribute to the saving groups? ______________ 
kyats 
8.5.?Did you borrow any cash or other cash equivalent assets within the last 12 months?  
8.6.? If yes, please describe details of cash or cash equivalent assets that you borrowed in the last 
12 months? 
Amount (mmk) Purpose Source of credits Interest rate 
    
    
 
9.? Future plan 
9.1.?How do you expect the future of your households? 
☐ Continue to stay in this community  ☐ Likely to move other community 
☐ Likely to migrate to the cities    ☐ Others,__________________________ 
9.2.?Please indicate the main reasons for the above answer. 
Reasons:  
  
 
PART – II HOUSEHOLD USE OF FOREST RESOURCES 
10.?Timber 
10.1.? How many timber species have you used within the last 12 months? 
Sr. Species Quantity Market 
price 
Purpose Labour 
cost 
Sources Other 
inputs 
1.        
2.        
10.2.?How has the use of timber species by your household changed over the past 10 years?  
? Declined  ? Unchanged  ? Increased 
10.3.?If it has changed, what would be the main reasons for these changes? 
Reasons:  
  
10.4.?Had your household planted any woodlots or trees within the last 10 years? ? Yes ? No 
10.5.?If ‘yes’, please indicate the area and purpose of the woodlots? ____________ 
 
11.?Fuelwood 
11.1.?How much firewood do you usually need per day? 
Types Quantity/day 
(Summer) 
Quantity/day 
(Winter) 
Estimated price 
[MMK] 
1.    
2.    
11.2.?How many days per week do your household spend to collect fuelwood? (____days/week) 
11.3.?In general, how has the use of firewood by your household changed over the past 10 
years?  ? Declined  ? Unchanged  ? Increased 
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11.4.?If it has changed, what would be the main reasons for these changes? 
Reasons:  
  
12.?Forest food 
12.1.?How many species of edible plants do you collect from the forest within the last 12 
months? 
Sr. Species Usage Quantity Market price 
1.     
2.     
12.2.?From which area, do you usually harvest forest food? 
? Private  ? Communal  ? Government  ? Open access 
12.3.?In general, how has the use of forest food by your household changed over the past 10 
years? ? Declined ? Unchanged  ? Increased 
12.4.?If it has changed, what would be the main reasons for these changes? 
Reasons:  
  
13.?NTFPs 
13.1.?Did your household collect NTFP within the last 12 months? ☐ Yes   ☐ No 
13.2.?If yes, please describe the type of NTFP and estimated amount within the last 12 months. 
Type of NTFP Quantity Unit 
price 
Source  Trend Purpose 
Sale Consumption 
       
13.3.?In general, how has the use of NTFPs by your household changed over the past 10 years? 
? Declined  ? Unchanged  ? Increased 
13.4.?If it has changed, what would be the main reasons for these changes? 
Reasons:  
  
14.?Wildlife 
14.1.?Did your household capture any wildlife within the last 12 months? ☐ Yes   ☐ No 
14.2.?If yes, please describe the type of animal and estimated amount within the last 12 months. 
Wildlife Quantity Unit 
price 
Source of 
collection 
Trend Purpose 
Sale Consumption 
       
       
14.3.?In general, how has the use of wildlife by your household changed over the past 10 years? 
? Declined  ? Unchanged  ? Increased 
14.4.?If it has changed, what would be the main reasons for these changes? 
Reasons:  
  
15.?Medicinal plants 
15.1.?How many species of medicinal plants do you collect from the forest within the last 12 
months? 
Sr. Species Usage Quantity Market price Sources 
1.      
2.      
15.2.?How has the use of medicinal plants by your household changed over the last 10 years? 
? Declined  ? Unchanged  ? Increased 
15.3.?If it has changed, what would be the main reasons for these changes? 
Reasons: 
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Questions for Awareness and Compliances with Tenure Rules 
1.? Traditionally, each Chin village has clear village territory that are recognised by neighbouring 
communities. Do you know the boundary of your village territory? Will you accept if the 
current boundaries are formalised by legal land title? 
2.? Traditionally, every villager has access to the village communal lands. Do you know that this 
rule exists within your community? Will you accept if this rule is adopted as formalised 
Statues by the village administration? 
3.? Traditionally, no one is permitted to clear the private land for shifting cultivation without 
prior consent from the customary land owner. Do you know that this rule exists within your 
community? Will you accept if this rule is adopted as formalised Statues by the village 
administration? 
4.? Traditionally, no one is permitted to cut the tree on private land for timber production without 
prior consent from the customary land owner. Do you know that this rule exists within your 
community? Will you accept if this rule is adopted as formalised Statues by the village 
administration? 
5.? Traditionally, no Clan member is permitted to clear the land owned by his own Clan for 
shifting cultivation without prior consent from other members of the Clan. Do you know that 
this rule exists within your community? Will you accept if this rule is adopted as formalised 
Statues by the village administration? 
6.? Traditionally, no Clan member is permitted to cut the tree on the land owned by his own Clan 
for timber production without prior consent from other members of the Clan. Do you know 
that this rule exists within your community? Will you accept if this rule is adopted as 
formalised Statues by the village administration? 
7.? Traditionally, no Clan member is permitted to sell the whole or part of the land owned by his 
own Clan without prior consent from other members of the Clan. Do you know that this rule 
exists within your community? Will you accept if this rule is adopted as formalised Statues 
by the village administration? 
8.? Traditionally, no one is permitted to clear the land for shifting cultivation, to cut the tree for 
timber production, or to produce gravels or stones for construction within the village 
communal land without prior consent from village head and other villagers. Do you know 
that this rule exists within your community? Will you accept if this rule is adopted as 
formalised Statues by the village administration? 
9.? Traditionally, every villager whoever clear the unoccupied virgin forests within village 
communal land with prior consent from villagers is regarded as the owner of the land. Do 
you know that this rule exists within your community? Will you accept if this rule is adopted 
as formalised Statues by the village administration? 
10.?Traditionally, no one is permitted to cut the trees from village use forests for commercial 
purposes. Do you know that this rule exists within your community? Will you accept if this 
rule is adopted as formalised Statues by the village administration? 
11.?Traditionally, no one is permitted to cut the trees or clear the forests for cultivation near the 
village water springs. Do you know that this rule exists within your community? Will you 
accept if this rule is adopted as formalised Statues by the village administration? 
12.?Even though the land is located within the national park, the customary land owner still 
maintains his rights to control the land. Do you know that this rule exists within your 
community? Are you still in compliance with this practice in your daily life? 
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13.?Traditionally, the customary land owners are not permitted to sell the whole or part of his 
own land to non-community members without prior consent from the community. Do you 
know that this rule exists within your community? Will you accept if this rule is adopted as 
formalised Statues by the village administration? 
14.? In former times, the lands were granted as inheritance to all the Clan members without proper 
allocation to each individual. Do you know that this practice exists within your community? 
Are you still in compliance with this practice in your daily life?  
15.? In former times, women do not have the rights to inherit the land owned by family or the 
Clans. Do you know that this practice exists within your community? Are you still in 
compliance with this practice in your daily life? 
 
 
Questions for Awareness and Compliances with TEK Practices 
 
1.? In former times, it is prohibited to clear the land for shifting cultivation or to cut the trees in 
sacred areas where the Spirits were believed to stay. Do you know that this practice exists 
within your community? Are you still in compliance with this practice in your daily life? 
2.? In former times, it is prohibited to cut the trees or clear the land in areas where villagers 
perform customary offerings to the Spirits. Do you know that this practice exists within your 
community? Are you still in compliance with this practice in your daily life? 
3.? Traditionally, village-use forests were demarcated in order to achieve sustainable timber 
supply, where no one is allowed to cut trees for commercial purposes inside these forests. Do 
you know that this rule exists within your community? Are you still in compliance with this 
practice in your daily life? 
4.? Traditionally, village water sources are protected in order to increase water supply, where no 
one is permitted to cut the trees or clear the land near the water sources. Do you know that 
this rule exists within your community? Are you still in compliance with this practice in your 
daily life? 
5.? In former times, it is taboo to cut the big fig trees (ficus spp.) which are believed to be a home 
for the Spirits. Do you know that this practice exists within your community? Are you still in 
compliance with this practice in your daily life? 
6.? In former times, it is prohibited to cut the big trees within the village settlement areas. Do you 
know that this practice exists within your community? Are you still in compliance with this 
practice in your daily life? 
7.? Traditionally, bamboos were planted for household uses and were inherited from generations 
to generations. No one is permitted to cut the bamboos around the village without prior 
consent from the owner. Do you know that this practice exists within your community? Are 
you still in compliance with this practice in your daily life? 
8.? Traditionally, one villager can request bamboo from other villagers for household uses if he 
does not have enough mature stocks of his own. In return, he also has to share his bamboo to 
other villagers in the future. Do you know that this practice exists within your community? 
Are you still in compliance with this practice in your daily life? 
9.? Traditionally, it is believed that crops will be destroyed and the village will face food shortage 
if the bamboo start flowering. Do you know that this belief exists within your community? 
Are you still in compliance with this practice in your daily life? 
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10.?Traditionally, the beehives in the forests have owners and no one is permitted to collect honey 
from beehives without prior consent from the owner. Do you know that this practice exists 
within your community? Are you still in compliance with this practice in your daily life? 
11.?Traditionally, every farmer has to practice shifting cultivation in one or two large fields chosen 
collectively by all farmers. No one is permitted to clear the land individually outside of the 
commonly chosen fields. Do you know that this practice exists within your community? Are 
you still in compliance with this practice in your daily life? 
12.?Traditionally, new agricultural fields are selected collectively by holding taungya meetings 
with farmers and villagers. Do you know that this practice exists within your community? 
Are you still in compliance with this practice in your daily life? 
13.?Traditionally, farmers usually celebrate ritual ceremonies collectively before opening the new 
agricultural fields in order increase crop production and reduce risks. No one is allowed to 
cultivate his agricultural plot without celebrating this ritual to the guardian spirits of the field. 
Do you know that this practice exists within your community? Are you still in compliance 
with this practice in your daily life? 
14.?Traditionally, every family residing in the village have access to the agricultural plots within 
the selected field. For landless farmers, the landowners have to allocate some plots within the 
selected agricultural field depending on the labour availability of the landless families. In 
return, the landless families had to pay some portion of their harvest or a chicken and a pot 
of local beer as land rent. Do you know that this practice exists within your community? Are 
you still in compliance with this practice in your daily life? 
15.?Traditionally, the land borrower could never become the landowner even though he is the 
one who cleared the borrowed land for the first time. Do you know that this rule exists within 
your community? Are you still in compliance with this practice in your daily life? 
16.? In former times, it is prohibited to clear the trees located either at the top of the ridges or close 
to the streams in order to protect landslides and soil erosions. Do you know that this practice 
exists within your community? Are you still in compliance with this practice in your daily 
life? 
17.? In former times, the farmers usually cut only the branches of big trees and left the stumps in 
clearing the land for shifting cultivation, in order to increase the rate of soil recovery as well 
as to reduce erosion. Do you know that this practice exists within your community? Are you 
still in compliance with this practice in your daily life? 
18.?Traditionally, the farmers have to clear the boundary of the fields as fire breaks before burning 
in order to protect the spread of fire to the neighbouring fields. Do you know that this practice 
exists within your community? Are you still in compliance with this practice in your daily 
life? 
19.?Traditionally, every farmer had to compensate if the fire spread outside of the target field and 
destroy the fields owned by other villages. Do you know that this practice exists within your 
community? Are you still in compliance with this practice in your daily life? 
20.?Traditionally, taungya burning should be done during the period of waxing moon in order to 
avoid accidents, instead of waning moon. Do you know that this belief exists within your 
community? Are you still in compliance with this belief in your daily life? 
21.?Traditionally, farmers adopted control burning practices, where they started to set fire from 
the top-ridges or from the area where the fire brakes were constructed. The centre of the field 
is usually burned once the fire has become stable. Do you know that this practice exists within 
your community? Are you still in compliance with this practice in your daily life? 
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22.? In former times, the farmers usually select the most appropriate person to start the fire based 
on the blessing from the prophets and previous experiences in order to minimize accidents. 
Do you know that this practice exists within your community? Are you still in compliance 
with this practice in your daily life? 
23.? In former times, farmers usually share labour to each other for labour-intensive activities such 
as land clearing or weeding the field. Do you know that this practice exists within your 
community? Are you still in compliance with this practice in your daily life? 
24.? In former times, farmers usually celebrate harvest rituals to field spirits after the crops have 
been harvested. No one is permitted to eat the crops before the harvest rituals. Do you know 
that this practice exists within your community? Are you still in compliance with this practice 
in your daily life? 
25.? In former times, hunting rituals were usually performed before hunting to avoid accidents 
and to get more animals. Do you know that this practice exists within your community? Are 
you still in compliance with this practice in your daily life? 
26.? In former times, outsiders are not permitted to hunt within the village territory without prior 
consent from village headman. Do you know that this practice exists within your community? 
Are you still in compliance with this practice in your daily life? 
27.? In former times, those who killed the big animals had to share the meat to all the member of 
the communities. Do you know that this practice exists within your community? Are you still 
in compliance with this practice in your daily life? 
28.? In former times, it is taboo to take animal shot by other hunters. Those who brake those rules 
had to compensate the requested amount of cash or other things (usually a Mithan) once the 
hunter knows about if in the future. Do you know these rules still exist within the community? 
Are you still in compliance with this practices in your daily life? 
29.? In former times, it is common to give wild birds as a token of friendship among the two 
families. Do you know that this practice exists within your community? Are you still in 
compliance with this practice in your daily life? 
30.? In former times, the ritual killings of Mithan was usually performed to increase social status 
or to be healthy among family members. Do you know that this practice exists within your 
community? Are you still in compliance with this practice in your daily life? 
31.? In former times, farmers adopt rotational grazing in fallow lands, in order to increase the soil 
fertility for next cultivation seasons. Do you know that this practice exists within your 
community? Are you still in compliance with this practice in your daily life? 
32.? In former times, it was taboo to kill or capture the whole group of the group-living species 
such as primate species. Do you know that this practice exists within your community? Are 
you still in compliance with this practice in your daily life? 
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D.1. Local Initiatives for Forest Conservation 
 
  
Photo 1. Watershed Forest in Makyar B 
village 
 
 
Photo 2. Watershed Forests in Kitaw A 
village 
  
Photo 3. Village-use forest in Ung C village 
 
 
 
Photo 4. Village-use forest in Kitaw B 
village 
  
Photo 5. Sacred Forest In Makyar D village 
 
Photo 6. Sacred Forest in Kitaw B village 
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D.2. Examples of Traditional Resource Management Practices 
 
  
Photo 7. Leaving forests at mountain ridges 
to protect against wind and soil erosion 
 
 
Photo 8. Leaving tree stumps in shifting 
cultivation area to enhance recovery of 
fallow land 
  
Photo 9. Creating fire brakes to prevent 
forest fire in secondary fallows 
 
 
Photo 10. Controlled burning to ensure 
proper burning and miminise risks 
 
 
 
Photo 11. Selection felling of bamboo culm 
to ensure sustainable bamboo production 
 
Photo 12. Maintaining natural beehives to 
ensure sustainable honey production 
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D.3. Key Forest Products and Services used by local villagers 
 
  
Photo 13. Local use of timber for house 
constructoin 
 
 
Photo 14. Non-timber forest products (wild 
tumeric) collected from the park 
  
Photo 15. Collecting water from water 
sources inside the national park 
 
Photo 16. Fuelwood collection for 
household uses 
 
 
  
Photo 17. Livestock (Mithan) grazing inside 
the national park 
 
 
Photo 18. Memorial posts indicating the 
number of Mithan offered to the local spirits 
while celebrating feasts of merit. 
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D.4. Photo Records of Data Collection 
 
  
Photo 19. Household face-to-face interview 
 
 
Photo 20. Key informant interview with a 
local trader 
  
Photo 21. Participatory land-use mapping 
in Makyar A village 
 
 
Photo 22. Result of a participatory land-use 
mapping exercise 
  
Photo 23. Village consultation at Kitaw A 
village 
 
 
Photo 24. Focus group discussion with a 
traditional leader in Makyar B village 
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D. 5. Participatory Scenario Planning Workshop 
 
  
Photo 25. Group photo at the participatory 
scenario planning workshop 
 
 
 
Photo 26. Discussion by local stakeholders 
at the workshop 
  
Photo 27. Introduction by the resource 
person about the participatory scenario 
planning approach 
 
 
 
Photo 28. Presentation by the park manager 
about challenges and opportunities for 
national park management 
  
Photo 29. Group discussion at the 
participatory scenario planning workshop 
 
 
Photo 30. Subjective ranking and feedback 
for each management scenario by 
individual participants 
 
